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Carey v. Musladin
(05-785)
Ruling Below: (Musladin v. Lamarque, 427 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 2005), cert granted 126 S.Ct.
1769, 74 USLW 3579, 74 USLW 3584, 06 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3140, 74 USLW 3371 [2006]).
Musladin was convicted of murder in the California state courts. He requested habeas relief in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, claiming his trial was
prejudiced because family members of the deceased wore buttons depicting the deceased at the
trial. His petition was denied by the District Court, but approved by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. The Ninth Circuit held that the buttons interfered with the right of the defendant to a
fair trial by an impartial jury free from outside influences.
Questions Presented: Whether the Ninth Circuit exceeded its authority by overturning
respondent's state conviction of murder on the ground that the courtroom spectators included
three family members of the victim who wore buttons depicting the deceased.
Mathew MUSLADIN
Petitioner, Appellant,
V.
Anthony LAMARQUE, Warden
Respondent, Appellee
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
Decided October 21, 2005
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:
At a murder trial in which the central
question is whether the defendant acted in
self-defense, are a defendant's constitutional
rights violated when spectators are permitted
to wear buttons depicting the deceased
individual? We conclude that under clearly
established Supreme Court law such a
practice interferes with the right to a fair
trial by an impartial jury free from outside
influences.
Mathew Musladin appeals the district court's
denial of his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. He contends that the buttons worn
by the deceased individual's family members
at his trial created an unreasonable risk of
impermissible factors coming into play, and
that the state court was objectively
unreasonable in denying this claim both on
direct appeal and in the post-conviction
proceedings. In light of clearly-established
federal law set forth by the Supreme Court,
and persuasive authority from this court
concerning the proper application of that
law, we hold that the last-reasoned decision
of the state court constituted an
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unreasonable application of Supreme Court
law. Accordingly, we reverse the district
court's denial of Musladin's petition and
remand for issuance of the writ.
I. Factual Background and Procedural
History
Musladin was charged in a California state
court with first degree murder for the killing
of Tom Studer, the fiance of his estranged
wife Pamela. On May 13, 1994, Musladin
came to the house where Pamela, Studer,
and Pamela's brother Michael Albaugh lived
in order to pick up his son for a scheduled
weekend visit. Pamela testified that she and
Musladin had an argument, and that
Musladin pushed her to the ground.
According to Pamela, when Studer and
Albaugh came out of the house to assist her,
Musladin reached into his car to grab a gun
and fired two shots at Studer, killing him.
Musladin contends, however, that after
Pamela fell to the ground, Studer and
Albaugh appeared, holding a gun and a
machete respectively, and threatened him.
Musladin asserted that, after seeing the
weapons, he shot in the general direction of
Studer out of fear for his own life.
Accordingly, at trial Musladin argued
perfect and imperfect self-defense. There is
no dispute that Musladin fired the shot that
killed Studer, although experts for both sides
agree that the fatal shot was the result of a
ricochet rather than a direct hit. Under
Musladin's theory of defense, there was no
crime and, thus, no victim.
During the 14-day trial, Studer's family sat
in the front row of the gallery. On each of
those 14 days, at least three members of the
family wore buttons on their shirts with the
deceased's photograph on them. According
to declarations submitted by the defendant,
the buttons were several inches in diameter
and "very noticeable." Furthermore, the
family members were seated in the row
directly behind the prosecution and in clear
view of the jury. Before opening statements,
counsel for Musladin requested that the trial
judge instruct the family members to refrain
from wearing the buttons in court, out of
fear that the button's expressive content
would influence the jury and prejudice
Musladin's defense. The trial judge denied
the request. Musladin was convicted of first
degree murder and three other related
offenses.
Musladin exhausted the available state
procedures both on direct review and on
post-conviction relief. The California Court
of Appeal on direct appeal held, citing
Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 570-71,
106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986), that:
"While we consider the wearing of
photographs of victims in a courtroom to be
an 'impermissible factor coming into play,'
the practice of which should be discouraged,
we do not believe the buttons in this case
branded defendant 'with an unmistakable
mark of guilt' in the eyes of the jurors."
Musladin then filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in the District Court for the
Northern District of California. He alleged,
among other things, that the state court
unreasonably applied clearly-established
federal law in determining that his right to a
fair trial was not violated by the family
members' wearing of the buttons depicting
the deceased. The district court denied the
petition and this appeal followed.
II. The AEDPA Standard
Musladin's petition for habeas corpus is
governed by the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).
Therefore, we may not grant habeas relief to
the defendant unless the state court decision
182
was "contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States." 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Because state courts
often issue "postcard" denials that offer no
rationale for their dispositions, we determine
whether the state court unreasonably applied
federal law by looking to the "last reasoned
decision of the state court as the basis of the
state court's judgment." Franklin v. Johnson,
290 F.3d 1223, 1233 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2002).
In this case, we look to the opinion of the
California Court of Appeal on direct appeal.
AEDPA limits the source of clearly-
established federal law to Supreme Court
cases. See28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
Nevertheless, we recognize that precedent
from this court, or any other federal circuit
court, has persuasive value in our effort to
determine "whether a particular state court
decision is an 'unreasonable application' of
Supreme Court law, and what law is 'clearly
established.' " Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200
F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir. 2000); see also
Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1057
(9th Cir. 2004) ("When faced with a novel
situation we may turn to our own precedent,
as well as the decisions of other federal
courts, in order to determine whether the
state decision violates the general principles
enunciated by the Supreme Court and is thus
contrary to clearly established federal
law."); Williams v. Bowersox, 340 F.3d 667,
671 (8th Cir. 2003) ("[T]he objective
reasonableness of a state court's application
of Supreme Court precedent may be
established by showing other circuits having
similarly applied the precedent."); Ouber v.
Guarino, 293 F.3d 19, 26 (1st Cir. 2002)
("[T]o the extent that inferior federal courts
have decided factually similar cases,
reference to those decisions is appropriate in
assessing the reasonableness vel non of the
state court's treatment of the contested
issue." (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)); Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI
Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 890 (3d Cir. 1999)
("[W]e do not believe federal habeas courts
are precluded from considering the decisions
of the inferior federal courts when
evaluating whether the state court's
application of the law was reasonable.") (en
banc).
III. Discussion
"Due process requires that the accused
receive a fair trial by an impartial jury free
from outside influences." Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362, 86 S.Ct. 1507,
16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966). The Supreme Court
has held that when the consequence of a
courtroom practice is that an "unacceptable
risk is presented of impermissible factors
coming into play," there is "inherent
prejudice" to a defendant's constitutional
right to a fair trial and reversal is required.
Flynn, 475 U.S. 570, 106 S.Ct. 1340. In
order to determine whether Musladin is
entitled to federal habeas relief, we must
therefore assess whether the buttons
depicting the deceased individual worn by
spectators at the trial posed a risk of
impermissible factors coming into play that
is similar to those previously found to exist
in other circumstances, such as in
compelling a criminal defendant to wear
prison garb and shackles before the jury, see
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S.Ct.
1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976), and in
permitting spectators at a rape trial to wear
anti-rape buttons, see Norris v. Risley, 918
F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1990). Because we
conclude that no significant difference exists
between the circumstances of this case and
the "unacceptable risks" found to exist in
Williams and Norris, we hold that the state
court unreasonably applied established
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Supreme Court law in denying Musladin
relief.
a. Clearly Established Federal Law
The underlying federal law in this case-that
certain practices attendant to the conduct of
a trial can create such an "unacceptable risk
of impermissible factors coming into play,"
as to be "inherently prejudicial" to a
criminal defendant-was clearly established
by the Supreme Court in Estelle v. Williams,
425 U.S. 501, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d
126 (1976), and Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S.
560, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986).
In Williams, the Court considered whether
compelling a criminal defendant to appear at
his jury trial dressed in prison clothing
violated his right to a fair trial. See Williams,
425 U.S. at 503-06, 96 S.Ct. 1691. The
Court found that the compelled wearing of
prison clothing constitutes a continuous
impermissible reminder to the jury of the
defendant's condition: an accused in custody
who is unable to post bail. Id. at 505, 96
S.Ct. 1691. The Court held that the influence
of prison clothing, and the message it
conveys to the jurors, impairs a defendant's
presumption of innocence. See id. at 503, 96
S.Ct. 1691. Noting these and other concerns,
the Court concluded that because "[t]he
defendant's clothing is so likely to be a
continuing influence throughout the trial an
unacceptable risk is presented of
impermissible factors coming into play." Id.
at 505, 96 S.Ct. 1691.
In Flynn, the court reaffirmed its holding in
Williams regarding the "inherent prejudice"
of courtroom practices that create an
"unacceptable risk of impermissible factors
coming into play," but distinguished the
case before it on the facts. The defendants in
Flynn argued that the presence of four
uniformed state troopers sitting in the front
row directly behind them at trial led the jury
to draw adverse inferences about them.
Flynn, 475 U.S. at 563-64, 106 S.Ct. 1340.
The Court explained that there are certain
"courtroom practices [that it] might find
inherently prejudicial," but that the use of
security officers to the extent involved did
not fall into that category. Id. at 569, 106
S.Ct. 1340. As the Court explained, the
"inferences that a juror might reasonably
draw from the officers' presence" in that
case "need not be that [the defendant] is
particularly dangerous or culpable." Id. In
distinguishing Flynn from Williams, the
Court pointed out that the jury may not even
have noticed that extra guards were being
used in the trial, or most likely, drew no
impermissible inference from their presence.
The court stated, "[guards] are doubtless
taken for granted so long as their numbers or
weaponry do not suggest particular official
concern or alarm." Id. at 569, 106 S.Ct.
1340. The law concerning the "inherently
prejudicial" nature of courtroom practices
which convey an impermissible message,
however, remained unchanged and clear.
This court's decision in Norris v. Risley, 918
F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1990), has persuasive
value in an assessment of the meaning of the
federal law that was clearly-established by
Williams and Flynn and whether the state
court's application of that law in the case
before us is objectively unreasonable. Like
the present case, Norris involved the
application of the Supreme Court's "inherent
prejudice" rule in assessing whether buttons
worn by audience members during a trial
created an "unacceptable risk of
impermissible factor coming into play." See
Norris, 918 F.2d 831-32. In Norris, the
defendant was facing a criminal charge of
rape. During the trial, several women sat in
the spectator's gallery wearing buttons that
read "Women Against Rape." Id. at 829. We
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noted that at any given time in Norris's trial,
approximately three women in the audience
would be wearing the anti-rape buttons. Id.
at 831. Faced with these facts, we applied
Williams and concluded that "[j]ust as the
compelled wearing of prison garb during
trial can create an impermissible influence
on the jury, throughout trial the buttons'
message constituted a continuing reminder
that various spectators believed Norris's
guilt before it was proven, eroding the
presumption of innocence." Id. at 831. As
we explained, because of the button's
obvious communicative purpose, its
impermissible message was far more clear
and direct than that deemed unlawful in
Williams:
Thus, though far more subtle than a direct
accusation, the buttons' message was all the
more dangerous precisely because it was not
a formal accusation. Unlike the state's direct
evidence, which could have been refuted by
any manner of contrary testimony to be
judged ultimately on the basis of each
declarant's credibility, the buttons' informal
accusation was not susceptible to traditional
methods of refutation. Instead, the
accusation stood unchallenged, lending
credibility and weight to the state's case
without being subject to the constitutional
protections to which such evidence is
ordinarily subjected. Id. at 833.
Our reliance on Norris is appropriate for
another reason: the last reasoned state court
opinion identified Norris as setting forth the
operative law as announced by the Supreme
Court, and the state court sought to apply
Norris when reaching its determination.
Indeed, the state court's unreasonable
application of federal law lies in its
misapplication of the Williams test, as it was
explained in Norris, to the facts of this case.
The state court's decision to apply Norris,
and ours to afford it persuasive weight when
determining the federal law as established
by Williams, are particularly significant in
light of the striking factual similarities
between Norris and the present case. See
Richardson v. Bowersox, 188 F.3d 973, 978
(8th Cir. 1999) ("In determining whether a
state court's decision involved an
unreasonable application of clearly
established federal law, it is appropriate to
refer to decisions of the inferior federal
courts in factually similar cases.").
b. Unreasonable Application of the Law
Although the state court identified the
correct federal law to apply in adjudicating
Musladin's claim, citing Williams for the
controlling principle, and properly looking
to our decision in Norris as a persuasive
application of that federal law in a factually
similar case, the state court was objectively
unreasonable both in its ultimate conclusion
and in the rationale it employed in denying
Musladin's appeal. The California Court of
Appeal justified its rejection of Musladin's
claim as follows:
[i]n contrast to the buttons in Norris, the
message to be conveyed by the Studer
family wearing buttons is less than clear.
The simple photograph of Tom Studer was
unlikely to have been taken as a sign of
anything other than the normal grief
occasioned by the loss of a family member.
While we consider the wearing of
photographs of victims in a courtroom to be
an "impermissible factor coming into play,"
the practice of which should be discouraged,
we do not believe the buttons in this case
branded defendant "with an unmistakable
mark of guilt" in the eyes of the jurors.
People v. Musladin, No. H015159 at 21-22
(Cal.Ct.App. Dec. 9, 1997) (unpublished
decision) (citing Flynn, 475 U.S. at 570-71,
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106 S.Ct. 1340).
By disposing of Musladin's claim in the
above manner, the state court unreasonably
applied federal law by imposing an
additional and unduly burdensome
requirement-demanding that the challenged
practice cause the "brand [ing]" of the
defendant with an "unmistakable mark of
guilty"-even though the Williams test for
finding "inherent prejudice" had already
been met. The court specifically found "the
wearing of photographs of victims in a
courtroom to be an 'impermissible factor
coming into play' " (emphasis added).
Under Williams and Flynn, that finding, in
itself establishes "inherent prejudice" and
requires reversal.
Williams and Flynn cannot be distinguished.
In the case before us, the state court found
not only that an "unreasonable risk" existed
that an impermissible factor would come
into play, but that an impermissible factor
actually had come into play. Nevertheless,
after setting forth this finding, the state court
added that, although the practice of wearing
such buttons "should be discouraged,"
Musladin was not entitled to relief because
"the buttons in this case [did not] brand[ ]
defendant 'with an unmistakable mark of
guilt' in the eyes of the jurors." The state
court was unreasonable in imposing this
additional requirement after it had
concluded that the "inherent prejudice"
elements had already been fully established.
The Supreme Court announced in Williams
and Flynn that following a finding of an
unacceptable risk of impermissible factors
coming into play, no further showing is
necessary because the practice is then
deemed "inherently prejudicial." Here, the
state court flouted that rule: it required that
the challenged practice not only constitute
an unacceptable risk of an impermissible
factor coming into play but also that it
"brand" the defendant with an
"unmistakable mark of guilt." This
additional test imposes too high and too
unreasonable a burden on defendants and is
contrary to established Supreme Court law.
See Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1051
n. 5 (9th Cir. 2002).
We note that the "branding" with an
"unmistakable mark of guilt" language
employed in Flynn constituted only a
descriptive comment. See Flynn, 475 U.S. at
571, 106 S.Ct. 1340 (quoting Williams, 425
U.S. at 518, 96 S.Ct. 1691 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)). Both Williams and Flynn are
clear as to the legal standard, and neither
suggested that "branding" was necessary.
Indeed, under the state court's interpretation,
the holding in Williams would not survive
its own test. The Williams Court never
found, or even implied, that the compelled
donning of prison clothing would "brand[
the] defendant 'with an unmistakable mark
of guilt' in the eyes of the jurors." Rather,
the court's concern was directed purely at
the clothes' role as a "constant reminder of
the accused's condition"-a "continuing
influence throughout the trial," principally
because the requirement that defendants
wear prison clothes "operates usually
against only those who cannot post bail prior
to trial." Williams, 425 U.S. at 504-06, 96
S.Ct. 1691. At most, the Williams Court
found that the shackling and prison clothes
were "unmistakable indications of the need
to separate a defendant from the community
at large," not that they would "brand" the
defendant with an "unmistakable mark of
guilt." Flynn, 475 U.S. at 569, 571, 106
S.Ct. 1340. Although a practice that brands a
defendant as guilty would surely be
sufficient to demonstrate "inherent
prejudice" and require reversal, branding is
not a necessary element of establishing such
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prejudice. The state court's imposition of the
additional "branding" requirement was
contrary to clearly established federal law
and constituted an unreasonable application
of that law.
Moreover, the finding by the California
Court of Appeal goes beyond the finding
that was held to require reversal in Norris.
The state court attempted to distinguish
Norris, but Norris simply cannot reasonably
be distinguished. The message conveyed in
the present case is even stronger and more
prejudicial than the one conveyed in Norris.
The state court unreasonably justified its
conclusion by stating that, when compared
to the buttons worn by spectators in Norris,
the "message conveyed by the Studer family
wearing buttons is less than clear." This is
simply not the case. Just as we held that the
message sent by the anti-rape buttons was
substantially more direct and clear than the
message conveyed by the prison clothing in
Williams, see Norris, 918 F.2d at 831, the
message conveyed by the buttons depicting
Studer in the case before us is substantially
more direct and clear than that of the anti-
rape buttons in Norris. In Norris, the buttons
expressed the wearer's position against rape
but did not specify the defendant or the
victim. In this case, the buttons actually
depicted the individual that the defendant
was charged with murdering and represented
him as the innocent party, or the victim.
Here, the direct link between the buttons, the
spectators wearing the buttons, the
defendant, and the crime that the defendant
allegedly committed was clear and
unmistakable. The primary issue at
Musladin's trial was whether it was the
defendant or the deceased individual who
was the aggressor. The buttons essentially
"argue" that Studer was the innocent party
and that the defendant was necessarily
guilty; that the defendant, not Studer, was
the initiator of the attack, and, thus, the
perpetrator of a criminal act.
The California court's belief that buttons
depicting the deceased individual were
"unlikely to have been taken as a sign of
anything other than the normal grief
occasioned by the loss of a family member"
is even more incorrect as a matter of law
than the view that interpreting the "Woman
against Rape" buttons in Norris served no
purpose other than women announcing a
general statement against rape or expressing
solidarity with, or support for, the rape
victim in Norris's case.
We did not excuse the wearing of the
buttons on that ground in Norris, and it was
objectively unreasonable in light of Norris
for the state court to do so here. See Norris,
918 F.2d at 831. In both Norris and the case
before us, the law requires the courts to look
beyond the general sentiment a button
reflects and to determine the specific
message that the button conveys in light of
the particular facts and issues before the
jury. Doing so here, a reasonable jurist
would be compelled to conclude that the
buttons worn by Studer's family members
conveyed the message that the defendant
was guilty, just as the buttons worn by
spectators in Norris did in that case.
IV. Conclusion
In finding the wearing of buttons depicting
the deceased individual to be an
"impermissible factor coming into play," the
state court reached the point at which the
Supreme Court "went no further and
concluded that the practice[at issue wa]s
unconstitutional." Flynn, 475 U.S. at 568,
106 S.Ct. 1340. Instead of granting relief,
however, the state court, disregarding the
fact that the central question was one of self-
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defense, unreasonably stated that the
message conveyed through the wearing of
the buttons in this case was not as clear as
that conveyed by the anti-rape buttons in
Norris. The state court then unreasonably
held that "branding" the defendant with "an
unmistakable mark of guilt" is necessary to
grant relief even though it had already found
that "impermissible factors" had come into
play before the jury. The state court did not
simply engage in an incorrect application of
Supreme Court law. Rather, its application
of that law was contrary to the Court's
established rule of law and was objectively
unreasonable. Accordingly, we reverse the
district court's denial of Musladin's petition
for habeas corpus and remand for issuance
of the writ. Musladin shall be released
unless the state elects to re-try him within 90
days of the issuance of the mandate.
Reversed and Remanded.
THOMPSON, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
A further statement of the facts seems
appropriate. The petitioner, Musladin, and
his wife, Pam, were married but separated at
the time of the crimes of which Musladin
was convicted. Pam was living at her
mother's house with her brother Michael
Albaugh, her fianc6 Tom Studer, and
Garrick Musladin, her then three-year-old
son by Musladin. On the day of the
shooting, Musladin went to the house to pick
up Garrick for a scheduled weekend
visitation.
The prosecutor presented evidence that an
argument ensued between Pam and
Musladin in the driveway, during which
Musladin pushed Pam to the ground and
reached for a gun in his car. Albaugh,
standing in the driveway, yelled, "He's got a
gun." Pam and Studer ran up the driveway.
Musladin fired the gun at Pam and Studer,
hitting Studer in the back of the shoulder.
Pam ran into the house and out the back
door. Studer fell to the ground and attempted
to crawl underneath a truck in the garage.
Musladin entered the garage and fired a
second shot which ricocheted into Studer's
head, killing him.
Musladin presented a different version of
these events. He admitted shooting at Studer
and killing him, but claimed perfect and
imperfect self-defense. He testified that he
believed Albaugh was carrying a machete
and Studer a gun, and that he fired both
shots out of fear for his life. After firing the
shots, he got in his car and drove away.
Musladin was tried and convicted of first-
degree murder of Studer and attempted
murder of Pam.
I disagree with the majority's reliance upon
our decision in Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d
828 (9th Cir. 1990), for the application in
this case of the rule of Estelle v. Williams,
425 U.S. 501, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d
126 (1976). In Williams, the Court
determined it to have been a violation of the
right to a fair trial for the state to have
compelled the defendant to wear prison
clothing during his trial. Id. at 505, 96 S.Ct.
1691. The Court held the prison clothing
impaired the defendant's presumption of
innocence. Id. In the present case, the state
court permitted relatives of the deceased
victim to wear buttons in the courtroom. The
buttons disclosed only the deceased victim's
picture, nothing else, and had nothing to do
with the defendant.
Our Norris case was a case involving three
women who wore buttons in the courtroom
during the defendant's trial for rape, but that
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case is not controlling here. The buttons in
Norris were two and one-half inches in
diameter and bore the words "Women
Against Rape." Norris, 918 F.2d at 830.
"[T]he word 'rape' [was] underlined with a
broad red stroke." Id. We stated: "[T]he
buttons' message, which implied that Norris
raped the complaining witness, constituted a
continuing reminder that various spectators
believed Norris's guilt before it was proven,
eroding the presumption of innocence." Id.
at 831.
Here, the buttons were three to four inches
in diameter and, except for the deceased
victim's picture, there was nothing else on
them. The buttons conveyed no "message."
As the state appellate court stated, "The
simple photograph of Tom Studer was
unlikely to have been taken as a sign of
anything other than the normal grief
occasioned by the loss of a family member."
Further, it is difficult to distinguish this case
from the routine situation of a deceased
victim's family members, without buttons,
sitting as a group in a courtroom during a
trial. Jurors in such a trial surely would
recognize the group for what it is. The
addition of buttons worn by them showing
only the victim's photograph would add little
if anything to any possible risk of
impermissibly prejudicing the jury.
Although the state appellate court in the
present case commented that it
"consider[ed] the wearing of the
photographs of victims in a courtroom to be
an 'impermissible factor coming into play,'
the practice of which should be
discouraged," quoting the "impermissible
factor" language from Williams, 425 U.S. at
505, 96 S.Ct. 1691 (which the Supreme
Court also quoted in Holbrook v. Flynn, 475
U.S. 560, 570, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed.2d
525 (1986)), the state court's "impermissible
factor" comment is most reasonably
understood as reflecting that court's view
that buttons bearing a victim's photograph
should not be worn in a courtroom. The
comment did not change the buttons or
make them something they were not.
Moreover, the state court's additional
comment that the buttons did not "brand[ ]
defendant 'with an unmistakable mark of
guilt' " is most reasonably understood as an
explanation that the buttons were not "so
inherently prejudicial as to pose an
unacceptable threat to [the] right to a fair
trial." Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 572, 106 S.Ct.
1340.
In sum, I do not believe the decision by the
California Court of Appeal was "contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States." See28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
The state court's decision was not "contrary
to" any such federal law, because the state
court did not " 'appl[y] a rule that
contradicts the governing law set forth in
[Supreme Court] cases,' " nor did the state
court " 'confront[ ] a set of facts that are
materially indistinguishable from a decision
of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless
arrive[ ] at a result different from [Supreme
Court] precedent.' " Lockyer v. Andrade,
538 U.S. 63, 73, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155
L.Ed.2d 144 (2003) (quoting Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 120 S.Ct.
1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)).
Nor does the state court's decision abridge
the "unreasonable application" clause of 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). "The 'unreasonable
application' clause requires the state court
decision to be more than incorrect or
erroneous. The state court's application of
clearly established law must be objectively
unreasonable." Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75, 123
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S.Ct. 1166 (internal citations omitted). Here,
even if erroneous (which it was not), the
California Court of Appeal's decision was
not "objectively unreasonable."
The petitioner also asserts a number of other
claims that he argues merit habeas relief. I
would reject those claims as well, and thus
would affirm the district court.
190
(Dissenting opinion from the Ninth Circuit's denial of En Banc Review:)
Musladin v. Lamarque
427 F.3d 647
C.A.9 (Cal.),2005.
KLEINFELD, Circuit Judge:
I respectfully dissent from the order denying
rehearing en banc. We have effectively
erased a statutory provision designed to
restrict the power of the lower federal courts
to overturn fully reviewed state court
criminal convictions. And we have
sharpened a serious circuit split.
Musladin was convicted of murder, and his
conviction was upheld through direct and
collateral review in the California courts.
The California Court of Appeal carefully
and reasonably applied the relevant
precedents of the United States Supreme
Court, but arguably deviated from the
implications of a Ninth Circuit precedent.
In 1996, Congress adopted the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA),
amending the standard that federal courts
must apply to state criminal convictions in
habeas cases. The statute as amended says
that we may grant a habeas petition if and
only if the last reasoned state court decision
"was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States."
Our decision in this case has the practical
effect of erasing the statutory phrase "as
determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States." Our tools for statutory
construction are many, but they do not
include an eraser. Yet here we go, erasing
the "clearly established" phrase and
expanding the "as determined" phrase. The
statute in nine states now says, as a practical
matter, "contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States,
giving 'persuasive weight' to Ninth Circuit
decisions that have applied Supreme Court
decisions." We do not have that legislative
authority.
The facts of this case and of the controlling
precedents show just how clear our mistake
is. Musladin, embroiled in a custody dispute
with his estranged wife, murdered her new
fianc6. At his trial, three members of the
fianc6's family sat in the spectator section of
the courtroom wearing buttons with his
picture on them. The buttons were two-to-
four inch pictures of the victim but had no
words. Musladin argued in his state court
appeal and petition for review that the
buttons denied him due process of law by
eroding his presumption of innocence.
The California Court of Appeal concluded
that the buttons contained no express
message and were unlikely to signify
"anything other than the normal grief
occasioned by the loss of a family member."
The California Court carefully examined
Estelle v. Williams and Holbrook v. Flynn
(the relevant Supreme Court decisions) and
Ninth Circuit cases. Though the Court of
Appeal noted that button wearing should be
"discouraged," it held that the buttons did
not amount to a denial of due process
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because they did not brand Musladin "with
an unmistakable mark of guilt."
The statute is quite clear that our task on
review of Musladin's petition for a writ of
habeas corpus is not to examine the
California Court of Appeal decision as
though we were a higher California court.
Rather, we exercise a much more limited
and deferential review to determine whether
the California Court of Appeal acted
contrary to "clearly established Supreme
Court" precedent or "unreasonabl[y]"
applied it. The only question for us is
whether there is any Supreme Court
authority that holds that silent signals of
affiliation by spectators in a courtroom deny
a defendant due process by eroding his
presumption of innocence. The answer is
that there is no such case. That should be the
end of our inquiry.
The Supreme Court held in Estelle v.
Williams that forcing a defendant to wear
prison clothes at trial is "inherently
prejudicial" and denies due process. It held
in Holbrook v. Flynn that the presence of
several armed uniformed officers in the
spectators' row directly behind the prisoner
is not inherently prejudicial. Neither of these
cases holds that a spectator's symbol of
affiliation or even opinion denies due
process to a defendant.
Dressing the defendant in "prison garb," the
Estelle problem, is not analogous to
spectators wearing buttons. First, prison
garb is an unambiguous statement that the
defendant is already a prisoner. Second, it is
a communication to the jury of the
government's determination-not a non-
governmental spectator's-that the defendant
belongs in jail. The buttons, by contrast, are
ambiguous. They may mean "we really want
this defendant punished because we care a
lot about his victim," or they may merely
mean "we care a lot about the victim,"
without an implication that the defendant is
the proper person to be punished. Even more
important, the spectators' buttons do not
imply any determination by the government.
Even if the buttons did imply that the
spectators wanted the defendant punished,
that would not be as corrosive of the
presumption of innocence as the government
saying "this defendant belongs in jail and he
is already there because of our
determination." Unlike the spectators'
buttons in this case, the prison garb in
Estelle detracted from the presumption of
innocence and from the defendant's dignity
in the courtroom.
The presence of the armed officers in the
spectator section in Flynn more closely
resembles the facts in our case than does the
prison garb in Estelle. Both involve what the
jury might perceive as communications from
the spectators' section. But the Supreme
Court held that the presence of the armed
officers did not deprive the defendant of due
process by corroding the presumption of
innocence. And the armed officers were far
more likely to do so than spectators not
associated with the government because the
officers represented the government and
might have communicated its judgment that
the defendant was dangerous. The Supreme
Court held that the armed officers did not
deny due process because of the "wider
range of inferences that a juror might
reasonably draw from the officers'
presence." The courtroom cannot be totally
free of indications that the state thinks the
defendant is guilty, for "jurors are quite
aware that the defendant appearing before
them did not arrive there by choice or
happenstance." With these two Supreme
Court cases as bookends-showing what
denies due process and what does not-the
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California courts were well within the
bounds of reasonable interpretation in
determining that this case is more like
Flynn. The buttons with a picture of the
dead fianc6 did not say or obviously imply
that the defendant killed him, just that the
spectators wearing them cared about him.
So how did the panel majority manage to
reach a different result in the face of
Supreme Court decisions plainly leaving
room for the California courts' conclusion
and a statute limiting us to Supreme Court
decisions? The panel extended a Ninth
Circuit case, not a Supreme Court case,
Norris v. Risley. But the statute says we
cannot do that, with the express restriction
"as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States." The panel evades that
restriction by holding that we give
"persuasive weight" to Ninth Circuit cases
when determining what is "clearly
established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court." The panel's proposition
means that we will grant writs based on
precedents other than those of the Supreme
Court. Ergo, the statutory restriction on our
power is erased.
We held in Norris-before AEDPA-that the
writ should be granted where several female
spectators wore "Women Against Rape"
buttons in the presence of jurors in
"elevators, in the courtroom, on their way to
and from the courtroom," and while "the
women served refreshments outside the
courtroom on behalf of the state." California
could properly decide the case at bar by
distinguishing Norris, disagreeing with
Norris, or in complete ignorance of Norris.
Under AEDPA's restriction to Supreme
Court decisions, we are obligated to deny
the writ so long as the California decision
was not contrary to or an unreasonable
application of Estelle and Flynn. We cannot
legitimately require the California courts to
follow Ninth Circuit decisions on pain of
our letting their prisoners out onto the street.
At least four of our sister circuits have
expressly repudiated the error our panel has
made. The Sixth Circuit, in Mitzel v. Tate,
held that "[w]e may not look to the decisions
of our circuit, or other courts of appeals,
when 'deciding whether the state decision is
contrary to, or an unreasonable application
of, clearly established federal law.' " The
Tenth Circuit in Welch v. City of Pratt held
AEDPA "restricts the source of clearly
established law to [the Supreme] Court's
jurisprudence" and federal courts are
therefore "no longer permitted to apply our
own jurisprudence." The Seventh Circuit
likewise determined that "[flederal courts
are no longer permitted to apply their own
jurisprudence, but must look exclusively to
Supreme Court case-law."
The Fourth Circuit has also held that habeas
relief may be granted only if "the state court
decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable
application of Supreme Court jurisprudence,
and not circuit court precedent," so "any
independent opinions we offer on the merits
of the constitutional claims will have no
determinative effect in the case before us,
nor any precedential effect for state courts in
future cases. At best, it constitutes a body of
constitutional dicta." The Fourth Circuit
expressly rejects the notion that the lower
federal courts need to provide "guidance" to
the state courts on how to read the Supreme
Court opinions. There is
no reason to presume that state courts are in
need of our guidance in interpreting and
applying the controlling Supreme Court
precedents. Our charge under the statute is
only to determine whether the state court's
adjudication of the claims before it was a
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reasonable one in light of the controlling
Supreme Court law.
Arguably our panel did not create the circuit
split ex nihilo. The panel notes that the
Eighth Circuit in Williams v. Bowersox held
that the "diversity of opinion" among federal
courts on a particular issue suggested that
the state court did not unreasonably apply
Supreme Court precedent. But saying that
the state court decision is not unreasonable
because some federal courts have reached
similar conclusions is not at all the same as
saying that the state court decision is
unreasonable because a circuit court has
reached a contrary conclusion. The First
Circuit in Ouber v. Guarino and the Third
Circuit in Matteo v. Superintendent come
much closer to supporting the panel's
decision, but our panel is unique in how
boldly it has flown in the face of the
statutory restriction to Supreme Court
decisions.
Those of us who have actually tried cases to
juries have frequently observed how
spectators communicate their feelings. This
communication is an unavoidable
consequence of the Constitutional guarantee
of "public trial." Sometimes there is a wall
of brown or blue in the spectators' section,
displaying that state or municipal police care
a great deal about the case. Sometimes the
courtroom is full of Hells Angels colors,
signifying a concern for their brother in the
defendant's chair. The local rape support
center volunteers may crowd into the seats
behind the prosecutor in a rape trial while
the victim sits silently looking at the jurors
through the entire trial. Defense lawyers
round up family members to show support
for the defendant by sitting behind the
defense table.
There is nothing wrong with the jury
knowing that people care about the case and
the parties. Typically, the spectators arrange
themselves like wedding guests choosing the
bride's side or the groom's side, with those
who favor a party sitting behind the lawyer
for that side. In a public trial, the jury can
always see that a lot of people care about
one side or the other, or that no one cares
except the parties and lawyers. Good
lawyers often use this to their advantage,
and good judges exercise prudence to avoid
situations that might intimidate or prejudice
the jury. Perhaps, as the California Court of
Appeal implied, the trial judge in this case
should have told the family members to
remove their buttons. T-shirts with pictures
of the victim would be difficult, but buttons
are easy. There is no legitimate way for
judges to prevent spectators in a public trial
from showing that they care about the case
and support one side or the other, even if
only by where they sit and who they look at
with sympathy or hostility. Public concern
and public sympathy for one side or the
other are part of what it means for a trial to
be "public."
The panel's error is symptomatic of a deeper
problem than its misapplication of Supreme
Court precedent to spectators' photo buttons.
Few things incumbent on powerful
government officials are more fundamental
than their duty to comply with the legal
limitations on their power. Our panel has
arrogated to our court power that we do not
legitimately possess.
State judges take the same oath to uphold
the Constitution that we do and perform the
same work we do, construing Constitutional
provisions and applying them to the facts
before them. We do not sit as a state
appellate court. One problem they
sometimes have is deciding what to do about
lower federal court decisions. Obviously
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they have to follow United States Supreme
Court decisions, and they construe them as
routinely as we do. Obviously they do not
have to follow federal decisions on
questions of state law. Not quite as
obviously, but just as true, state courts
understand that they are free to act contrary
to circuit court holdings on questions of
federal law. Lower courts must follow the
law laid down by higher courts. But we are
not a higher court than the Supreme Court of
California or the California Court of Appeal,
or for that matter, California traffic courts.
We are in a different judicial hierarchy.
Our panel's error creates uncertainty and
inconsistency for the nine state court
systems and nearly 20% of our nation's
population within the Ninth Circuit. Must
they follow our decisions when they think
our decisions are contrary to or unreasonable
applications of Supreme Court precedent?
The statute tells them one thing, we tell
them another, and the briefs they get will tell
them both. Under the plain statutory
language, state courts are free to ignore our
decisions. But under the panel's decision,
they must follow them. We have effectively
turned ourselves into the supreme court of
the nine states in our circuit. I therefore
dissent.
BEA, Circuit Judge:
I join Judge Kleinfeld's dissent from the
denial of rehearing en banc. I write
separately to underscore that it was not an
"unreasonable application of clearly
established federal law" for the California
Court of Appeal to deny habeas relief
notwithstanding its determination that the
wearing of victims' photographs in a
courtroom constitutes an "impermissible
factor coming into play."
The panel opinion suggests that, once the
California Court of Appeal "specifically
found 'the wearing of photographs of
victims in a courtroom to be an
"impermissible factor coming into play," ' "
Musladin's conviction could not stand. The
rationale offered in support of this
conclusion is that, "[u]nder Williams and
Flynn," the finding of an impermissible
factor coming into play "in itself establishes
'inherent prejudice' and requires reversal."
The panel opinion misconstrues Williams
and Flynn. In Williams, the Court
established that putting a defendant on trial
in prison garb is constitutional error of the
variety amenable to harmless-error analysis.
When the Court in Flynn "reaffirmed its
holding in Williams," it did not, of course,
transform "courtroom arrangements
challenged as inherently prejudicial" into
structural errors. Rather, Flynn suggested
that, to obtain a conviction's reversal, a
defendant must show "actual prejudice"
even after successfully demonstrating that
the challenged courtroom arrangement was
"inherently prejudicial." Under Flynn, in
other words, it is possible to have a situation
that is "inherently prejudicial" but not " so
inherently prejudicial as to pose an
unacceptable threat to [a] defendant's right
to a fair trial."
Accordingly, it was a reasonable application
of Supreme Court precedent for the
California Court of Appeal to determine
that, although in its view the wearing of
victims' photographs in a courtroom is
inherently prejudicial, the button-wearing in
this case did not actually deprive Musladin
of his right to a fair trial.
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"Justices to Rule on Photos at Trial; An appeals panel threw out the conviction of a
California man because family members wore buttons displaying the victim's picture in
court"
Los Angeles Times
April 18, 2006
David G. Savage
The Supreme Court agreed Monday to
decide whether a California murderer's right
to a fair trial was denied when members of
the victim's family wore buttons in court
with a photo of the slain man. It is the latest
instance of the high court's reconsidering a
ruling from the liberal-leaning U.S. 9th
Circuit Court of Appeals in a criminal case.
In the murder case, the appeals court, in a 2-
1 decision, last year overturned the
conviction of Mathew Musladin of San Jose
for the 1994 shooting of his ex-wife's fiance,
Tom Studer. Judge Stephen Reinhardt of
Los Angeles said the buttons with the
victim's photo "conveyed the message that
the defendant was guilty" and might have
prejudiced the jury. Judge Marsha S. Berzon
of San Francisco agreed with him.
The trial judge had said he saw no problem
with the family members wearing buttons in
court. They were probably seen by jurors as
a sign of "the normal grief occasioned by the
loss of a family member," another state
judge said. The California courts and a
federal judge upheld Musladin's conviction
before his case reached the 9th Circuit.
After their separation in 1992, Musladin had
threatened to kill his former wife, Pamela,
and the two had repeated confrontations
over who would have custody of their son.
In 1994, Pamela was engaged to marry
Studer. On an afternoon in May of that year,
Musladin came to her house in San Jose to
pick up their son for a visit. In the driveway,
he angrily shoved Pamela to the ground.
When her brother and Studer came to her
aid, Musladin shot Studer, first in the
shoulder and then in the head. He
maintained the shooting was in self-defense.
During the trial, three family members wore
buttons with 2- to 4-inch photos of Studer.
The jury convicted Musladin of first-degree
murder and he was sentenced to 32 years in
prison.
Congress in 1996 made it harder for federal
judges to overturn state criminal
convictions. It said U.S. judges should not
free state inmates unless their convictions
arose from "an unreasonable application of
clearly established federal law," as set by the
Supreme Court.
Nonetheless, the 9th Circuit has continued to
overturn state convictions with regularity.
Seven judges on the 9th Circuit filed a
dissent, saying the full appeals court should
reconsider the decision set by Reinhardt and
Berzon.
California Atty. Gen. Bill Lockyer appealed
to the Supreme Court, urging the justices to
reverse the ruling.
On Monday, the court issued an order
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granting the appeal and saying it would hear
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the case in the fall.
"COURTS; Buttons of victim's family prompt new trial"
The San Francisco Chronicle
April 9, 2005
Bob Egelko
Members of a slain San Jose man's family
who wore buttons showing his photo at a
murder trial may have swayed the jury, a
federal appeals court said Friday in
overturning the defendant's murder
conviction.
Mathew Musladin of Fair Oaks (Sacramento
County) was convicted of first-degree
murder for shooting his estranged wife's
fiance, Tom Studer, 31, outside the couple's
San Jose home in May 1994. Musladin, then
34, claimed self-defense, saying Studer had
come outside with a gun after Musladin
argued with his wife, Pamela, and pushed
her to the ground.
In a 2-1 ruling, the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals granted Musladin a new trial.
The majority of judges said the courtroom
display of buttons by Studer's family had
violated Musladin's right to "a fair trial by
an impartial jury free from outside
influences."
At least three of Studer's relatives sat in a
front row of the courtroom throughout the
trial wearing buttons with large photos of
the victim's face. Musladin's attorney
objected, but the trial judge refused to order
the buttons removed.
The appeals court majority said the case was
comparable to two others in which
convictions were overturned: a 1976
Supreme Court case in which the defendant
was forced to wear prison clothing and
shackles in court, and a 1990 Ninth Circuit
case in which spectators at a rape trial wore
buttons reading "Women Against Rape." In
both cases, the court said, a message of guilt
was conveyed to the jury.
In this case, where the only issue was the
claim of self-defense, "the buttons
essentially 'argue' that Studer was the
innocent party and that the defendant was
necessarily guilty," said Judge Stephen
Reinhardt.
In dissent, Judge David Thompson said the
buttons sent no message, had nothing to do
with Musladin, and were unlikely to have
had any more impact than victims' family
members who typically sit together during a
murder trial.
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"Ninth Circuit Will Not Review Ruling That Wearing of Buttons Depicting Victim in Court
Requires New Trial"
Metropolitan News Enterprise (Los Angeles, Calfornia)
October 24, 2005
Kenneth Ofgang
The Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
yesterday denied en banc rehearing of a
ruling granting a new trial to a convicted
murderer who claimed he was denied a fair
trial because relatives of the victim appeared
in court wearing buttons with the deceased's
picture on them.
The denial brought a strong dissent, signed
by seven judges, arguing that the panel
decision "effectively erased" the statutory
provision limiting the power of federal
courts to overturn state convictions.
The Northern California defendant, Matthew
Musladin, was convicted in the 1994 killing
of Tom Studer, who was engaged to marry
Musladin's estranged wife.
Pamela Musladin testified that she and her
husband, who had come to her home to pick
up their son for a weekend visit, got into an
argument and that Studer and her brother,
with whom she shared the house, came out
to assist her after she was pushed to the
ground. Musladin, she said, grabbed a gun
and fired two shots, killing Studer.
The defendant admitted pushing his wife to
the ground. But he contended that Studer
and the defendant's brother were armed and
that he shot in their direction out of fear for
his own life.
Experts agreed that Studer was killed by a
ricocheting bullet. Musladin claimed both
self-defense and imperfect self-defense.
Members of Studer's family, who sat in the
front row of the gallery at trial, wore buttons
on their shirts with the decedent's picture on
them during each of the 14 days of the trial.
The trial judge overruled defense objections
to the wearing of the buttons.
Convicted of first degree murder, Musladin
lost his state appeals, the Court of Appeal
holding that while the wearing of
photographs depicting a victim "should be
discouraged," it did not brand the defendant
as guilty in the context of the particular case.
Musladin sought habeas corpus relief in
state and federal courts. He took his appeal
to the Ninth Circuit after U.S. Magistrate
Judge James Larson of the Northern District
of California ruled that the state courts had
not acted contrary to clearly established
federal law in upholding the conviction.
Writing for the panel, Judge Stephen
Reinhardt said the magistrate judge erred in
his application of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which
limits federal habeas corpus relief from state
convictions to cases in which the final state
court ruling is contrary to, or an
unreasonable application of, clearly
established law as determined by the U.S.
Supreme Court.
Reinhardt cited a Supreme Court ruling that
a defendant was deprived of due process
when forced to wear prison garb in court.
The judge also noted that the Ninth Circuit
had applied that decision in holding that the
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wearing of buttons by women at a rape trial,
reading "Women Against Rape," may have
impermissibly influenced the jury to convict.
But Judge Andrew Kleinfeld, dissenting
from yesterday's denial of en banc review,
said the panel had, in effect, removed the
"clearly established" language from AEDPA
and improperly relied on Ninth Circuit,
rather than Supreme Court, precedent.
Nothing in Supreme Court precedent,
Kleinfeld argued, establishes a blanket rule
against the wearing of buttons in court. In
this case, he said, the buttons-which bore the
victim's photo, but no words-conveyed only
that the victim's family mourned his loss,
not that they were trying to persuade the jury
to convict.
The judge elaborated:
"There is nothing wrong with the jury
knowing that people care about the case and
the parties. Typically, the spectators arrange
themselves like wedding guests choosing the
bride's side or the groom's side, with those
who favor a party sitting behind the lawyer
for that side. In a public trial, the jury can
always see that a lot of people care about
one side or the other, or that no one cares
except the parties and lawyers. Good
lawyers often use this to their advantage,
and good judges exercise prudence to avoid
situations that might intimidate or prejudice
the jury. Perhaps, as the California Court of
Appeal implied, the trial judge in this case
should have told the family members to
remove their buttons... .There is no
legitimate way for judges to prevent
spectators in a public trial from showing that
they care about the case and support one
side or the other, even if only by where they
sit and who they look at with sympathy or
hostility. Public concern and public
sympathy for one side or the other are part
of what it means for a trial to be public."'
The dissent was joined by Judges Alex
Kozinski, Richard Tallman, Consuelo
Callahan, Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, Jay
Bybee, and Carlos Bea. Bea, in a separate
dissent joined by Kleinfeld, Kozinski, and
O'Scannlain, argued that under Supreme
Court precedent, the trial judge committed,
at most, harmless error by allowing the
buttons to be worn because there was no
showing that the verdict would have been
different.
The case is Musladin v. Lamarque, 03-
16653.
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"San Jose Man Fatally Shot; Lover's Spouse Arrested"
San Jose Mercury News
May 14, 1994
Rodney Foo and Sandra Gonzales
A San Jose man was gunned down at his
Blossom Valley home Friday by his
girlfriend's estranged husband, who was
arrested minutes after the shooting, police
said.
Within 10 minutes after the shooting at 539
Bluefield Drive, an undercover officer
stopped a car that fit the description of the
prime suspect's vehicle on Highway 101 just
south of Blossom Hill Road and arrested
Mathew Guy Musladin.
Inside Musladin's car, police found a
handgun that investigators believe was used
in the killing of Thomas Allen Studer, a 31-
year-old plumber who was living with
Musladin's estranged wife, Pamela, 23.
Musladin, 34, of Fair Oaks, was taken to
police headquarters, questioned, and then
booked on suspicion of murder. Musladin
works in retail sales, police said.
The 1:50 p.m. shooting unfolded when
Musladin went to his former wife's home to
pick up their 3-year-old son. The couple had
been separated for more than a year and she
had been living with Studer for about three
months, police said.
An argument between the couple erupted
outside the home and Studer tried to
intervene. Police say Musladin went to his
vehicle, got a gun and shot Studer in front of
the home's open garage.
Musladin took his son and drove away.
Pamela Musladin ran to a neighbor's home
to call police.
"I heard three shots, barn, barn, barn, and a
scream," said neighbor Marie Godin. "It was
a horrible scream. Then there was complete
silence. I heard a car leave, and I thought an
animal had been hit."
Randy Zuber, who called police, said
Pamela Musladin sought refuge at his house
and told him her ex-husband had shot her
boyfriend, kidnapped their son and was now
trying to kill her.
"She was beating my door down,
hysterical," Zuber said. "She was hoping her
boyfriend wasn't dead."
Officers who arrived at the scene quickly
broadcast the description of Musladin's car,
including the license plate and the direction
he was heading.
Lt. Tom Wheatley, who was in an unmarked
car, heard the description and saw Musladin
traveling east on Capitol Expressway at
Tuers Road.
Wheatley followed Musladin onto
southbound Highway 101 and arrested him
without incident. Inside the car was the gun
that investigators believe was used in the
killing. The child was unharmed.
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Ornaski v. Belmontes
(05-493)
Ruling Below: (Belmontes v. Brown, 414 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2005), cert granted 126 S.Ct.
1909, 74 USLW 3260, 74 USLW 3617, 74 USLW 3612 [2006]).
Belmontes was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in the California state courts. He
requested habeas relief in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California
because the jury was not instructed to consider his mitigating evidence as to whether he would
adapt well to life in prison without parole. His petition was denied by the District Court, but
approved by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Ninth Circuit held in part that the
instruction was insufficient to satisfy the Eight Amendment requirement that the jury consider
and weigh all mitigating evidence presented by the defendant, and that the instructional error was
not harmless. Circuit Judge O'Scannlain concurred in part and dissented in part.
Questions Presented: Does Boyde confirm the constitutional sufficiency of California's
"unadorned factor (k)" instruction where a defendant presents mitigating evidence of his
background and character which relates to, or has a bearing on, his future prospects as a life
prisoner? Also, does the Ninth Circuit's holding, that California's "unadorned factor (k)"
instruction is constitutionally inadequate constitute a "new rule" under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.
288 (1989)?
Fernando BELMONTES, Jr.,
Petitioner, Appellant,
V.
Jill L. BROWN, Warden,
Respondent, Appellee
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
Decided July 15, 2005
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:
I. PREAMBLE
On July 15, 2003, we filed an opinion in this
case holding that there is a reasonable
probability that as a result of instructional
error the jury did not consider
constitutionally mitigating evidence at the
penalty phase. . . . The warden timely
petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari. On March 28, 2005, the Supreme
Court granted the writ, vacated our
judgment, and remanded the case "for
further consideration in light of Brown v.
Payton.
Upon careful consideration, we conclude
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that Payton does not affect our holding in
the present case. Notwithstanding the
similarity of the factual and legal issues,
Payton was a post-AEDPA case and was
decided under the highly deferential
AEDPA standard, while the case before us is
pre-AEDPA and is determined by the
application of the ordinary rules of
constitutional interpretation. . . .
II. INTRODUCTION
In this pre-AEDPA death penalty case,
Petitioner Fernando Belmontes, Jr., appeals
the district court's denial of his petition for
writ of habeas corpus. Because the jury was
not instructed that it must consider
Belmontes' principal mitigation evidence,
which tended to show that he would adapt
well to prison and would likely become a
constructive member of society if
incarcerated for life without possibility of
parole, and because there is a reasonable
probability that the instructional error
affected the jury's decision to impose the
death penalty on Belmontes, we grant the
petition with respect to the penalty phase.
We reject, however, those claims that seek
relief from the judgment of conviction and
the finding of special circumstances.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's
decision in part, reverse in part, and remand
with instructions to issue a writ vacating the
death sentence.
III. FACTUAL
BACKGROUND
AND PROCEDURAL
[The court provided in-depth details of the
evidence of Belmontes' guilt presented at
trial.]
C. The Penalty Phase
At the penalty phase, the prosecution
introduced minimal aggravating evidence...
. . . Ron Cutler, a California Youth
Authority ("CYA") counselor, testified that
he once observed Belmontes swinging a
chair as if he were about to hit another ward,
but Cutler was able to intervene before a
fight ensued. On cross examination, he
admitted that Belmontes was significantly
smaller than the other youth.
Barbara Murillo testified about a domestic
violence incident that occurred when she
asked Belmontes to move out of their shared
apartment and to give her his keys so he
could not come back....
Finally, the prosecution and defense
stipulated that Belmontes entered a plea of
no contest in April 1979 to a charge of being
an accessory after the fact to voluntary
manslaughter. The court refused to allow the
prosecutor to introduce evidence that
Belmontes had actually murdered the victim,
Jerry Howard. Consequently, the jury never
heard any details of the murder or
Belmontes' alleged role in it.
Belmontes' mitigation presentation was also
limited in scope, focusing on two themes:
his family and personal history and his
capacity for rehabilitation and positive
institutional adjustment. It was primarily the
latter theme that defense counsel pressed
upon the jury.
Belmontes' family history was one of
poverty and violence....
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The state agrees that Belmontes' counsel,
John Schick, presented "substantial
evidence" in support of this theme in the
form of a series of witnesses who testified to
Belmontes' behavior and achievements
during his prior CYA incarceration and to
the likelihood that he would make positive
contributions to the welfare of others if his
life was spared. Belmontes himself testified
that he was in the custody of the Youth
Authority from early 1979 until November
1980, four months prior to the crime. While
at the CYA, he was employed on the fire
crew at the Pine Grove Camp for one year,
during which he worked his way up from
last man to number two, a position of
leadership and responsibility. Belmontes
also testified that during his incarceration he
became involved in the M-2 Christian
sponsorship program. He admitted that he
initially entered the M-2 program as a way
to get out of camp, but he explained that he
was touched by the decency of his M-2
family, the Haros, and so gradually became
curious about Christianity and embraced it.
The Reverend Dale Barrett, chaplain at the
Youth Authority's Pine Grove Facility,
testified that he knew Belmontes from his
participation in the M-2 Christian
sponsorship program, which matched a local
church-going family with a ward. . . . Barrett
felt that, unlike the many wards who stayed
in the program only to get out of camp and
manipulate favors from the sponsoring
families, Belmontes had not "conned" them.
Don Miller, assistant chaplain at the Youth
Authority's Preston Facility ... believed that
if Belmontes were committed to prison for a
life term, he would be good at counseling
other prisoners not to make the same
mistakes that he had.. . .
Finally, several witnesses offered evidence
with respect to Belmontes' conversion to
Christianity, which occurred during his first
CYA incarceration, and his failure to
maintain his religious commitment upon his
release. . . .
At the conclusion of the evidentiary stage,
the court permitted Belmontes to address the
jury personally during closing arguments.
Belmontes stated that he did not think that
his difficult childhood excused his role in
the McConnell murder. However, he
explained that he could not handle the
pressures of life outside of an institution,
and he asked the jury to give him "an
opportunity to achieve goals and try to better
[him]self." Belmontes' attorney similarly
stressed that Belmontes could not "make it
on the outside." He argued that Belmontes
had had a hard life but still retained his
humanity. He characterized Belmontes as
someone who thrived in a structured
environment-as evidenced by his
accomplishments while in the CYA-and
asked the jury to spare Belmontes' life on
the ground that he would make positive
contributions if allowed to live out his
natural life in prison.
[The judge instructed the jury to consider
Belmontes' age, criminal history, and any
other circumstance which mitigates the
crime, but without specifically instructing
the jury to consider Belmontes' ability to
adjust to life in prison]
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D. Post-Trial
VII. PENALTY PHASE ISSUES
[The court recounted the post-trial
procedural history of the case]
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Belmontes filed his habeas petition
prior to AEDPA's effective date, we apply
pre-AEDPA standards of review. State court
factual findings are presumed correct unless
one of eight enumerated exceptions applies.
The application of law to historical facts is
reviewed de novo.
V. GUILT PHASE ISSUES
[The court considered and rejected the
defendant's claims arising from the guilt
phase of the trial, including deprivation of
due process through failure to disclose the
prosecuter's dismissal of several of Bolanos'
misdemeanor charges, prosecutor's failure
to correct an incorrect statement by Bolanos,
conflict of interest for council, admission of
an involuntary statement, council's failure to
challenge the arrest warrant, cross
examination regarding post-arrest silence,
restriction of cross examination, evidentiary
errors, instructional error, jury which did not
compose a fair cross section of the
community, and jury misconduct.]
VI. SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES ISSUES
[The court considered and rejected the
defendant's claims arising from special
circumstances, including racial
discrimination and arbitrariness in charging]
A. Instructional Error
Belmontes contends that the trial judge's
instructions to the jury prevented it from
considering nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances relating to the likelihood that
he would live a constructive life in prison
and make positive contributions to others if
granted life without the possibility of parole.
Because we conclude that there is a
reasonable probability that as a result of
instructional error the jury did not consider
constitutionally relevant mitigating
evidence, and because we believe that the
error was not harmless, we grant the petition
with respect to the sentencing phase.
1. Factual Background
At Belmontes' trial, the judge gave the jury
the then-standard model jury instructions ...
The judge also gave the jury half of a
supplemental instruction requested by the
defense. The part that was given read:
[T]he mitigating circumstances which I have
read for your consideration are given to you
merely as examples of some of the factors
that you may take into account as reasons
for deciding not to impose a death penalty or
a death sentence upon Mr. Belmontes. You
should pay careful attention to each of these
factors. Any one of them standing alone may
support a decision that death is not the
appropriate punishment in this case.
The other half of the instruction, which the
trial judge refused to give, stated: "[Y]ou
should not limit your consideration of
mitigating circumstances to these specific
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factors. You may also consider any other
circumstances as reasons for not imposing
the death sentence."
After several hours of deliberations, the jury
sent the judge a note asking, "What happens
if we cannot reach a verdict?" and "Can the
majority rule on life imprisonment?" The
jury was brought back to the courtroom, and
the judge reread a portion of the jury
instructions, emphasizing that "all 12 jurors
must agree, if you can." The jurors asked
again what would happen if they could not
agree, but the court refused to tell them.
The judge asked the jury: "Do you think if I
allow you to continue to discuss the matter
and for you to go over the instructions again
with one another, that the possibility of
making a decision is there?" The jurors
agreed that they needed more time to
deliberate. They then asked the following
series of questions:
JUROR HERN: The statement about the
aggravation and mitigation of the
circumstances, now, that was the listing?
THE COURT: That was the listing, yes,
ma'am.
JUROR HERN: Of those certain factors we
were to decide one or the other and then
balance the sheet?
THE COURT: That is right. It is a balancing
process. Mr. Meyer?
JUROR MEYER: A specific question,
would this be an either/or situation, not a
one, if you cannot the other [ sic]?
THE COURT: No. It is not that.
JUROR MEYER: It is an either/or situation?
THE COURT: Exactly. If you can make that
either/ or decision. If you cannot, I will
discharge you.
JUROR HAILSTONE: Could I ask a
question? I don't know if it is permissible. Is
it possible that he could have psychiatric
treatment during this time?
THE COURT: That is something you cannot
consider in making your decision.
2. Discussion
The California death penalty statute has a
unique mechanism for guiding the jury's
discretion. Instead of separate sets of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances,
the statute features an eleven-factor test
which focuses the jury's attention on the
specifics of the crime and the background
and character of the defendant. The first ten
factors instruct the jury to evaluate various
circumstances of the crime and the
defendant's age and prior convictions. The
jury itself decides whether these factors are
aggravating or mitigating. The eleventh
factor-factor (k)-is intended to function as a
catch-all that will enable the jury to consider
any relevant mitigating circumstance that
the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death. The jury is
obligated to weigh and balance the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances
and must impose the death penalty if it
determines that the circumstances in
aggravation outweigh those in mitigation.
In this statutory scheme, the importance of
factor (k) cannot be overstated. The Eighth
Amendment requires that a capital jury
consider all relevant mitigating evidence
offered by the defendant and afford it such
weight as it deems appropriate. This broad
mandate includes the duty to consider
mitigating evidence that relates to a
defendant's probable future behavior,
especially the likelihood that he would not
pose a future danger if spared but
incarcerated. Factor (k) provides the only
mechanism for allowing the jury to consider
a substantial portion of many defendants'
mitigating evidence-indeed, all mitigating
evidence that does not relate to the
circumstances of the crime or the
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defendant's age and criminal record.
To pass constitutional muster, the trial
judge's instructions must convey to the jury
that factor (k) compels it to consider all
relevant mitigating evidence proffered by
the defendant as a basis for a sentence less
than death. "[I]t is not enough simply to
allow the defendant to present mitigating
evidence to the sentencer." Rather, the trial
judge's instructions must convey "that the
sentencer may not be precluded from
considering, and may not refuse to consider,
any constitutionally relevant mitigating
evidence."
At the time of Belmontes' trial, factor (k)
allowed the jury to consider "[a]ny other
circumstance which extenuates the gravity
of the crime even though it is not a legal
excuse for the crime." The Supreme Court
had occasion to review this language in
Boyde v. California. In Boyde, the defendant
had argued that the jury instruction was
unconstitutional because there was a
reasonable likelihood that the jury would
construe the instruction as forbidding it from
considering evidence unrelated to the crime-
e.g., mitigating evidence relating to the
defendant's background and character.
However, the Supreme Court held that
because of the view "long held by society"
that a defendant with a disadvantaged
background or emotional or mental
problems may be "less culpable than
defendants who have no such excuse," the
jury was reasonably likely to have
understood that the defendant's evidence of
"his impoverished and deprived childhood,
his inadequacies as a school student, and his
strength of character in the face of these
obstacles" could have "extenuate[d] the
gravity of the crime even though it [wa]s not
a legal excuse for the crime." The Court
held that, because the trial judge instructed
the jury that it " shall consider all of the
evidence which has been received during
any part of the trial of this case," there was
no reasonable likelihood that the jury
believed that factor (k) prevented it from
considering the background and character
evidence introduced by Boyde and its
bearing on Boyde's commission of the
crime. In other words, the Supreme Court
held that the unadorned factor (k), at least
when accompanied by an appropriate
clarifying instruction, was constitutional as
applied to mitigating evidence relating to the
defendant's psychological make-up and
history, which practically, if not legally,
bore upon his commission of the crime and
was offered for the purpose of reducing his
culpability for the offense.
The same type of evidence, however, can
serve an alternative forward-looking
purpose, mitigating in a manner wholly
unrelated to a petitioner's culpability for the
crime he committed. This alternative
purpose has nothing to do with persuading
the jury that the defendant is less culpable
with respect to the crime because of some
aspect of his family background, personal
history, character, or mental capacity.
Rather, as defined by the Supreme Court in
Skipper v. South Carolina, the jury must
"consider[ ] a defendant's past conduct as
indicative of his probable future behavior"
and "draw[ ] favorable inferences" about a
defendant's "probable future conduct if
sentenced to life in prison." . . .
Belmontes contends that his Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated
because the trial judge's instructions failed
to advise the jury to consider the portion of
his mitigating evidence that tended to show
that he would adapt well to prison and
would become a constructive member of
society if granted a life sentence. We review
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this claim of instructional error under the
approach set forth by the Supreme Court in
Boyde, which directs us to determine
whether there is a reasonable likelihood that
the jury understood the instruction in a
manner that resulted in its failure to consider
constitutionally relevant evidence. Although
Belmontes' briefs emphasize the trial judge's
mid-deliberation colloquy with Juror Hem,
the Court has held that we must examine
claims of instructional error in light of the
record as a whole. Accordingly, in assessing
Belmontes' claim of instructional error, we
consider the entire mid-deliberation
colloquy as well as the original jury
instructions.
We begin with the original instructions. As
stated above, Belmontes' jury was instructed
to consider and take into account "[a]ny
other circumstance which extenuates the
gravity of the crime even though it is not a
legal excuse for the crime." Most naturally
read, this instruction allows the jury to
consider evidence that bears upon the
commission of the crime by the defendant
and excuses or mitigates his culpability for
the offense. We now know that such
evidence includes background and character,
both of which tend to explain why the
defendant committed the crime. By its plain
language, however, the instruction does not
encompass events or considerations that are
unrelated to the defendant's culpability. In
particular, the instruction does not apply to
those forward-looking considerations
encompassed by the Supreme Court's
decision in Skipper: evidence that allows the
jury to evaluate the defendant's probable
future conduct if incarcerated for life
without the possibility of parole-specifically,
evidence that would tend to prove that
Belmontes would likely live a constructive
life if permanently confined within a
structured prison environment. These
important sentencing considerations are
simply not in any respect "circumstance [s]
that extenuate[ ] the gravity of the crime."
Moreover, unlike in Boyde, "society" has
not had a "long held view" that a defendant's
likely future conduct can serve to mitigate or
excuse his commission of a serious crime.
Rather, the doctrine is a legal concept
peculiar to capital punishment cases. Thus,
in the absence of a clear instruction on point,
jurors are not likely to be aware in
determining the appropriate punishment in
such cases that the defendant's potential for
a positive adjustment to life in prison
constitutes a proper mitigating factor.
In the current case, the most important part
of Belmontes' mitigation presentation was
that the jury should spare his life because he
had the potential, if confined within a prison
setting, to contribute positively to prison
life. Although the record made before the
jury included a substantial amount of
evidence about his difficult childhood, in his
own testimony he repeatedly stated that he
did not want to use his rough childhood "as
a crutch" or an excuse. Thus, ultimately the
more significant evidence related to his
conduct during the period of his prior CYA
incarceration and to his ability to conform
his behavior to societal norms should he be
confined within a structured prison
environment. Belmontes' counsel argued to
the jury that the evidence demonstrated that
if granted life without parole, he would
adapt well to prison life, would make a
positive contribution to the welfare of
others, and would not pose a future danger
to the guards or the other inmates.
Unlike the background and character
evidence in Boyde that tended to mitigate
the offense, Belmontes' mitigation evidence
was simply not covered by any natural
reading of the words of the unadorned factor
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(k) instruction. To the contrary, that
instruction, read most naturally, suggested to
the reasonable juror that Belmontes'
evidence tending to show his probable future
good conduct should be excluded from
consideration, and thus that such evidence
was governed by the earlier instruction that
the jury "consider all of the evidence except
as you may be hereafter instructed." At the
least, the unadorned factor (k) instruction is
ambiguous with respect to Skipper's
requirement that the jury be permitted to
consider and give effect to evidence bearing
on a defendant's probable future good
conduct when it decides whether to impose
the death penalty, and thus with respect to
the jury's right to consider Belmontes' most
important mitigating evidence.
The court's supplemental instructions only
exacerbated this problem. Belmontes'
counsel had requested instructions that
would have expressly instructed the jury that
it "should not limit [its] consideration of
mitigating circumstances to these specific
factors," i.e., the factors listed in the original
instruction. However, although the trial
judge gave part of the instruction requested
by defense counsel, he refused to give the
most critical portion. . . . A juror who
followed these instructions would likely
think that he could not consider nonstatutory
mitigating evidence-evidence not going to
culpability-such as testimony tending to
show that Belmontes would lead a
constructive life if confined permanently
within a structured environment. Still, the
supplementary instructions did not end the
matter.
Compounding the problems with the
original and supplemental instructions were
the trial judge's responses to the jurors'
questions during the mid-deliberation
colloquy. .. .
Juror Hern's questions reveal that she did not
understand that her duty as a juror was to
consider all of Belmontes' mitigating
evidence. . . . Juror Hem wanted
confirmation that there was a finite list of
factors for the jury to consider and that the
list consisted of the statutory factors read to
the jury by the judge. This interpretation is
reinforced by Juror Hem's next question:
"Of those certain factors, we were to decide
one or the other [e.g., whether the evidence
is aggravating or mitigating] and then
balance the sheet?" The structure of this
question separates the "certain factors" that
appear in "the listing" from other factors
that may not be reflected there. It makes it
clear that at least one juror believed that the
jury should consider, weigh, and balance
only "those certain factors" that appeared in
"the listing." Of course, such a belief would
have been incorrect; the jury was required to
consider and evaluate Belmontes' mitigating
evidence relating to his potential adjustment
to life in prison regardless of the fact that it
was not listed in the statute.
In any event, Juror Hern's questions
signified that she was not sure how to follow
the judge's instructions. "When a jury makes
explicit its difficulties a trial judge should
clear them away with concrete accuracy." . .
. Instead, however, the judge simply
affirmed Juror Hem's incorrect assumptions
with a terse, "That is right." In so doing, he
not only failed to correct Juror Hern's
erroneous view, but he likely left all the
jurors with the impression that they could
consider mitigation evidence only if it
appeared as one of the "certain factors" in
"the listing." As we have discussed,
Belmontes' principal mitigating evidence
does not fall in this category.
We need not rely on affirmative evidence of
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jury confusion in order to reach this
conclusion, however. "A trial judge's duty is
to give instructions sufficient to explain the
law, an obligation that exists independently
of any question from the jurors or any
indication of perplexity on their part." To
hold otherwise would condition our ability
to redress serious constitutional violations
on such subjective vagaries of fate as
whether the jurors happened to ask a
question instead of embarking boldly down
the wrong path.
The trial judge also instructed the jury that it
could not consider a specific subject relating
to Belmontes' ability to adjust to prison life.
Less than thirty seconds after Juror Hem's
inquiry, Juror Hailstone said: "Could I ask a
question? I don't know if it is permissible. Is
it possible that he could have psychiatric
treatment during this time?" The trial judge
responded: "That is something you cannot
consider in making your decision." He did
not explain why the jury could not consider
this issue, and immediately after issuing this
response, he sent the jury off to resume its
deliberations. The instruction not to consider
possible future psychiatric treatment was
misleading because of the judge's failure to
explain to the jury why it could not consider
the prohibited subject; to the extent that the
jury believed that it could not consider
mitigating evidence relating to how
Belmontes might behave in a controlled
prison environment, the instruction as given
would likely have confirmed its
misconception.
Juror Hailstone's question and the trial
judge's response are troubling because of the
likelihood that the jury understood them in
the context of the larger discussion about
how to consider, weigh, and balance
aggravating and mitigating circumstances...
. The trial judge's response thus likely
reinforced the jury's mistaken notion that
Belmontes' mitigation evidence relating to
his probable future good conduct if confined
in a structured prison environment was
irrelevant to the sentencing decision.
The next question is whether the trial judge's
various instructions relating to limitations on
the evidence that could be considered had an
effect on the jury's deliberations. We may
not reverse the jury's penalty determination
unless the instructions actually created "a
reasonable probability that the jury has
applied the challenged instruction in a way
that prevents the consideration of
constitutionally relevant evidence."
We hold that there is a reasonable
probability that, as a result of the court's
instructions, the jury in Belmontes' case did
not consider his principal mitigating
evidence. . . .
Having concluded that an error of
constitutional magnitude infected the
penalty phase of Belmontes' trial, we turn
finally to the question whether that error was
nonetheless harmless. Belmontes cannot
obtain a new trial unless the instructional
error had "a substantial and injurious effect"
on the jury's verdict. We hold that it did.
Our cases appear to be divided as to whether
the petitioner, the state, or neither bears the
responsibility for showing harmless error
under the Brecht harmless error standard.
In a recent case, we stated that "[t]he
Supreme Court has made clear that whether
a trial error had a substantial and injurious
effect is not to be analyzed in terms of
burdens of proof." In that case, we further
stated that the reviewing court has "the
responsibility to determine this legal
question 'without benefit of such aids as
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presumptions or allocated burdens of proof
that expedite factfimding at the trial.' "
However, O'Neal also stated that "it is the
State that bears the 'risk of doubt.' " Also,
as we said only recently, we look to the
State to instill in us a "fair assurance" that
there was no effect on the verdict....
Here we need not consider the issue of
burdens of proof any further. Regardless of
the applicable rule, we are convinced that
the instructional error in this case, which
prevented the jury from considering and
giving effect to Belmontes' most important
mitigation evidence, had a substantial and
injurious effect on the jury's verdict.. . .
CONCLUSION
. . . [B]ecause the trial judge failed to
instruct the jury that it was required to
consider Belmontes' principal mitigation
evidence, and because we conclude that this
failure had a substantial and injurious effect
upon the verdict, we reverse with respect to
the sentencing phase. We remand to the
district court with instructions to issue an
appropriate writ vacating Belmontes' death
sentence.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part,
and REMANDED for issuance of the writ in
accordance with this opinion.
O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge, concurring
in part and dissenting in part.
The court properly affirms Judge Levi's
determination that there was no
constitutional error in Belmontes's
conviction for first-degree murder with
special circumstances in state court. I am
pleased to concur in its conclusions as to the
guilt phase. Regrettably, as to the penalty
phase, the majority strains mightily-and
unpersuasively-to perceive constitutional
error in the comprehensive and perfectly
proper jury instructions given by the state
trial judge. Because there simply is no such
error, and the Supreme Court has expressly
told us so on two separate occasions, I must
respectfully dissent from the court's reversal
of the district court's denial of the petition
for the writ with respect to the penalty
phase.
Over a decade ago, the Supreme Court in
Boyde v. California, interpreted the same
jury instruction at issue today, "factor (k),"
and concluded that it was constitutionally
sound. The Court held that there was no
"reasonable likelihood that the jury applied
[factor (k)] in a way that prevent[ed] the
consideration of constitutionally relevant
evidence." Factor (k)'s constitutionality was
recently reaffirmed in Brown v. Payton,
where the Court again refused to invalidate a
death sentence imposed pursuant to
instructions that included factor (k). The
Court reached that result even though the
prosecutor had explicitly argued to the
sentencing jury that factor (k) prohibited
them from considering the defendant's
mitigating evidence.
The majority nonetheless manages to
distinguish Boyde and Payton, and reaches
the extraordinary conclusion that there was a
reasonable likelihood that the jury refused to
consider mitigating evidence that both the
prosecution and the defense acknowledged
was properly before it. Because the jurors
were not constitutionally barred from
making a death penalty determination in this
case, I would affirm.
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The majority's holding is based on the false
premise that factor (k) limits the jury's
consideration only to circumstances that
might excuse the crime. But the Supreme
Court has already explicitly rejected this
proposition. In Boyde, the Court held that
factor (k) did not "limit the jury's
consideration to 'any other circumstances of
the crime which extenuates the gravity of
the crime.' [It directed the jury] to consider
any other circumstance that might excuse
the crime, which certainly includes a
defendant's background and character."
Boyde makes it perfectly clear that
testimony relating to a defendant's pre-crime
background and character is within the jury's
purview under factor (k).
Belmontes's penalty phase presentation was
entirely composed of such evidence. The
witnesses who testified on his behalf spoke
to his religious convictions and his behavior
while a ward of the California Youth
Authority ("CYA")-all of which goes to his
background and character before he
murdered Steacy. While the majority
attempts to paint such evidence as showing
that he would be a model inmate if
sentenced to life in prison, the testimony as
actually presented deals exclusively with his
character prior to the crime. In fact, not one
witness who testified during the penalty
phase testified to Belmontes's behavior after
the murder.
Belmontes's religious conversion and ability
to conform to prison are exactly the types of
evidence that the Supreme Court held fit
within the plain language of factor (k).
Accordingly, under Boyde, the jury was able
to consider and to give effect to all of
Belmontes's mitigating evidence. Nothing
more was constitutionally required.
Even so, the Supreme Court has held that
inquiry into future dangerousness of a
defendant "is not independent of an
assessment of personal culpability." In
Johnson, the Court held that an instruction
that asked jurors to consider the future
dangerousness of a defendant provided
ample opportunity for the jury to consider
the defendant's youth as mitigating
evidence. Even though the statutory factor
did not explicitly provide that the jury could
consider the defendant's youth as a
mitigating factor for culpability of the crime,
the Court concluded that there was no
reasonable likelihood that the jury would
have thought it was foreclosed from
considering it.
Likewise, because factor (k) allows the jury
to consider Belmontes's character and
background, there is no reason to think that
the jury would have thought it was
foreclosed from using such information to
consider his future potential if sentenced to
life in prison. As the Supreme Court has
noted, "Consideration of a defendant's past
conduct as indicative of his probable future
behavior is an inevitable and not undesirable
element of criminal sentencing."
Thus, while the majority scours the cold
record decades after the trial to find an
ambiguity in the sentencing instruction, it is
highly doubtful that the jury itself would
have so found. "Jurors do not sit in solitary
isolation booths parsing instructions for
subtle shades of meaning in the same way
that lawyers might." I see no reason why the
jury would have resisted the inevitable
consideration of Belmontes's future potential
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in light of the character evidence presented.
B
The majority also ignores the Supreme
Court's advice that "[d]ifferences in
interpretation of instructions may be
thrashed out in the deliberative process, with
commonsense understanding of the
instructions in light of all that has taken
place at the trial likely to prevail over
technical hairsplitting." That factor (k)
permits the consideration of Belmontes's
character evidence is amplified when the
penalty phase is viewed as a whole,
particularly in light of the arguments made
by counsel.
In Payton, the prosecutor explicitly argued
during the penalty phase that factor (k) did
not permit the jury to consider evidence of
the defendant's post-crime religious
conversion. Notwithstanding the trial judge's
failure to correct this misstatement of law,
the Supreme Court concluded that habeas
relief was not warranted because it was
improbable that the sentencing jury would
have disregarded the two days of mitigating
evidence presented by the defense. In
contrast, during the penalty phase of
Belmontes's trial, both the prosecutor and
the defense attorney urged the jury to
consider the mitigating evidence, and the
trial court likewise instructed the jury to
consider all the evidence unless directed
otherwise. The majority nevertheless
concludes that the jury likely misunderstood
its sentencing task after repeatedly receiving
the same unambiguous directions from the
prosecutor, the defense attorney, and the
court.
The jury heard, without objection, evidence
regarding Belmontes's behavior in prison
before the murder: how he had found God
and how he could serve as an example to
other inmates. In its closing argument, the
prosecution stated, "I suspect you will be
told that the defendant's religious experience
is within that catchall [factor (k)] that relates
to the defendant at the time he committed
the crime, extenuates the gravity of the
crime. I'm not really sure it fits in there. I'm
not sure it really fits in any of them." Even
so, the prosecutor noted, "But I think it
[Belmontes's religious experience] appears
to be a proper subject of consideration."
Later the prosecutor expounded on why the
jury should consider Belmontes's evidence:
I suppose you can say it would be
appropriate [to consider such evidence]
because-in this fashion: The defendant may
be of value to the community later. You
recall the people talking about how he
would have the opportunity to work with
other prisoners in prison. And I think that
value to the community is something that
you have to weigh in. There's something to
that.
"[Factor] K" says any other circumstance
which extenuates or lessens the gravity of
the crime. What does that mean? That to me
means some fact-okay?-some factors at the
time of the offense that somehow operates to
reduce the gravity for what the defendant
did. It doesn't refer to anything after the fact
or later. That's particularly important here
because the only defense evidence you have
heard has been about this new born
Christianity.
What I am getting at, you have not heard
during the past few days any legal evidence
mitigation. What you've heard is just some
jailhouse evidence to win your sympathy,
and that's all. You have not heard any
evidence of mitigation in this trial.
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Belmontes's pleas were similar. Belmontes
asked for life in prison because in prison
"there is an opportunity to achieve goals and
try to better yourself." His counsel
continued the argument, asking the jury to
spare Belmontes's life because he would
make a positive contribution if his life were
spared: "[W]hat I am suggesting to you and
what I hope the evidence suggests to you is
Fernando Belmontes cannot make it on the
outside. I think it is pretty clear from the
development he undertook, the kind of
experiences he had with the Haros as
compared with his being placed out on his
own." He added:
The people who came in here told you about
him. They told you not only what they know
of him, but they gave you, as best they
could, under the very difficult circumstances
of somebody looking at the rest of their life
in prison, a game plan, something he can do
with his life, something he's been able to do.
We're just suggesting the tip of the iceberg
because who knows in 20, 30, 40, 50 years
what sorts of things he can do, as he fits into
the system, as he learns to set his goals, to
contribute something in whatever way he
can.
At no time did the prosecutor object to the
defense's characterization, nor did the trial
judge indicate that the parties' statements of
law were not correct or that the jury could
not consider any of the evidence.
Nevertheless, the majority concludes that the
jury thought that the witnesses wasted their
time by testifying, and that the prosecutor,
Belmontes, and Belmontes's lawyer were
not smart enough to realize they were all
mistaken. In its world, the majority
envisions a jury playing a game of "gotcha"
with the lawyers, whereby the jury ignores
everyone and applies its own instructions.
Such a conclusion is pure fantasy and cannot
justify overturning the jury's choice here.
II
Even assuming, arguendo, that there was a
reasonable likelihood that the jury could
have interpreted factor (k) to prohibit
consideration of Belmontes's character
witnesses, the instructions were still
constitutionally sufficient. To arrive at its
result, the majority downplays the trial
court's initial instruction, in which the jury
was told, "In determining which penalty is
to be imposed on the defendant you shall
consider all of the evidence which has been
received during any part of the trial of this
case, except as you may be hereafter
instructed." Such a jury instruction alone is
constitutionally sufficient to convey to the
jury its duty to consider all mitigating
evidence.
The trial court's duty is simply to convey to
the jury that all mitigating evidence must be
considered and may be given effect when it
deliberates on a defendant's capital sentence.
The absence of any specific instruction to
the jury to consider the defendant's ability to
adjust to an institutional setting is utterly
irrelevant.
Even if the jury were confused by the
subsequent enumeration of individual
factors-perhaps thinking that its
consideration of mitigating evidence was
limited to such factors-the confusion would
have been short lived. After reading the
enumerated factors, the court instructed,
"[T]he mitigating circumstances which I
have read for your consideration are given to
you merely as examples of some of the
factors that you may take into account as
reasons for deciding not to impose a death
penalty or a death sentence upon Mr.
Belmontes." The majority, however, fixates,
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not on the clear language of such directive,
but on the two sentences that directly
follow: "You should pay careful attention to
each of these factors. Any one of them
standing alone may support a decision that
death is not the appropriate punishment in
this case." According to the majority, these
sentences somehow obfuscate the clarity of
the court's instructions.
We must look at these instructions in their
entirety, however.
The trial court's additional instruction
reinforced the constitutional requirement of
conveying to the jury that it is "not ...
precluded from considering, and may not
refuse to consider, any constitutionally
relevant mitigating evidence." Instead of
confusing the jury, the trial court's
instructions made it clear that all evidence
that was presented must be considered.
Moreover, the instruction 8362 that the
majority concludes was "critical"
substantively adds nothing. Rather than
speculating that the jury was too dim to
understand what it was told by the court, we
must presume that the jury understood the
instructions taken as a whole.
III
According to the majority, however, it is the
series of questions between individual jurors
and the judge that proves the jury's
confusion. After the jury deliberated for
several hours, it sent the judge a note asking,
"What happens if we cannot reach a
verdict?" and "Can the majority rule on life
imprisonment?" The judge refused to tell the
jury what would happen if they could not
agree, but told them that it would discharge
them if they could not reach an agreement.
He then asked, "Do you think if I allow you
to continue to discuss the matter and for you
to go over the instructions again with one
another, that the possibility of making a
decision is there?"
At this time, individual jurors asked the
judge some questions.
JUROR HERN: The statement about the
aggravation and mitigation of the
circumstances, now, that was the listing?
THE COURT: That was the listing, yes,
ma'am.
JUROR HERN: Of those certain factors we
were to decide one or the other and then
balance the sheet?
THE COURT: That is right. It is a balancing
process.
JUROR HAILSTONE: Could I ask a
question? I don't know if it is permissible. Is
it possible that he could have psychiatric
treatment during this time?
THE COURT: That is something you cannot
consider in making your decision.
In the majority's view, Juror Hem's use of
the term "listing," and the judge's failure to
note that the "listing" was not exclusive as
to mitigating circumstances, shows that
individual jurors were confused by the
instruction. I respectfully disagree. The jury
did not submit a formal question to the judge
to indicate that it was confused as to its
duties or the instructions, and no informal
follow-up questions were asked by any
jurors. And while the answers the judge
gave the juror might have been cryptic, they
were not incorrect
Most importantly, just before the judge
answered these informal questions, he asked
the jury "to go over the instructions again."
Under existing Supreme Court authority,
any confusion with regard to its
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responsibilities would have been cleared up
with another such review. And if, after
reviewing the instructions once again, jurors
were still confused about the evidence they
could consider, they likely would have
asked for a formal clarification. While it is
possible that after reviewing the instructions
again, confusion might have arisen, it was
certainly not reasonably likely.
Incredulously, the majority also takes issue
with Juror Hailstone's question regarding
whether Belmontes could receive psychiatric
treatment while in prison. The court
properly instructed the jury that it could not
consider such potentially mitigating
evidence. And for good reason: no such
evidence was ever introduced at any stage of
the trial. Indeed, the jury was prohibited
from such considerations.
There was absolutely nothing wrong with
the trial judge's instruction that the jury
could not consider evidence that was not
presented; indeed, it would have been
unconstitutional for him to have said
otherwise. Yet, the majority ignores such
niceties. If the jury were truly confused by
the judge's answer, surely it would have
asked a follow-up question of some sort.
Nonetheless, without any basis in the record,
the majority concludes that the judge's
perfectly proper statement was likely to
confuse.
IV
The majority concludes that the jurors
listened to all the evidence regarding
Belmontes's character, listened to the
prosecution and the defense tell it to
consider such evidence, and listened to the
trial court tell it that it must consider all the
evidence presented; yet the majority holds
that the jury was confused about whether it
could consider the evidence presented. Such
conclusion, with all due respect, is simply
beyond belief; such holding turns the entire
proceeding "into a virtual charade."
The jury, in reality, returned a death
sentence for Belmontes, not because of a
confusing jury instruction, but because he
murdered nineteen-year-old Steacy
McConnell in cold blood, striking her 15-20
times in the head with an iron dumbbell he
had brought with him to her house in case of
such an encounter; I sincerely doubt the
family and friends of Steacy would share the
majority's callous view that her murder was
not "especially heinous."
By concluding that the trial court's jury
instructions were unconstitutional, the
majority ignores the "strong policy against
retrials years after the first trial where the
claimed error amounts to no more than
speculation." There is nothing in the record
which would lead me to believe that there
was a reasonable probability that the jury
was confused about its sentencing duties;
therefore I would affirm the denial of the
petition for the writ as to the penalty phase. I
must respectfully dissent from the majority's
refusal to do so.
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"THE NATION; Voided Death Sentence to Be Reconsidered"
Los Angeles Times
May 2, 2006
David G. Savage
The Supreme Court agreed Monday to hear
another appeal by California prosecutors
who are challenging a decision by the U.S.
9th Circuit Court of Appeals that voided a
death sentence in a 25-year-old murder case.
In 1981, Fernando Belmontes broke into a
woman's home in the San Joaquin Valley.
He clubbed her, broke her skull and stole her
stereo. He described the crime to two
accomplices, and then sold the stereo.
Belmontes was convicted of first-degree
murder with special circumstances, making
him eligible for a death sentence.
In the trial's penalty phase, prosecutors
described Belmontes' previous crimes,
which included severely beating his
pregnant girlfriend a month before the
murder. The defense argued that his early
life had been troubled, and noted that he had
responded well during a commitment in a
California Youth Authority facility and had
"wholesome relationships" with friends and
family members.
After the testimony, the judge gave the
jurors standard instructions telling them to
consider as mitigating evidence the
defendant's age, criminal history and any
"other circumstance which extenuates the
gravity of the crime even though it is not a
legal excuse for the crime." He did not give
them an instruction the defense had
requested: that "you should not limit your
consideration of mitigating circumstances to
these specific factors. You may also
consider any
reasons for
sentence."
other
not
circumstances ... as
imposing the death
The jury voted in favor of a death sentence
for Belmontes.
The California state courts upheld his
conviction and sentence, as did a federal
judge. When the case reached the 9th
Circuit, Judges Stephen Reinhardt and
Richard A. Paez voted to reverse the death
sentence.
"There is a reasonable probability,"
Reinhardt wrote, that the jurors were "not
likely to be aware ... that the defendant's
potential for a positive adjustment to life in
prison constitutes a proper mitigating
factor." Had they been aware of this, they
may have spared Belmontes, he said.
Judge Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain dissented
from the three-judge panel's ruling. Seven
other judges-short of the needed
majority-called on the full 9th Circuit to
reverse the ruling.
California Atty. Gen. Bill Lockyer appealed
to the Supreme Court, saying "no reasonable
juror" would have thought he or she was
prohibited from voting to spare Belmontes'
life.
Last year, when the state appealed for the
first time, the Supreme Court told the 9th
Circuit to reconsider the case under a recent
ruling that had restored a death sentence in
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an Orange County case. But the 9th Circuit
simply reaffirmed its ruling.
Lockyer appealed again on behalf of San
Quentin State Prison Warden Steven
Ornoski. This time, the Supreme Court said
it would rule in the case of Ornoski vs.
Belmontes.
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"Appeals Court Overturns Death Sentence; U.S. 9th Circuit blocks man's execution for a
second time after being told by Supreme Court to reconsider the first decision it made in
2003."
Los Angeles Times
July 16, 2005
Henry Weinstein
For the second time, a federal appeals court
in San Francisco has overturned the death
sentence of a man who has spent more than
two decades on death row for beating a
woman to death with an iron bar.
In recent years, the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals has toppled more than a dozen
California death sentences, on some
occasions drawing rebukes from the
Supreme Court.
On Friday, the 9th Circuit overturned the
death penalty for Fernando Belmontes, 44.
He was 19 when he and two other young
men went to the home of Steacy McConnell
in Victor, Calif., just east of Lodi, to steal
her stereo in the aftermath of an argument
over drugs, according to trial testimony.
McConnell's parents later found their
daughter lying in a pool of blood.
In mitigation, the defense
evidence that Belmontes had
history of poverty and violence.
presented
a family
The 9th Circuit first blocked Belmontes'
execution in 2003, ruling that the trial judge
had failed to instruct the jury to consider all
mitigating evidence before deciding on
execution.
On March 28, the Supreme Court vacated
the decision and directed the court to
reconsider its ruling in light of a decision a
week earlier. That case concerned Orange
County murderer William Payton, who
raped and stabbed to death a Garden Grove
woman in 1980. Payton had argued that his
trial judge failed to instruct the jury to
consider his behind-bars conversion to
Christianity.
In Payton's case, the high court noted that
Congress in 1996 changed the law to say
that federal judges should defer to state
courts' reasonable judgments in death
penalty cases.
The 9th Circuit, however, ruled Friday that
Belmontes' case was different because he
filed his challenge before the 1996 law was
enacted. Consequently, the state court
rulings were due less deference, the court
said, and it was appropriate to overturn the
death penalty because of the judge's failure
to issue the mitigation instruction.
The ruling was written by Judge Stephen
Reinhardt, an appointee of President Carter
who is one of the court's most consistent
skeptics about the validity of death
sentences. Judge Richard A. Paez, a Clinton
appointee, joined Reinhardt's opinion. Judge
Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, a Reagan
appointee who consistently votes to uphold
death sentences, issued a strong dissent, just
as he did two years ago.
"The majority strains mightily-and
unpersuasively-to perceive constitutional
error in the comprehensive and perfectly
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proper jury instructions given by the state
trial judge," O'Scannlain wrote. "Because
there simply is no such error, and the
Supreme Court has expressly told us so on
two separate occasions, I must respectfully
dissent."
Mill Valley attorney Eric Multhaup, who
has represented Belmontes in appeals for 23
years, called the ruling "really good news."
The California attorney general's office had
no immediate comment. The office almost
always asks the Supreme Court to review a
case when the 9th Circuit overturns a death
sentence.
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"California; U.S. Appeals Court Voids Death Penalty in '81 Killing"
Los Angeles Times
July 16, 2003
Henry Weinstein
A federal appeals court Tuesday overturned
the death sentence of a man who has spent
21 years on death row for beating a woman
to death with an iron bar, ruling that the
judge at his trial violated his constitutional
rights by not fully instructing the jury to
consider all possible mitigating evidence
before passing sentence.
The ruling was the 12th by the U.S. 9th
Circuit Court of Appeals in the last year and
a half that either reversed a death sentence
or upheld the decision of a federal trial judge
who had overturned a death sentence in a
California case. Two of those rulings have
been overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court.
The 9th Circuit has upheld four California
death sentences in the same period.
Tuesday's 2-1 decision was written by Judge
Stephen Reinhardt, a Jimmy Carter
appointee who is one of the court's most
consistent skeptics about the validity of
death sentences. He was jointed by Judge
Richard A. Paez, a Clinton appointee. Judge
Diarmuid O'Scannlain, a Ronald Reagan
appointee who consistently votes to uphold
death sentences, issued a strong dissent.
The 42-year-old defendant, Fernando
Belmontes Jr., was 19 when he and two
other young men went to the home of Steacy
McConnell in Victor, just east of Lodi in
1981, intending to steal her stereo in the
aftermath of an argument over drugs,
according to testimony in his trial.
One of Belmontes' accomplices, who said he
was the lookout at the robbery and made a
plea bargain with prosecutors, testified that
Belmontes entered the home, not expecting
to find McConnell. He emerged shortly
afterward spattered with blood and saying
that he had needed to "take out a witness."
McConnell's parents found their daughter
lying in a pool of blood. An autopsy
determined that her skull had been shattered
by 15 to 20 blows.
After finding Belmontes guilty, jurors heard
extensive testimony about Belmontes'
background before deliberating six hours
and voting in favor of a death sentence.
Belmontes' conviction and his death
sentence were upheld by the California
Supreme Court and a federal district court
judge.
The 9th Circuit upheld the conviction but
toppled the death sentence in a lengthy
opinion.
The key issue for the court involved the
instructions that the judge at Belmontes' trial
gave to jurors about how to weigh the
evidence on whether they should spare his
life.
That evidence included testimony that
Belmontes had a record of violence, which
included slugging his wife when she was
four months pregnant, pleading guilty to
being an accessory after the fact to voluntary
manslaughter and taking a gun from another
man who had offered to sell it to him.
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The jurors also heard that Belmontes, who
dropped out of school in the ninth grade, had
a family history of poverty and violence.
His trial lawyer, who asked the jury to
sentence Belmontes to life in prison without
parole, rather than death, also presented
what the appeals court called substantial
evidence that Belmontes could lead a
constructive life if he was kept behind bars.
During four months in custody at a
California Youth Authority facility the year
before the murder, Belmontes worked his
way up to a position of leadership in the
camp's fire crew. A youth authority chaplain
testified that he should not be executed
because he was a salvageable person with "a
lot of extenuating circumstances in his life."
Several witnesses testified that Belmontes
became a Christian while incarcerated by the
CYA then failed to maintain his religious
commitment after being released.
Belmontes told the jury that he did not think
his difficult childhood excused his role in
McConnell's murder.
He told jurors that he could not withstand
the pressures of life outside prison but asked
them to give him "an opportunity to achieve
goals and try to better" himself.
When the testimony was over, the trial judge
gave the jurors a set of standard instructions
telling them to consider as mitigating
evidence the defendant's age, criminal
history and any "other circumstance which
extenuates the gravity of the crime even
though it is not a legal excuse for the crime."
But the judge declined to give the jury what
the appeals court declared to be the most
important part of another instruction
requested by the defense.
That instruction would have told the jurors
that "you should not limit your consideration
of mitigating circumstances to these specific
factors. You may also consider any other
circumstances ... as reasons for not imposing
the death sentence."
The importance of that catchall instruction,
which is listed in California's death penalty
law, cannot be overstated, Reinhardt wrote.
A reasonable probability exists that the
judge's refusal to give the instruction
affected the jury's decision, Reinhardt held.
"To pass constitutional muster, the trial
judge's instructions must convey to the jury"
that they are free "to consider all relevant
mitigating evidence," he wrote.
In his dissent, O'Scannlain said, "the
majority strains mightily-and
unpersuasively-to perceive constitutional
error in the comprehensive and perfectly
proper jury instructions given by the state
trial judge."
"There is no reason to think that the jury
would have thought it was foreclosed from
using" the testimony that it heard,
O'Scannlain wrote.
Belmontes' history of
behavior, not an
instruction," put him
O'Scannlain concluded.
"violent, antisocial
ambiguous jury
on death row,
The California attorney general's office had
no immediate comment.
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Eric Multhaup, an attorney from Mill Valley
who has represented Belmontes for 21 years
on appeal, said: "I am very happy that he
will get a second chance at a life verdict.
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"High court: Jury acted properly in killer's case:
The convict's new faith was fully considered and a death sentence given anyway, justices
ruled."
The Philadelphia Inquirer (PA)
March 23, 2005
Hope Yen
WASHINGTON The Supreme Court ruled
yesterday that a jury that sentenced a
convicted killer to death had properly taken
into account his religious conversion, even
though a prosecutor incorrectly argued that
it was irrelevant.
In a 5-3 ruling, justices reversed a lower
court that had ordered a new trial for
William Payton. While a California
prosecutor was wrong to assert that Payton's
conversion was irrelevant, the errors did not
make a difference in sentencing, because
jurors had heard from other witnesses
attesting to Payton's conversion, the justices
ruled in Brown v. Payton.
"Testimony about a religious conversion
spanning one year and nine months may
well have been considered altogether
insignificant in light of the brutality of the
crimes, the prior offenses, and a proclivity
for committing violent acts against women,"
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote for the
majority.
He also noted that justices may overturn a
death sentence only if it was unreasonable
given all the evidence presented.
"In context, it was not unreasonable for the
state court to conclude that the jury believed
Payton's evidence was neither credible nor
sufficient to outweigh the aggravating
factors, not that it was not evidence at all,"
Kennedy wrote.
In a dissent, Justice David H. Souter argued
that Payton deserved a new trial because of
the prosecutor's misstatements.
"The trial judge utterly failed to correct
these repeated misstatements or in any other
way to honor his duty to give the jury an
accurate definition of legitimate mitigation,"
Souter wrote. He was joined by Justices
John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader
Ginsburg.
Payton's is one of the longest-running death-
penalty cases. He was convicted and
sentenced in the 1980 rape and stabbing
death of Pamela Montgomery of Garden
Grove, Calif.
California has more than 600 inmates on
death row, though the state has executed
only 10 people since 1992 because of legal
challenges and concerns about the system's
fairness.
Payton's lawyers have said that about 70
cases involve death-row inmates who
contend that mitigating factors after a
crime-such as a religious conversion-
were not properly considered because of
inadequate jury instructions.
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Whorton v. Bockting
(05-595)
Ruling Below: (Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir., 2005)., cert granted 126 S. Ct.
2017; 74 U.S.L.W. 3639 [2006]).
Marvin Bockting was convicted for sexual abuse of his six-year old stepdaughter with evidence
from an interview the child had with a detective. Bockting claims that the admission of this
evidence without cross-examination violated his Sixth Amendment right "to be confronted with
the witnesses against him." His claim turns on whether or not the strict standard for admitting
such testimony laid down in Crawford v. Washington in a new rule and if it applies retroactively
to this case. The Second and Tenth Circuits have held that Crawford should not not be applied
retroactively. In this panel ruling, all three Circuit Judges wrote separately.
Question Presented: I. Whether, in direct conflict with the published opinions of the Second,
Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth circuits, the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that this court's decision in
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) regarding the admissibility of testimonial hearsay
evidence under the sixth amendment, applies retroactively to cases on collateral review.
II. Whether the Ninth Circuit's ruling that Crawford applies retroactively to cases on collateral
review violates this court's ruling in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
Ill. Whether, in direct conflict with the published decisions of the Fourth and Seventh Circuits,
the Ninth circuit erred in holding that 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d) (1) and (2) adopted the Teague
exceptions for private conduct which is beyond criminal proscription and watershed rules.
Glen WHORTON, Director, Nevada Department of Corrections, Petitioner
V.
Marvin Howard BOCKTING, Respondent
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
Decided February 22, 2005
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:
Although this case has been before the
Nevada Supreme Court twice and before the
United States Supreme Court on one
occasion, resolution now rests on
interpretation of an intervening Supreme
Court case: Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177
(2004). In Crawford, the Court definitively
held that "testimonial statements of
witnesses absent from trial have been
admitted only where the declarant is
unavailable and only where the defendant
has had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine." 124 S. Ct. at 1369. Because the
little girl's testimony, which was not subject
to cross-examination, was central to the
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conviction, its admission can hardly be
classified as harmless error. Crawford
dictates reversal.
The thorny issue is whether Crawford
applies retroactively to this state habeas
appeal. If, as Judge Noonan argues,
Crawford simply reiterates a longstanding
rule and does not announce a new rule, then
retroactivity falls out of our analysis. If, on
the other hand, Crawford is characterized as
a "new rule," then we are faced with
analyzing the retroactivity of Crawford in
the framework of yet another recent
Supreme Court case, Schriro v. Summerlin,
159 L. Ed. 2d 442, 542 U.S. 348, 124 S. Ct.
2519 (2004). New rules apply retroactively
only where they place "certain kinds of
primary, private individual conduct beyond
the power of the criminal law-making
authority to proscribe," or where the new
rule is "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty." Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307,
103 L. Ed. 2d 334, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989).
The latter category is "reserved for
watershed rules of criminal procedure." Id.
at 311.
. . . [A]pplication of the Supreme Court's
guidance in Teague leads to the conclusion
that Crawford announces a "new rule."
Because the Crawford rule is both a
"watershed rule" and one "without which
the likelihood of an accurate conviction is
seriously diminished," Summerlin, 124 S.
Ct. at 2523, the rule is retroactive.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
[The Court recounts the background:
Bockting's step-daughter Autumn's telling
her mother that she was sexually abused by
Bockting, her interview with a detective, and
her inability to testify in the trial, at which
the judge declared her an unavailable
witness.]
II. DISCUSSION
In explaining Teague's application, the
Supreme Court recently explained that there
are three steps to determining whether a rule
of criminal procedure applies on collateral
review:
First, the court must determine when the
defendant's conviction became final.
Second, it must ascertain the legal landscape
as it then existed, and ask whether the
Constitution, as interpreted by precedent
then existing, compels the rule. That is, the
court must decide whether the rule is
actually "new." Finally, if the rule is new,
the court must consider whether it falls
within either of the two exceptions to
nonretroactivity.
Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 159 L. Ed. 2d
494, 124 S. Ct. 2504, 2510 (2004). Because
Bockting's conviction became final in 1993,
we must evaluate whether any subsequent
rule of constitutional law is new against the
benchmark of that year.
A. Crawford ANNOUNCED A NEW
RULE
The question before us is whether the
Confrontation Clause principles stated in
Crawford amount to a new rule. In
Crawford, the Supreme Court considered
whether Washington State's use at trial of a
witness's tape-recorded statement to a police
officer violated the Confrontation Clause.
124 S. Ct. at 1357. Writing for the Court,
Justice Scalia engaged in a lengthy historical
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analysis of the Confrontation Clause, noting
that "the principal evil at which the
Confrontation Clause was directed was the
civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and
particularly its use of ex parte examinations
as evidence against the accused." Id. at 1363
. He went on to emphasize "that the Framers
would not have allowed admission of
testimonial statements of a witness who did
not appear at trial unless he was unavailable
to testify, and the defendant had had a prior
opportunity for cross-examination." Id. at
1365.
Whether the rule in Crawford is new
depends on whether it "was dictated by the
then-existing precedent." Beard, 124 S. Ct.
at 2511. . . . Careful scrutiny of the
Crawford opinion suggests otherwise for at
least two reasons: (1) Crawford deviates
from the test announced in Ohio v. Roberts,
448 U.S. 56, 100 S. Ct. 2531 (1980); and (2)
simply reaching the right "result" does not
mean that the result flowed from a constant
rule.
As the Court observed, "Roberts conditions
the admissibility of all hearsay evidence on
whether it falls under a 'firmly rooted
hearsay exception' or bears particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness." Crawford,
124 S. Ct. at 1369 (quoting Roberts, 448
U.S. at 66). Roberts rests on evidentiary
principles of reliability and trustworthiness
rather than on the constitutional principle of
confrontation.
Finally, the Court in Crawford pinpointed a
situation that was, in fact, "arguably in
tension with the rule requiring a prior
opportunity for cross-examination when the
proffered statement is testimonial." Id. at
1368 n.8. Citing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S.
346, 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992), the Court
described a case remarkably similar to ours,
in which "statements of a child victim to an
investigating police officer [were] admitted
as spontaneous declarations." Id. White
rested on the issue of the unavailability
requirement under the Confrontation Clause;
had Crawford been the rule at the time, the
lack of cross-examination would have been
fatal to the admission of the evidence.
On balance, an analysis of the historical
application of the Confrontation Clause
cases leads to the conclusion that Crawford
announces a new rule that must be put
through the Summerlin strainer.
B. SUMMERLIN CONTROLS
RETROACTIVITY ANALYSIS
THE
Because Crawford announces a new rule,
we must ask whether it falls into one of the
two Teague exceptions to the bar on
retroactivity. The first Teague exception is
for primary conduct that cannot be
criminalized. The second is for bedrock
rules of criminal procedure. Teague, 489
U.S. at 307. It is the second exception that is
at play in this case.
The Crawford rule does not narrow the
scope of a criminal statute by interpreting its
terms, nor is it a constitutional determination
that places particular conduct or persons
covered by the statute beyond the State's
power to punish. . . . Therefore, Crawford
merits retroactive application only if it
implicates "the fundamental fairness and
accuracy of the criminal proceeding," Saffle
v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495, 110 S. Ct. 1257
(1990), and reworks our understanding of
bed-rock criminal procedure, Sawyer v.
Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242, 110 S. Ct. 2822
(1990).
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That the Crawford requirement is
fundamental to our legal regime is beyond
dispute. Justice Scalia's eloquent recitation
of the history, purpose, and place of the
Confrontation Clause and cross-examination
answers this question. Crawford, 124 S. Ct.
at 1359. Hundreds of years of tradition have
embedded this notion as a fundamental role.
Indeed, "the Framers would be astounded to
learn that ex parte testimony could be
admitted against a criminal defendant
because it was elicited by 'neutral'
government officers." Id. at 1373.
The question next posed is whether the rule
implicates the accuracy of the criminal
proceeding. ...
.. . [T]he evidence that cross-examination
seriously decreases the possibility of
inaccurate conviction is unequivocal.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly and
without deviation held that the purpose of
the Confrontation Clause is to promote
accuracy. See, e.g., Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at
1370 ("This open examination of witnesses .
. . is much more conducive to the clearing
up of truth.") (quoting 3 Blackstone,
Commentaries * 373)....
But accuracy and reliability do not exist in a
vacuum. Rather, "the central concern of the
Confrontation Clause is to ensure the
reliability of the evidence against a criminal
defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing
in the context of an adversary proceeding
before the trier of fact. "The word 'confront,'
after all, also means a clashing of forces or
ideas, thus carrying with it the notion of
adversariness." Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S.
836, 845, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990)....
Thus, at the heart of the Court's concerns in
Crawford was the reliability of admitted
evidence. Where admitted evidence is
unreliable, the accuracy of convictions is
seriously undermined. That the rule in
Crawford is one without which the accuracy
of convictions would be seriously
undermined is further born out by the
Court's own description of its prior doctrine
as a "rare case" of "fundamental failure." Id.
at 1373. The difference between pre- and
post-Crawford Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence is not the sort of change that
can be dismissed as merely incremental....
In Crawford, the Court itself faults the
previous regime under Roberts. Crawford,
124 S. Ct. at 1371-73. Indeed, to benchmark
reliability against Roberts would undermine
Crawfords central thesis. Reliance on
Roberts' judicially-administered reliability
test gives illusory comfort, as "the
[Confrontation] Clause . . . reflects a
judgment ... about how reliability can best
be determined," id. at 1370, and "the legacy
of Roberts in other courts vindicates the
Framers' wisdom in rejecting a general
reliability exception," id. at 1371.
Rules that are properly considered
retroactive are those that "alter our
understanding of the bedrock procedural
elements essential to the fairness of a
proceeding." Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227,
242, (1990) (internal quotations omitted)...
. Recognizing that bedrock procedural rules
are very few in number, it is no leap to
conclude that the right of cross-examination
as an adjunct to the constitutional right of
confrontation joins the very limited
company of Gideon.
We join one other circuit that has concluded
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that Crawford announces a new rule,
although its retroactivity analysis differs
from ours. See Brown v. Uphoff 381 F.3d
1219 (10th Cir. 2004). The Second Circuit
did not directly address the new rule issue
but concluded that even if Crawford did
announce a new rule, it would not be
retroactive. Mungo v. Duncan, 393 F.3d
327, 336 (2d Cir. 2004).
[The Court described the Tenth Circuit's
reasoning in holding that Crawford was a
new rule but not retroactive.]
The Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence in Crawford cannot be
dismissed as a mere tweak on the
admissibility of hearsay. See Brown, 281
F.3d at 1226. The Supreme Court surely did
not conceive of it as such. Rather, the Court
describes the right of confrontation as a
"bedrock procedural guarantee," notes that it
"dates back to Roman times" and was part of
the common law known to the founding
generation. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1359.
The Court also contrasts "exclusion under
the hearsay rules" with "the civil-law abuses
the Confrontation Clause targeted."
Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364. In a rare mea
culpa, the Court faults itself for not
enunciating the Crawford rule earlier,
stating that "it reveals a fundamental failure
on our part to interpret the Constitution in a
way that secures its intended constraint on
judicial discretion." Id. at 1373. There is
nothing "mere" about the Crawford rule.
The Tenth Circuit mistakenly concluded that
rules of constitutional law subject to
harmless error review can never be
considered bedrock rules of procedure. The
two inquiries hinge on different questions.
Whether a rule is a bedrock rule of
procedure depends on whether it increases
the likelihood of accurate conviction.
Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2523. Whether a
rule is subject to harmless error analysis
depends on whether the impact of the error
can be measured. See Arizona v.
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-08, 111 S.
Ct. 1246 (1991). Therefore, a rule of
constitutional law could be essential to
promote accurate convictions, but still
subject to harmless error review if the
impact of misapplication of the rule were
easily measurable. In short, because
accuracy and measurability are different
concepts, whether a rule of constitutional
law is subject to harmless error review does
not answer the question whether it is a
bedrock rule of procedure.
After assuming that Crawford announced a
new rule, the Second Circuit rejected
retroactivity, reasoning that the Crawford
rule would not improve overall accuracy
because "it is likely to improve accuracy in
some circumstances and diminish it in
others." Mungo, 393 F.3d at 335. The flaw
in this analysis is that the Second Circuit has
substituted its judgment of whether the
Crawford rule is one without which the
accuracy of conviction is seriously
diminished, for the Supreme Court's
considered judgment. The Court has found
repeatedly that the purpose of the
Confrontation Clause is to promote
accuracy, see, e.g., Tennessee v. Street, 471
U.S. 409, 415, 105 S. Ct. 2078 (1985), and
thus Crawford rejected the Roberts
framework as reflective of "a fundamental
failure on our part to interpret the
Constitution in a way that secures its
intended constraint on judicial discretion,"
Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1373. Viewing these
holdings together leads to the conclusion
that the Crawford rule is one without which
the likelihood of accurate conviction is
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seriously diminished.
C. BOCKTING MERITS RELIEF UNDER
AEDPA
Having determined that Crawford is
retroactive, the remaining task is to
determine whether, under AEDPA, the
Nevada Supreme Court's analysis was either
"contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal
law." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(l)-(2). [The
Court explains why the Nevada Court's
analysis misapplied the established federal
law.]
The final question is whether admission of
Autumn's statement is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Neder v. United
States, 527 U.S. 1, 15, 144 L. Ed. 2d 35, 119
S. Ct. 1827 (1999). The detective's
testimony regarding Autumn's interview was
a critical piece of evidence, particularly in
view of Autumn's inconsistent testimony at
the preliminary hearing. Even if her
statement to the mother was, for argument's
sake, considered admissible, the detective's
description of Autumn's interview was so
significant that the error could have
materially affected the verdict. Thus,
admitting Autumn's statement was not
harmless beyond reasonable doubt.
III. CONCLUSION
Because a majority concludes that Crawford
must be applied in this pending habeas case,
Bockting's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus is GRANTED.
NOONAN, Circuit Judge, concurring (In
Part):
. . . Bockting is entitled to a writ of habeas
corpus. The misunderstanding of the law
governing the case is comprehensible in the
light of the history set out in Crawford;
nontestimonial hearsay is not subject to an
absolute bar. "Where testimonial evidence is
at issue, however, the Sixth Amendment
demands what the common law required:
unavailability and a prior opportunity for
cross-examination." Id. at 1374.
No opportunity for cross-examination by
Bockting ever existed. He was, of course,
not present when Autumn spoke to her
mother or when she spoke to Detective
Zinovitch. Totally untested by the method
constitutionally required, the two testimonial
tales, retold by Laura and the detective,
confronted Bockting at his trial. The
Confrontation Clause demanded that he be
confronted with the witness against him.
U.S. Const. amend. VI.
It is a work of supererogation to praise the
wisdom of the Founders and to celebrate the
enforcement of a "bedrock procedural
guarantee." Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1359.
Nonetheless, the circumstances of this case
demonstrate how wise it is to exclude
testimony untested by cross-examination.
It is argued that to apply Crawford is to
apply it retroactively. To the contrary, the
Supreme Court, after reviewing its own
decisions, declared:
Our cases have thus remained faithful to
the Framers' understanding: Testimonial
statements of witnesses absent from trial
have been admitted only where the declarant
is unavailable, and only where the defendant
has had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine.
230
Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1369. Crawford,
therefore, does not announce a new rule.
Retroactivity is not an issue.
Because the action of the Nevada Supreme
Court resulted in a decision that was
contrary to established federal law as
determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), the
writ of habeas corpus should issue to free
Bockting from his unconstitutional
confinement.
WALLACE, Senior
concurring and dissenting:
Circuit Judge,
Both Judges McKeown and Noonan
conclude that the Supreme Court's recent
landmark decision, Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d
177 (2004), governs our consideration of
Bockting's Confrontation Clause claim,
although for different reasons. While Judge
Noonan would hold that retroactivity is "not
an issue" because Crawford did not establish
a "new rule" within the meaning of Teague
v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334,
109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989), Ante at 2015, I
concur with that part of Judge McKeown's
opinion holding that Crawford established a
new rule that does not apply retroactively to
state convictions on habeas review unless it
satisfies one of two narrow exceptions.
However, I do not agree that Crawford fits
within either of those exceptions. Guided by
the principles outlined in Schriro v.
Summerlin, 159 L. Ed. 2d 442, 542 U.S.
348, 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004), I would hold
that Crawfords new procedural rule does
not qualify for retroactive application and
would analyze Bockting's Confrontation
Clause claim under pre-Crawford
jurisprudence. In doing so, I would reject
that claim, as well as Bockting's remaining
claims, under the deferential standards of
review embodied in the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA), and affirm the district court's
denial of Bockting's habeas petition.
A.
Several weeks after this case was argued
before us and submitted for decision, the
Supreme Court issued Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354,
(2004). Parting ways with the constitutional
test formulated in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S.
56, 100 S. Ct. 2531 (1980), Crawford held
that in criminal proceedings, "testimonial
statements of witnesses absent from trial
[are admissible] only where the defendant is
unavailable, and only where the defendant
has had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine." Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1369.
Bockting argues that Crawford does not
raise retroactivity concerns at all because it
does not qualify as a "new rule" under
Teague. Although the Supreme Court took
great pains to harmonize Crawfords result
with previous Sixth Amendment decisions, I
agree with Judge McKeown that Crawfords
ratio decidendi effected a clear and decisive
break from prior precedent. Before
Crawford, controlling precedent permitted
courts to admit hearsay evidence against a
criminal defendant whenever the declarant
was "unavailable" and the evidence had
"adequate 'indicia of reliability,"' i.e., fell
within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception"
or bore "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness." Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
Crawford, however, emphatically rejected
Roberts's approach to testimonial evidence,
arguing that its test demonstrated an
"unpardonable . . . capacity to admit core
testimonial statements that the Confrontation
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Clause plainly meant to exclude." 124 S. Ct.
at 1371. . . . Responding to these concerns,
the Court limited Roberts's reach to cases
"where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue."
Id. at 1374. In cases involving "testimonial
evidence," the Court replaced Roberts with a
new test that has two requirements:
"unavailability and a prior opportunity for
cross-examination." Id. Thus, since
Crawford overruled Roberts's test for the
admission of testimonial evidence, the
decision also represents a "new rule" for
retroactivity purposes.
Crawfords "new" constitutional rule would
only apply retroactively to final convictions
on collateral review if it falls within certain
categories of rules. The Supreme Court
recently clarified the nature and scope of
these categories in Summerlin:
New substantive rules generally apply
retroactively. . . . New rules of procedure,
on the other hand, generally do not apply
retroactively. They do not produce a class of
persons convicted of conduct the law does
not make criminal, but merely raise the
possibility that someone convicted with use
of the invalidated procedure might have
been acquitted otherwise. Because of this
more speculative connection to innocence,
we give retroactive effect to only a small set
of "'watershed rules of criminal procedure'
implicating the fundamental fairness and
accuracy of the criminal proceeding."
124 S. Ct. at 2522-23 (citations omitted),
quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S.
614, 620 (1998).
Measured against Summerlin's standards,
Crawford is best classified as a procedural
rule. Crawfords characterization as a
procedural rule is further supported by the
Crawford decision itself. By labeling the
Confrontation Clause as "a procedural rather
than a substantive guarantee . . . " the Court
endeavored to reinstitute "the
constitutionally prescribed method of
assessing reliability." Crawford, 124 S. Ct.
at 1370. While, the line between "substance"
and "procedure" may not always be crystal-
clear, there can be no serious dispute that
Crawfords restriction on testimonial
evidence is a "procedural" rule.
Bockting contends that Crawford merits
retroactive application here because it is a
"'watershed rule[] of criminal procedure'
implicating the fundamental fairness and
accuracy of the criminal proceeding." Saffle,
494 U.S. at 495, citing Teague, 489 U.S. at
311. This argument-which Judge
McKeown finds persuasive-admittedly has
some intuitive appeal; as Bockting observes,
the Supreme Court has described "the Sixth
Amendment's right of an accused to
confront the witnesses against him" as
"fundamental," Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400, 403, 85 S. Ct. 1065 (1965), and
Crawford purports to effectuate the
Confrontation Clause's original design and
thereby enhance the fairness and accuracy of
defendants' criminal proceedings. Crawford,
124 S. Ct. at 1373. However, the fact that
Crawford is "'fundamental' in some abstract
sense is not enough" to entitle Bockting to
habeas relief. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2523.
Under Teague and its progeny, Crawford
does not constitute a "watershed rule"
suitable for retroactive application unless the
Roberts test "so 'seriously diminishe[s]'
accuracy that there is an 'impermissibly
large risk' of punishing conduct the law does
not reach." Id. at 2525, quoting Teague, 489
U.S. at 312-13.
Although Summerlin does not directly
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control the outcome of this case, the close
similarities between the two cases are
compelling. As in Summerlin, there is no
clear consensus over the comparative
effects Roberts and Crawford might have on
the accuracy of jury verdicts, see Crawford,
124 S. Ct. at 1377-78 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring), much less any evidence that
Roberts "so 'seriously diminishe[s]' accuracy
that there is an 'impermissibly large risk' of
punishing conduct the law does not reach,"
Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2525, quoting
Teague, 489 U.S. at 312-13. Nor am I
prepared to assert that all testimonial
hearsay evidence admitted without the
opportunity for cross-examination
necessarily renders a criminal trial
"impermissibly inaccurate," id. at 2526, or
otherwise "unfair," id. at 2525, quoting
DeStefano, 392 U.S. At 634. . . . There is
simply no solid evidence that Roberts has so
seriously undermined the accuracy of
criminal proceedings as to discredit the host
of final convictions generated pursuant to its
authority.
Yet another flaw in Judge McKeown's
analysis is her focus on language in
Crawford suggesting that the new rule
announced in that case is truer to the
Framers' design. . . . That the Framers made
a particular judgment about the best way to
ensure the reliability of testimony does not
mean that any rule other than the one they
envisioned creates an impermissibly high
risk of inaccurate conviction.
The focus of Justice Scalia's analysis in
Crawford was on Roberts' fidelity to the
Framers' intentions, rather than the accuracy
of convictions obtained under the Roberts
regime. . . . But, even if one assumes that
the Framers were correct as an empirical
matter that cross-examination is the best
way to ensure the reliability of testimony,
that does not mean that any other method
impermissibly threatens punishing the
innocent.
[Wallace summarizes the circuit split on this
issue and sides with the Tenth Circuit's
reasoning in Brown v Uphoff 381 F.3d 1219
against McKeown.]
For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that
Crawford does not qualify as a "watershed
rule[] of criminal procedure" appropriate for
retroactive application to convictions
already final on direct review. Teague, 489
U.S. at 311. Like the Second Circuit in
Mungo, see 393 F.3d at 334-35, and unlike
Judge McKeown, see Ante at 2010-11, I
therefore would not reach the question
whether AEDPA "nullifies" the Teague
exceptions, such that no "new rule"-even
one fitting within one of those exceptions-
may serve as the basis for habeas relief.
Nonetheless, to determine whether I can
concur in the result, I must evaluate
Bockting's Confrontation Clause claim
according to the standards articulated in
Roberts and our own pre-Crawford
decisions.
B.
[Wallace recounts the trial judge's decision
to consider Autumn unavailable as a witness
and determination to admit the hearsay
statements from her mother and a detective.]
Roberts outlines two preconditions for the
introduction of out-of-court statements
against a criminal defendant. First, the
government must establish the declarant's
"unavailability" to testify as a witness at
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trial. Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 973
(9th Cir. 2000), citing Roberts, 448 U.S. at
65-66. Second, the government must
demonstrate that the hearsay statements bear
"adequate indicia of reliability" by showing
that they either fall "within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception" or contain
"particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness." Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66.
In Bockting's state proceedings, the Nevada
Supreme Court determined that the
government satisfied these two
requirements, see Bockting v. State, 109
Nev. 103, 847 P.2d 1364, 1366-70 (Nev.
1993) (per curiam), and Bockting challenges
these determinations on federal habeas
review.
A more difficult question is whether the
Nevada Supreme Court's substantive
unavailability determination was "contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)....
As a general matter, however, the Court held
in Roberts that "a witness is not 'unavailable'
... unless the prosecutorial authorities have
made a good-faith effort to obtain [her]
presence at trial." Roberts, 448 U.S. at 75,
quoting Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-
25, 20 L. Ed. 2d 255, 88 S. Ct. 1318 (1968).
Seizing on Roberts's good faith requirement,
Bockting makes a plausible argument that
child witnesses who refuse to testify in a
courtroom setting should not be considered
"unavailable" unless the government first
makes a good-faith attempt to secure their
testimony through closed circuit television
or some other medium amenable to cross-
examination. I need not consider the merits
of Bockting's proposal, however, because
my task here is not to decide what might be
best; instead, my review is limited to
whether the Nevada Supreme Court's
application of Roberts was unreasonable.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). On its face,
Roberts requires no more than "a good-faith
effort to obtain [a witness's] presence at
trial," Roberts, 448 U.S. at 75 (emphasis
removed), quoting Barber, 390 U.S. at 724-
25, and the government arguably satisfied
this requirement here by (1) securing
Autumn's physical "presence" at trial and (2)
making "a good-faith effort" to elicit her
testimony in that forum.
... I would hold, therefore, that the Nevada
Supreme Court's failure to insist upon
alternative procedures for procuring
Autumn's contemporaneous testimony did
not involve an unreasonable application of
Roberts, Craig, or Coy.
The record does not support Bockting's
claim that the Nevada Supreme Court's
reliance on the trial court's unavailability
finding "was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court
proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) . At
Bockting's preliminary hearing, Autumn
initially responded to the prosecution's
inquiries with incomplete or evasive
answers, then quickly broke into tears and
refused to answer any further questions.
Efforts to elicit her testimony at trial were
even less fruitful, as she refused so much as
to stand or to raise her hand to be sworn in
as a witness. The trial transcript does not
paint a detailed portrait of Autumn's
demeanor on the latter occasion, but there
are strong hints that Autumn was distraught
and uncommunicative from the start, leading
the state trial court to conclude that there
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was no use pursuing further questioning
before the jury. I therefore am not
"convinced that an appellate panel, applying
the normal standards of appellate review,
could not reasonably conclude" that Autumn
was emotionally incapable of testifying at
trial. Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000. To the
contrary, deference to state courts is
particularly appropriate in a case such as
this, where findings of fact turn on a trial
court's eye-witness evaluation of a child
witness's demeanor.
In sum, Bockting has not established that the
Nevada Supreme Court's unavailability
determination was "contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States," 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or "was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding," id. § 2254(d)(2).
Bockting argues that the Nevada Supreme
Court evaluated the trustworthiness of
Autumn's statements based on an
unreasonable application of Supreme Court
precedent, because it mistakenly interpreted
Wright to prohibit consideration of any
evidence that did not support
trustworthiness. . . .
I need not decide, however, if a categorical
refusal to consider evidence challenging the
trustworthiness of Autumn's out-of-court
statements would constitute an objectively
unreasonable application of Wright, for the
record does not support Bockting's assertion
that the Nevada Supreme Court "explicitly
refused to consider evidence" establishing
the unreliability of Autumn's accusations in
this case. . . . Given the Nevada Supreme
Court's assertion that it considered all the
"record evidence" in assessing Bockting's
claims, it would appear that its "totality of
the circumstances" analysis did, in fact,
embrace the Bocktings' marital problems
and other relevant circumstances
surrounding Autumn's out-of-court
statements. I would thus reject Bockting's
contention that the Nevada Supreme Court
unreasonably applied Wright's restrictions
on corroborating evidence.
The ultimate determination "whether
[Autumn's] hearsay statements were
sufficiently reliable to be admitted without
violating [Roberts] is a mixed question" of
law and fact, Swan, 6 F.3d at 1379, so I
review the Nevada Supreme Court's
reliability determination to ascertain whether
it "was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States." 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see also Davis v.
Woodford, 333 F.3d 982, 990 (9th Cir.
2003). [Wallace recounts Bockting's claims
which undermine Autumn's testimony and
questions their validity.]
Although the Nevada Supreme Court did not
expressly discuss Autumn's statements at the
preliminary hearing when evaluating the
consistency of her out-of-court statements, it
did not ignore these statements altogether.
The court clearly recognized the
inconsistencies in Autumn's statements,
because the "Facts" section summarized
Autumn's relevant testimony at the
preliminary hearing. See Bockting, 847 P.2d
at 1365 ("At the preliminary hearing, . . .
[Autumn] stated that her pants were never
removed [during the alleged abuse] and that
she could not remember how Bockting
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touched her."). Thus, this testimony was an
"aspect of the record evidence" that the state
supreme court incorporated into its
evaluation of the "totality of the
circumstances surrounding the child's out-
of-court statements, as defined in Wright."
Id. at 1369-70. As such, I would reject
Bockting's assertion that the state supreme
court "failed to consider and weigh relevant
evidence that was properly presented."
Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1001.
. . . Considering the totality of the
circumstances surrounding Autumn's
hearsay statements, see id. at 820, I am not
persuaded that the Nevada Supreme Court
applied Roberts and Wright unreasonably by
holding that Autumn's testimony at the
preliminary hearing does not singlehandedly
tip the scale of reliability against the
admission of her out-of-court statements.
Since the Nevada Supreme Court's
"unavailability" and "adequate indicia of
reliability" determinations satisfy AEDPA's
stringent standard of review, Bockting's
Confrontation Clause claim fails.
II.
[Wallace discusses several other claims that
Bockting raised in support of his habeas
petition that were not discussed by the other
Judges and explains why they are not
compelling.]
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm
the district court's denial of Bockting's
petition for habeas corpus. I therefore
respectfully dissent.
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"Nevadan's Supreme Court case could nullify countless convictions"
Reno Gazette-Journal
May 30, 2006
Martha Bellisle
The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to hear
a Nevada case that has the potential to force
new trials for countless criminal cases-
from burglaries to murders-in which
hearsay testimony was used.
The high court has agreed to hear the appeal
of Marvin Bockting, a Las Vegas man
convicted of sexually assaulting a child in
1988. His appeal relies on a 2004 high court
decision that blocked the use of taped
testimony or other such statements in a
Washington case.
At issue is whether that Washington case
should apply retroactively. In the Michael
Crawford v. Washington case, the court said
a person has a constitutional right to
question an accuser. If that's not possible,
the statements can't be used in court.
Prosecutors say that if Bockting is
successful in his appeal, the high court's
ruling could have "a devastating effect."
"Since the defendant (Bockting) received a
fair trial under the law as it existed at the
time of his trial, the 2004 ruling should not
apply retroactively," said Chief Deputy
District Attorney Dave Clifton of Washoe
County.
"To reverse those cases that were fair at the
time would be unjust," he said. "It would be
like punishing the state for something it
didn't do wrong."
But defense lawyers say limiting the use of
hearsay was a wise move, and all cases
should benefit from that wisdom.
"The Crawford decision represents one of
the most significant constitutional decisions
of the last decade," said Washoe County
Public Defender Jeremy Bosler. "It corrected
what had been a gradual erosion of the basic
constitutional right that a person must be
allowed to confront his or her accuser.
"The ruling brought a return to basic
constitutional principles regarding the right
to a fair trial."
In the 2004 case, Crawford was accused of
stabbing a man he said was trying to rape his
wife. During the trial, prosecutors played a
tape of his wife, in which she made
statements that contradicted Crawford's
story.
Crawford argued because he could not
cross-examine her about the prerecorded
statement and because spouses can't be
forced to testify against each other, the use
of the statement violated Crawford's Sixth
Amendment right to confront witnesses
against him.
The Supreme Court agreed, and ruled that
such hearsay testimony can't be used.
In the Nevada case that the Supreme Court
will hear, Bockting was convicted in 1988 of
four counts of sexual assault of a minor. At
his trial, prosecutors tried to call the 6-year-
old victim, but she was unable to testify, so
they used statements from the girl's mother
and statements the girl made to police
237
cases would right past wrongs.
Bockting was convicted but has appealed,
arguing that based on the Crawford ruling
he should get a new trial.
Clifton said he disagreed with the old ruling,
and hopes it doesn't have further reach.
"The Crawford decision essentially wiped
out 20 years of litigation and case law
dealing with the admissibility of trustworthy
out-of-court statements made to police and
others," Clifton said. "As prosecutors, we
have been diligently following these laws
over the years by presenting certain
trustworthy statements of children, murder
victims prior to the killing, and other
deceased or otherwise unavailable witnesses
to jurors in order to gain convictions.
"Retroactivity of this ruling could have a
devastating effect," he said. "It would force
a review and possible reversal of every one
of these criminal cases, including a
significant percentage of murder cases, even
though the prosecutor and the court followed
the law as it stood at the time."
But Bosler said applying Crawford to past
"Before Crawford, citizens were left with a
confusing patchwork of state and federal
cases, with decisions analyzing the
admission of hearsay statements using a
logic that could be best described as
torturous," he said. "These decisions
established a body of law where a person
could be convicted of a crime based upon
the admission of an audiotaped statement of
an accuser."
Bosler said he understood Clifton's concerns
that applying Crawford retroactively could
be costly, reduce closure for victims and be
a burden on the courts.
"But the focus should not be on those costs,"
he said. "Instead, we should be asking
ourselves how many people have been
convicted, and may still be incarcerated,
based upon the admission of unchallenged
and unconstitutional hearsay testimony."
The high court is scheduled to hear the case
in the fall. Nevada Attorney General George
Chanos will argue the case for the state,
while Bockting's position will be argued by
the federal public defender's office.
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instead.
"LV Case Could have National Impact"
Las Vegas Sun
August 15, 2005
Cy Ryan
CARSON CITY - In a case that has national
implications, the state attorney general's
office will appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court
a decision overturning the conviction of a
Las Vegas man found guilty of the sexual
assault of a 6-year-old relative.
Senior Deputy Attorney General Victor H.
Schulze said Friday the 9th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals has been asked to hold its
order overturning the conviction of Marvin
Bockting. A petition for the Supreme Court
to review the case is being prepared.
In 2004 the U.S. Supreme Court put more
restrictions on hearsay evidence being
presented at criminal trials, and then a panel
of the 9th Circuit Court, in a 2-1 vote,
decided the Supreme Court decision should
be retroactive.
The Supreme Court ruled that prior
statements of witnesses absent from the
criminal trial are admissible only when the
witness is unavailable and only when the
defendant has had a prior chance to cross-
examine the witness
In the Bockting case, the young victim was
not available at trial and her prior statements
were admitted into evidence.
Judge Clifford Wallace of the appeals court,
who dissented from the original ruling, said
it will spark a great number of appeals from
inmates now in prison.
The 9th Circuit refused Thursday to have the
full court re-hear the case. Wallace objected,
saying the Supreme Court ruling should be
applied only to future cases. He wanted the
full court of 9th Circuit to hear the case.
Wallace said the retroactivity decision "will
open the door for a slew of habeas petitions
from prisoners whose convictions were
based, even partially, on out-of-court
testimonial statements."
Schulze said five other federal circuit
appeals court have ruled the Supreme Court
decision is not retroactive. Because of the
conflict between the appeals courts, Schulze
said he believed the Supreme Court would
accept the case. He suggested that oral
arguments could be as early as January next
year.
Schulze said he has been getting calls from
prosecutors and attorneys general from
Oregon to California asking what Nevada is
going to do in light of the Bockting ruling
and the way it could affect many cases.
If the U.S. Supreme Court upholds the 9th
Circuit Court ruling, it could mean that
numerous past convictions in these types of
cases could be overturned. It would require
numerous retrials and young victims would
be forced to take the stand at trial and be
subject to cross-examination.
Also if the ruling is affirmed by the nation's
highest court, that rule would apply
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nationwide. At present five other five circuit
courts have held that the rule of the Supreme
Court on juvenile witnesses applied from the
date of the ruling, not to past cases.
Attorney General Brian Sandoval said this
was "definitely" a case that must be taken to
the U.S. Supreme Court.
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"Appeals court: Hearsay ruling is retroactive"
Associated Press
February 23, 2005
By David Kravets
SAN FRANCISCO-A federal appeals court
set aside a Nevada man's 1988 child-
molestation conviction yesterday, ruling that
statements the 6-year-old girl made to police
could not be introduced at trial unless the
victim took the stand.
The 2-1 decision by the 9th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals was the first appellate
ruling declaring that a 2004 U.S. Supreme
Court decision limiting courtroom hearsay
statements applied retroactively to past
cases.
Two other circuit courts of appeal, the 2nd
and 10th, have ruled otherwise, and said the
2004 decision generally applied to pending
or new cases.
The split in circuits likely means that the
Supreme Court will decide the issue, and
Nevada state prosecutors are planning to
appeal.
"We're certainly planning to challenge it one
way or the other," said Nevada Deputy
Attorney General Rene Hulse.
The retroactive application of Supreme
Court decisions has generated legal debate.
The justices have recently announced that
federal sentencing guidelines were advisory,
and demanded that juries, not judges, must
decide facts that can increase prison terms.
The San Francisco-based appeals court, the
nation's largest, sets precedent for the nine
Western states of Alaska, Arizona, Idaho,
California, Hawaii, Montana, Nevada,
Oregon and Washington.
Many states allow limited "hearsay
exceptions," whereby somebody testifies
about what someone else said while the
defendant cannot cross-examine the person
who made the original statement.
The case the San Francisco appeals court
decided yesterday concerned Marvin
Bockting, convicted of molesting his 6-year-
old stepdaughter in a Las Vegas motel where
he and his wife lived. The girl told
investigators of the abuse and demonstrated
to authorities the acts with anatomically
correct dolls. A medical doctor concluded
that she was sexually abused.
Her statements to the authorities were
admitted at trial, after she became upset and
testified during a preliminary hearing that
she couldn't remember the abuse or her
statements to authorities.
Bockting's lawyers were unable to cross-
examine the girl, and he was convicted and
sentenced to life in prison, largely because
of hearsay statements.
Bockting's lawyer, Franny Forsman of Las
Vegas, said the decision will affect other
cases in which hearsay testimony from
police officers is the focal point of a
conviction.
"You can't rest your case on a cop's
recitation on what the child responded in an
interview," Forsman said.
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The 9th Circuit said Bockting's inability to
cross-examine the girl on the stand violated
the Sixth Amendment right to confront
witnesses, as spelled out by a Supreme
Court decision last year.
Judge M. Margaret McKeown, writing for
the majority, was sensitive that
"prosecutions for child abuse often rely
heavily" on hearsay testimony of the
victims, but added, "The detective's
description of (the girl's) interview was so
significant that the error could have
materially affected the verdict."
In March, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled the
Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant
may confront his accusers. The justices
sided with a Washington state man
convicted of assaulting an acquaintance he
had accused of trying to rape his wife.
The wife did not testify at her husband's
Washington state trial because of the law
protecting spouses from testifying against
one another. Prosecutors used her taped
statements to rebut the husband's claim that
the stabbing was self-defense.
That the husband's lawyers had no
opportunity to cross-examine his wife "is
sufficient to make out a violation of the
Sixth Amendment," Justice Antonin Scalia
wrote.
242
"Justices Rule Against Statements Made Out of Court"
The Washington Post
March 9, 2004
Charles Lane
The Supreme Court ruled yesterday that
prosecutors may not introduce as evidence
witness statements made out of court even if
a judge has deemed them reliable,
overturning a 24-year-old precedent in favor
of a new standard likely to be more
favorable to criminal defendants.
The court ruled unanimously that the state of
Washington violated Michael Crawfords
constitutional right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses against him at his 1999
trial for attempted murder when it played a
tape recording of his wife Sylvia's police
interrogation, in which she undermined her
husband's claim that he had acted in self-
defense. Sylvia Crawford could not testify in
person, because Michael Crawford had
invoked the spousal privilege to block her
appearance.
The state was able to do this because of a
1980 Supreme Court ruling that permitted
the introduction of a witness statement made
out of court if the trial judge finds specific
reasons why it is trustworthy. In this case,
the state argued that the reliability of Sylvia
Crawford's statement was established
because it overlapped with her husband's
version of events.
But yesterday, in an opinion written by
Justice Antonin Scalia, the court overruled
the 1980 case, Ohio v. Roberts, holding that
the language and history of the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution clearly
require that witness testimony be challenged
on cross-examination.
"Dispensing with confrontation because
testimony is obviously reliable is akin to
dispensing with jury trial because a
defendant is obviously guilty," Scalia wrote.
"This is not what the Sixth Amendment
prescribes."
Statements by absent witnesses should be
admissible in court only when the witness is
unavailable to testify and the defendant has
had a prior opportunity to cross-examine,
Scalia wrote.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, joined
by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, wrote
separately to say that he agreed with the
result in the case, but that the court could
have reached it without overruling Roberts.
The court's decision "casts a mantle of
uncertainty over future criminal trials,"
Rehnquist wrote.
Crawford had been supported in the case by
the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers and the American Civil
Liberties Union, which argued in a friend-
of-the-court brief that Roberts was too vague
and was being inconsistently applied.
"The Supreme Court's decision will
fundamentally alter the way that criminal
defendants are tried across the nation,
"Crawford's lawyer, Jeffrey Fisher, said in a
prepared statement. "No more will
governments be able to convict people of
crimes on the basis of accusations that they
are unable to cross-examine."
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reliable" statements.
In its brief, Washington state had maintained
that overturning the Roberts rule would
undermine the truth-seeking function of
trials. "The Roberts framework represents a
fair balance between a defendant's right to
confrontation and valid considerations of
public policy and should not be abandoned,"
the state argued.
The Bush administration had urged the court
to modify the Roberts rule, but not to bar all
out-of-court testimony. It proposed instead a
rule that would have permitted "inherently
But the court swept that proposal aside, with
a majority made up of the court's two
leading adherents to a "textualist" approach
to reading the Constitution, Scalia and
Justice Clarence Thomas, and its four most
liberal members, Justices John Paul Stevens,
David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Stephen G. Breyer. Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy also joined Scalia's opinion in full.
The case is Crawford v. Washington, No.
02-9410.
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Lopez v. Gonzales
(05-547)
Ruling Below: (Lopez v. Gonzales 417 F.3d 934 (8' Cir. 2005), cert granted 126 S. Ct. 1651, 74
U.S.L.W. 3559 [2006]).
Lopez, a permanent resident on the United States was convicted of aiding and abetting the
possession of a controlled substance, a felony under South Dakota law but not under federal law.
Lopez claims that since his crime was not considered to be a federal felony by the INA at the
time of his pleading, it should not be grounds for his removal as a permanent resident. The
Eighth Circuit Court ruled that it was not relevant that the INA did not consider the crime to be
an aggravated felony at that time because it was settled law for the circuit court that the crime
was a felony. This case had been joined with Toledo-Flores v. United States.
Question Presented: Whether an immigrant who is convicted in state court of a drug crime
that is a felony under the state's law but that would only be a misdemeanor under federal law has
committed an "aggravated felony" for purposes of the immigration laws.
JOSE ANTONIO LOPEZ,
Petitioner,
V.
ALBERTO GONZALES, Attorney General of the United States,
Respondent
United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit
Decided August 9, 2005
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
GRUENDER, Circuit Judge:
Jose Antonio Lopez appeals an order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA")
pretermitting and denying his application for
cancellation of removal. Lopez argues that
his state-law conviction for aiding and
abetting the possession of a controlled
substance is not an aggravated felony for
purposes of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act ("INA"). For the reasons
discussed below, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner Jose Antonio Lopez entered the
United States in 1986 and adjusted his status
to legal permanent residency as a Seasonal
Agricultural Worker in 1990. In September
1997, Lopez was convicted of aiding and
abetting the possession of a controlled
substance (cocaine) in South Dakota. The
conviction was a felony under South Dakota
law.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service
("INS") initiated removal proceedings
against Lopez in 1998. The INS argued that
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his drug conviction established two separate
grounds for removal: it was both a
controlled substance violation under INA §
237(a)(2)(B)(i) and an aggravated felony
conviction based on drug trafficking under
INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii). The INS later
added charges that Lopez fraudulently
obtained his original adjustment of status in
1990. Lopez conceded removability for the
controlled substance violation but filed an
application for cancellation of removal as a
long-time permanent resident pursuant to
INA § 240A(a).
In November 2002, the Immigration Judge
(IJ) found Lopez removable on both the
controlled-substance-violation and
aggravated-felony grounds. The IJ also
pretermitted and denied Lopez's application
for cancellation of removal because INA §
240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), forbids the
Attorney General to cancel removal for an
alien convicted of an aggravated felony. The
BIA affirmed the IJ's order with a short
opinion. Lopez timely appeals the
pretermission and denial of his application
for cancellation of removal, arguing that his
South Dakota conviction was not an
aggravated felony for purposes of the INA.
II. DISCUSSION
We first address our jurisdiction to hear
Lopez's appeal. Lopez's eligibility for
cancellation of removal is governed by INA
§ 240A. The INA states that "no court shall
have jurisdiction to review ... any judgment
regarding the granting of relief under section
... 240A." INA § 242(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(2)(B). However, the REAL ID Act
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231,
has added an additional jurisdictional
provision to INA § 242. The new provision,
INA § 242(a)(2)(D), codifies our jurisdiction
to review constitutional claims or questions
of law raised in petitions for review of
decisions made by the Attorney General
under INA § 240A and other sections. See
Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 410 F.3d 585,
587 (9th Cir. 2005). Furthermore, the
amendment was intended to be retroactive,
applying to direct review of orders issued
before, on or after the date of the enactment.
REAL ID Act § 106(b); Fernandez-Ruiz,
410 F.3d at 587. In this case, Lopez raises a
question of law as to whether his conviction
in South Dakota state court meets the INA
definition of aggravated felony. As
amended, INA § 242 makes clear that we
have jurisdiction to review this claim.
"We review the BIA's legal determinations
de novo, 'according substantial deference to
the [BIA's] interpretation of the statutes and
regulations it administers."' Regalado-
Garcia v. INS, 305 F.3d 784, 787 (8th Cir.
2002) (quoting Tang v. INS, 223 F.3d 713,
718-19 (8th Cir. 2000)). We review the
BIA's interpretation of federal criminal
statutes de novo without according any
deference. Omar v. INS, 298 F.3d 710, 714
(8th Cir. 2002), overruled in part on other
grounds, Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 160
L. Ed. 2d 271, 125 S. Ct. 377, 380 (2004).
The requirements for
cancellation of removal
residents are as follows:
eligibility for
for permanent
The Attorney General may cancel
removal in the case of an alien who is
inadmissible or deportable from the United
States if the alien-
(1) has been an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence for not less than 5
years,
(2) has resided in the United States
continuously for 7 years after having been
admitted in any status, and
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(3) has not been convicted of any
aggravated felony.
INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).
Lopez argues that his South Dakota
conviction for possession of a controlled
substance was not an aggravated felony for
the purposes of the INA because, although it
was a felony under South Dakota law, it
would not have qualified as a felony under
federal law. However, the plain language of
the INA, and of the other statutes it refers to,
states that any drug conviction that would
qualify as a felony under either state or
federal law is an aggravated felony. An
aggravated felony is defined as "illicit
trafficking in a controlled substance, . . .
including a drug trafficking crime (as
defined in section 924(c) of title 18, United
States Code)." INA § 101(a)(43)(B), 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). In turn, a drug
trafficking crime is "any felony punishable
under the Controlled Substances Act (21
U.S.C. § 801 et seq.)." 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(2).
Finally, "the term 'felony' is defined for the
purposes of the Controlled Substances Act
(CSA) as 'any Federal or State offense
classified by applicable Federal or State Law
as a felony."' United States v. Briones-Mata,
116 F.3d 308, 309 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting
21 U.S.C. § 802(13)).
In other words, for INA purposes, a drug
trafficking crime is an offense which would
be punishable under 21 U.S.C. §§ 801 et
seq., and which would qualify as a felony
under either state or federal law. Briones-
Mata, 116 F.3d at 310 ("The definitions of
the terms at issue indicate that Congress
made a deliberate policy decision to include
as an 'aggravated felony' a drug crime that is
a felony under state law but only a
misdemeanor under the CSA."); accord
United States v. Hernandez-Avalos, 251
F.3d 505, 510 (5th Cir. 2001); but see
Cazarez-Gutierrez v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d
905, 910-11 (9th Cir. 2004) (relying on "the
presumption that immigration laws should
be interpreted to be nationally uniform,
evidence that Congress intended uniformity,
and prudential concerns" in agreeing with
the Second and Third Circuits that "state
felony drug offenses are not aggravated
felonies for immigration purposes unless the
offense contains a trafficking element or is
punishable as a felony under the federal
laws enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2)").
Lopez's South Dakota conviction for aiding
and abetting the possession of a controlled
substance was a felony under state law, even
though it only would have qualified as a
misdemeanor under federal law.
Accordingly, following Briones-Mata, we
hold that Lopez's state-law drug conviction
is an aggravated felony for INA purposes.
Lopez contends that the BIA's reliance on
Eighth Circuit precedent in finding that his
conviction constituted an aggravated felony
was an impermissible retroactive application
of a new rule. At the time Lopez was
convicted in South Dakota, it was the BIA's
position that only crimes which would have
qualified as felonies under federal law could
support a finding of an aggravated felony.
See In re L-G, 21 1. & N. Dec. 89 (BIA
1995). Later, in In re Yanez, the BIA
reversed its earlier position, ruling that:
In those circuits that have spoken, the
determination whether a state drug
conviction constitutes a 'drug trafficking
crime' under § 924(c)(2), and therefore an
aggravated felony under section
101(a)(43)(B) of the Act, shall be made by
reference to applicable circuit law, and not
by reference to any legal standard articulated
by this Board.
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23 I. & N. Dec. 390, 397 (BIA 2002). In
finding that Lopez's South Dakota
conviction was an aggravated felony, the IJ
cited the Yanez rule and accordingly applied
our precedent from Briones-Mata. The BIA
expressly affirmed the IJ's reasoning.
Lopez cites INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289,
150 L. Ed. 2d 347, 121 S. Ct. 2271 (2001),
for the proposition that the BIA's
"retroactive" application of the Yanez rule
violated his due process rights. In that case,
St. Cyr pleaded guilty to an aggravated
felony conviction in March 1996. At the
time of his plea, an aggravated felony would
not have prevented St. Cyr from obtaining a
waiver of deportation (analogous to
"cancellation of removal") under INA §
212(c); by the time of his deportation
hearing in April 1997, however, § 212(c)
had been repealed and replaced with §
240A, under which the aggravated felony
barred him from cancellation of removal.
The Supreme Court, citing traditional
presumptions against the retroactive
application of amended statutes, held that
aliens who had pleaded guilty to an
aggravated felony before the replacement of
§ 212(c) with § 240A were still eligible to
seek cancellation of removal.
In contrast to St. Cyr, Lopez pleaded guilty
to an aggravated felony in September 1997,
months after § 212(c) had been repealed and
replaced with § 240A. To avoid the
consequences of his aggravated felony,
Lopez argues detrimental reliance not on a
repealed section of the INA that was in
effect at the time of his plea, but rather on
the BIA's interpretation of a federal criminal
statute at the time of his plea-an
interpretation that had no legal force in the
Eighth Circuit. See Hernandez-Avalos, 251
F.3d at 508 n.3 ("If a circuit court's
interpretation of 'aggravated felony' is
different from the BIA's interpretation, the
INS is bound by the decisions of the circuit
court in removal proceedings arising in that
circuit."); Yanez, 23 I. & N. Dec. 390, 394-
96. Briones-Mata was published several
months before Lopez's guilty plea in South
Dakota and was settled law for removal
proceedings arising in the Eighth Circuit
regardless of the BIA's conflicting policy at
the time of Lopez's plea. See, e.g., Amaral v.
INS, 977 F.2d 33, 36 n.3 (1st Cir. 1992)
(noting that a state-law felony conviction
was an "aggravated felony" for INA
purposes, despite the BIA's failure to rely on
that ground). Therefore, the BIA did not
retroactively apply a rule in concluding that
Lopez's conviction was an aggravated felony
for the purposes of the INA under Eighth
Circuit precedent.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the BIA's order pretermitting and
denying Lopez's application for cancellation
of removal.
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Toledo-Flores v. United States
(04-41378)
Ruling Below: (United States v. Toledo-Flores, 149 Fed. Appx. 241 (5h Cir, 2005), cert granted
126 S. Ct. 1652, 74 U.S.L.W. 3559 [2006]).
Toledo-Flores appealed a two year sentence arguing that the court erred by imposing a longer
sentence due to his prior felony conviction, because that conviction does not qualify as an
aggravated felony under the federal Controlled Substances Act. The court concluded that a state
felony counts for this purpose if it is punishable by more than one year of imprisonment. This
case had been joined with Lopez v. Gonzales (see previous case).
Question Presented: Has the Fifth Circuit erred in holding-in opposition to the Second, Third,
Sixth, and Ninth Circuits-that a state felony conviction for simple possession of a controlled
substance is a "drug trafficking crime" under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2) and hence an "aggravated
felony," under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (43) (B), even though the same crime is a misdemeanor under
federal law?
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee
V.
REYMUNDO TOLEDO-FLORES, Defendant-Appellant
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
Decided August 17, 2005
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
BENAVIDES, CLEMENT, and PRADO,
Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Reymundo Toledo-Flores (Toledo) appeals
the two-year sentence imposed following his
guilty-plea conviction for improper entry by
an alien. Toledo argues that the district court
erred by imposing the eight-level increase in
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(C) (2003) for having
a prior aggravated felony conviction. Toledo
contends that his Texas state conviction for
possession of cocaine is not a qualifying
aggravated felony because it is not a felony
under the federal Controlled Substances Act.
Although Toledo conceded before the
district court that this argument was
foreclosed by United States v. Rivera, 265
F.3d 310 (5th Cir. 2001), and United States
v. Hinojosa-Lopez, 130 F.3d 691 (5th Cir.
1997), on appeal he asserts that these
decisions are not binding because they
conflict with Jerome v. United States, 318
U.S. 101, 87 L. Ed. 640, 63 S. Ct. 483
(1943).
Our precedent is clear that Congress has
made a "deliberate policy decision to
include as an 'aggravated felony' a drug
crime that is a felony under state law but
only a misdemeanor under the [Controlled
Substances Act]." United States v.
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Hernandez-Avalos, 251 F.3d 505, 510 (5th
Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). A prior conviction for a
state drug offense will qualify as an
aggravated felony under U.S.S.G. §
2L1.2(b)(1)(C) if it is punishable under the
Controlled Substances Act and it is
punishable by more than a year of
imprisonment under the applicable state law.
See United States v. Sanchez- Villalobos, 412
F.3d 572, 576 (5th Cir. 2005). Toledo's prior
offense meets this definition. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 844(a) (2003); TEX. HEALTH AND
SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 481.102(3)(D) &
481.115 (Vernon 2001); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 12.35(a) (Vernon 2001).
Accordingly, the judgment of the district
court is AFFIRMED.
250
"High Court to Consider Deportation Cases"
Associated Press
April 4, 2006
The Supreme Court on Monday agreed to
decide whether immigrants can avoid
deportation over some state drug
convictions.
Solicitor General Paul Clement, the Bush
administration's Supreme Court lawyer, said
appeals courts are split over whether
immigrants convicted of state drug felonies
can avoid deportation if the same crimes
were considered misdemeanors under
federal law.
Clement said 77,000 aliens with criminal
records received deportation orders in fiscal
year 2005. Fewer than 7,000 of them had
arrests for drug possession, he said.
In late 2006, Justices will hear appeals
brought by two Mexican citizens with drug
convictions.
Jose Antonio Lopez pleaded guilty to a
felony drug charge in South Dakota. The
owner of a grocery store in Sioux Falls,
Lopez was arrested in 1997 and pleaded
guilty to aiding and abetting the possession
of drugs. He served 15 months of a five-year
prison sentence.
Reymundo Toledo-Flores was convicted in
Texas of possession of cocaine in 2002. In
2004 he pleaded guilty to felony entry into
America and was sentenced to two years in
prison, based in part on the previous drug
conviction.
The cases are Lopez v. Gonzales, 05-547,
and Toledo-Flores v. United States, 05-
7664.
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"Justices Decline Terror Case of a U.S. Citizen"
New York Times
April 4, 2006
Linda Greenhouse
WASHINGTON, April 3
In another development on Monday, the
court agreed to resolve a dispute among the
lower courts with implications for thousands
of deportation and criminal sentencing
cases. The question is whether a drug
offense that is only a misdemeanor under
federal law, but that an individual state's
criminal code treats as a felony, is deemed
an "aggravated felony" for purposes of
immigration law or for adding time to a
federal sentence.
The issue is particularly important in
immigration law because deportable aliens
with "aggravated felonies" on their records
are ineligible for administrative discretion,
making their deportation essentially
automatic, no matter the individual
circumstances. To resolve the issue, the
court accepted two cases, Lopez v. Gonzales,
No. 05-547, and Toledo-Flores v. United
States, No. 05-7664.
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"On The Docket: Lopez, Jose v. Gonzales, Alberto "
Medill News Service
April 3, 2006
Katherine Boyle
Most people are aware that helping someone
gain, sell or distribute cocaine is a crime.
However, for Jose Antonio Lopez and
Reymundo Toledo-Flores whether or not
their crimes constitute aggravated felonies
meant the difference between living in
America and being sent back to Mexico.
Approximately 7,000 immigrants were
deported for drug-related crimes in 2005.
Lopez was deported to Mexico on Jan. 4,
2006, leaving behind two children who are
United States citizens and an uncle.
Lopez, who attained legal permanent
resident status in the United States in 1990,
was arrested in 1997 for aiding and abetting
the possession of cocaine in South Dakota,
which is a felony under the state's law.
Prior to his arrest he owned a grocery and
craft store in South Dakota. He also ran a
taco stand.
In 1998, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service began removal proceedings against
Lopez. The INS based its grounds for
removal on two key parts of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA).
First, the INA states that any alien admitted
to the United States can be removed if
convicted of a controlled substance violation
involving any drug other than marijuana.
The INA also mandates that any alien
convicted of an aggravated felony is
deportable.
Although Lopez admitted the controlled
substance violation was grounds for
removal, he filed an application contesting
the INS' decision to remove him. He argued
that the INA allows the Attorney General to
cancel the removal of an alien who is
deportable if the immigrant has been fully
admitted for permanent residence for five or
more years or has lived in the United States
for seven years.
However, the INA also states that, in order
to avoid removal, the deportable alien must
have no aggravated felony convictions.
In November 2003, an immigration judge
and the Board of Immigration Appeals
decided that Lopez had committed an
aggravated felony and denied his application
for cancellation of removal. The Board of
Immigration Appeals is the highest
administrative body for interpreting and
applying immigration law, and can only be
overruled by the Attorney General or a
federal court.
Lopez appealed to the 8th Circuit Court of
Appeals, arguing that his conviction in the
state of South Dakota did not meet the
INA's definition of an aggravated felony
because it would not be considered a felony
under federal law.
The term aggravated felony used to cover
murder, drug trafficking and firearms
trafficking cases, but has been expanded to
include crimes such as shoplifting, if they
come with a year or more of prison time.
Sentencing can vary from state to state.
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Lawyers for Lopez argue that his is a simple
possession case, and that the Board of
Immigration Appeals is over-expanding the
definition of aggravated felony by defining
his crime as drug trafficking.
Attorneys for the government noted in a
brief that an earlier 8th Circuit case, US. v.
Briones-Mata, established in 1997 a
precedent that classified Lopez' crime as an
aggravated felony regardless of whether or
not it so qualified under federal law. In that
situation, the INA states that only the Board
of Immigration Appeals has jurisdiction to
review the case.
Lopez also argued that the Board of
Immigration Appeal's decision was invalid
because it relied on a rule created after his
conviction. The rule in In re Yanez, states
that an aggravated felony under state or
federal law constitutes grounds for removal.
However, the 8th Circuit precedent, Briones-
Mata, was published before Lopez'
conviction, and on June 24, 2005, the 8th
Circuit panel used it to deny Lopez'
application for cancellation of removal.
But an attorney for Lopez, Theodore Metzler
of Covington and Burling, said the 8th
Circuit precedent would never have been
applied if the Board of Immigration Appeals
hadn't incorrectly used the rule from In re
Yanez.
"Mr. Lopez argued that the Board of
Immigration Appeals didn't change its
position on that question until after his
conviction, Metzler added. "It's true that
Briones-Mata had decided that question in
the sentencing guidelines context before Mr.
Lopez's case arose, and our comment would
be that regardless of whether the 8th Circuit
followed its own precendent, as it was
entitled to do, we think that precedent was
incorrect."
In a separate 5th Circuit Court of Appeals
case, Reymundo Toledo-Flores appealed a
two-year sentence he received in Texas for
possession of cocaine, arguing that his
conviction was not an aggravated felony. He
claimed it was not classified as a felony
under the Controlled Substances Act.
Yet the 5th Circuit panel affirmed, noting
that Congress made a "deliberate policy
decision to include as an 'aggravated felony'
a drug crime that is a felony under state law
but only a misdemeanor under the
[Controlled Substances Act]."
"One case is immigration [and] one case is
criminal," noted Timothy Crooks, attorney
for Toledo-Flores, in a phone interview.
"But both turn on the interpretation of a
group of statutes."
Both Lopez and Toledo-Flores petitioned the
U.S. Supreme Court for review.
The 2nd, 3rd, 6th and 9th circuit courts have
ruled that crimes that are not felonies under
federal law cannot constitute aggravated
felonies and therefore are not grounds for
removal. The Court's decision will likely
resolve the difference in precedent between
these courts and the 5th and 8th circuits.
"We think the emerging trend among the
circuit courts of appeals is that a state law
drug possession crime defined as a felony
under state law is not a drug trafficking
crime under the aggravated felony
provisions," Metzler said.
On April 3, 2006, the Supreme Court
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accepted review in both cases and
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consolidated them for consideration.
"Expanding powers of immigration authorities"
Medill News Service
June 6, 2006
Katherine Boyle
Jose Lopez lived in South Dakota before he
was deported to Mexico in January 2006. He
ran a taco stand, and, eventually, owned his
own grocery and crafts store. A legal
permanent resident, he didn't seem like the
kind of man who would draw the attention
of immigration lawyers across the country.
But that was before he was arrested for a
drug crime and threatened with deportation.
It was also before the U.S. Supreme Court
agreed to hear his appeal.
Now some immigration experts are taking
notice of the case, saying it demonstrates a
growing trend: immigration authorities'
efforts to expand their powers of
deportation.
Experts say immigration authorities'
classification of drug offenses, stricter laws
on asylum cases and a recent rash of
worksite raids have all made it easier to
deport immigrants.
"Immigration laws have gotten particularly
strict with respect to drug offenses," said
Fred Tsao, Policy Director for the Illinois
Coalition of Immigrant and Refugee Rights.
"This is a trend we've been seeing over the
past twenty years, and it's only getting
worse."
Lopez' drug offense occurred in 1997, when
he was arrested for aiding and abetting the
possession of cocaine. The Controlled
Substances Act, passed by Congress in
1988, states that drug trafficking crimes are
aggravated felonies, but Lopez' lawyers
argue that his is a simple possession case
and doesn't qualify for the aggravated
felony label associated with trafficking.
"This aggravated felony question comes up
in a substantial number of [immigration]
cases," said Theodore Metzler, an attorney
for Covington and Burling, the Washington,
D.C.-based law firm that is representing
Lopez. "I think that the United States
[government's] strategy in many of the
[immigration] cases has been to increase the
definition and widen the number of crimes
that can be constituted an aggravated felony.
. . The main issue [in the Lopez case] is
whether, when Congress said that a drug
trafficking crime is an aggravated felony,
they meant to include a simple possession
charge."
The distinction matters because under
immigration law, Lopez could only apply for
cancellation of removal, which would stop
his deportation proceedings, if the Board of
Immigration Appeals determined that he had
not committed an aggravated felony.
Manny Vargas, an immigration lawyer for
the New York State Defenders Association's
Immigrant Defense Project, is advising
lawyers for Lopez and Toledo-Flores, whose
aggravated felony conviction in Texas will
be considered before the Supreme Court
along with Lopez' case.
"[Lopez' case] is an illustration of the
federal government overreaching, going
beyond what Congress probably intended,"
Vargas said. "Hopefully ... immigrants [can
still] go and seek review in the federal courts
to put a check on instances where the
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government can be overreaching... One of
the overarching background issues here is
that these cases illustrate the importance of
people, including non-citizens, being able to
have access to the federal courts to challenge
overly broad government applications of
harsh laws."
The U.S. Attorney's Office declined to
comment on the case, and Elaine Komis,
spokeswoman for the Board of Immigration
Appeals, said the Board does not comment
on its case decisions.
It is clear, however, that the definition of an
aggravated felony under the Controlled
Substances Act has been greatly expanded
since its first use in 1988. While it first only
applied to violent crimes, such as murder
and rape, and drug and firearms trafficking,
under the Board of Immigration Appeal's
expanded interpretation, it can even apply to
crimes such as shoplifting, if they come with
a year or more of prison time.
"For those immigrants that are in states that
classify minor drug possession crimes as
[aggravated] felonies, it has very serious
consequences for them and in other states
there are no consequences at all," Metzler
said. "That's the fundamental point of
fairness in this case."
The federal circuit courts have disagreed on
whether the Board of Immigration Appeals
has misinterpreted Congress' original intent
with the Controlled Substances Act and is
too loosely applying the label of aggravated
felony to crimes that don't fully qualify.
The 2nd, 3rd, 6th and 9th circuits have ruled
that crimes that are not aggravated felonies
under federal law cannot constitute
aggravated felonies and therefore are not
grounds for removal. However, the 5th and
8th circuits have maintained that, as long as
the crimes were considered aggravated
felonies under state law, immigrants were
not eligible for cancellation of removal.
The Supreme Court's decision is expected to
determine whether or not immigration
authorities have been too draconian in
interpreting the Controlled Substances Act.
"A favorable decision [for Lopez and
Toledo-Flores] will not only benefit non-
citizens whose cases specifically raise this
issue," Vargas said, "but also may be a
further incentive for the [immigration]
agency to be less aggressive in applying
these laws generally."
Vargas added that in Leocal v. Ashcroft, a
2004 Supreme Court decision, the court
rejected a broad government interpretation
of the term aggravated felony in its
application to violent crimes.
"If [the Leocal case] was coupled with a
decision here that reversed broad
government interpretation on the drug
category, it might send a signal to the
[immigration] agency that they need to be
more careful about how they apply these
very harsh provisions in the immigration
laws," Vargas said.
The Board of Immigration Appeal's
interpretation of the Controlled Substances
Act isn't the only legislation that has made
remaining in the United States more difficult
for immigrants.
New asylum laws also showcase the
increasing stringency of the immigration
courts.
"About a year ago a new law came down ...
that had implications for asylum seekers,"
said Uzoamaka Nzelibe, an immigration
attorney at Northwestern University's
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Bluhm Legal Clinic.
She said the Real ID Act, which was passed
in May 2005 as part of an emergency
spending bill on Iraq and tsunami aid, has
made the asylum process much more
arduous.
"Some of the immigration judges are
denying [asylum] on very technical
grounds," Nzelibe said. "Some [judges] say
they are denying [cases] because they don't
believe the applicant. That's very difficult to
refute later on. [Judges] deny based on
cooperating evidence. They are denying on
bases that are difficult to challenge in the
appeals court, so that's making it very
difficutl [for asylum seekers]."
A person's demeanor in the courtroom or a
woman's inability to tell male airport
officers her experience being raped by
soldiers could be grounds for a judge to
deny an asylum case under the Real ID Act,
according to the New York-based
organization Human Rights First.
However, the latest data the U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Service is able to offer
regarding the percentage of asylum cases
accepted per year is for 2004, said Sean
Saucier, spokesman for the office. The lack
of available data means it is impossible to
tell statistically whether or not more
applicants for asylum are being rejected.
Yet most immigration lawyers agreed that
the law has made gaining asylum more
difficult. They also say they are haunted by
the cases they lose.
"If [asylum] cases fail, there aren't a whole
lot of options and the person has to go
back," said Evelyn Marsh, a Chicago
immigration attorney. "It seems like a
horrible thing to do to anybody. [Losing an
asylum case is] a nightmare that I have."
Other enforcement actions-such as the
recent spate of worksite raids by
immigration authorities-are also keeping
many undocumented immigrants who are
already living and working in the United
States awake at night.
While authorities have always had the
ability to arrest those who are working
illegally, many immigrants perceive the
recent raids as a crackdown.
Vargas said the raids are symbolic of "the
general more aggressive approach to
enforcement of immigration laws that the
federal government is engaging in now" that
is also seen in the Lopez case.
Large numbers of undocumented workers
have been arrested lately. In April 2006,
raids on IFCO, a Houston-based crate and
pallet manufacturer, resulted in the arrests of
seven managers and 1,187 undocumented
workers in 26 states.
Antonio, a 21-year-old undocumented
immigrant, who asked that his real name not
be used, lives in Little Village, a Chicago
neighborhood that has a high concentration
of Hispanics.
Although he has lived in the United States
for seven years, for the past few months he
said he has been living in fear. His mother
and father, both of whom are undocumented,
work in printing and metal factories in the
Chicago area.
Recent worksite raids have left Antonio
terrified, worried that one or both of his
parents may be arrested and deported.
"If immigration goes to the factory where
my father works, he's going to be deported,
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and then my family will be split," he said.
According to Tsao, Antonio's fears are not
unjustified.
The IFCO raids were just the "opening salvo
in the [worksite raid] initiative," said Tsao.
Statements from immigration officials
appear to corroborate Tsao's position.
In an April press release, Homeland Security
Secretary Michael Chertoff said the status
quo for immigration had changed.
"This nationwide enforcement action shows
how we will use all our investigative tools to
bring these individuals to justice," he said.
But in the midst of strict measures of
enforcement by immigration authorities and
the Board of Immigration Appeals, the
Lopez case, which will likely go before the
Supreme Court next fall, could mean a new,
less stringent era for immigrants who are
arrested for drug crimes. A decision in favor
of Lopez would essentially check the Board
of Immigration Appeals' power to deport
immigrants for simple drug possession
charges.
Approximately 7,000 immigrants were
deported for drug-related crimes in 2005, but
it is unclear how many of them were subject
to removal for minor drug possession
crimes.
However, for immigrants facing deportation
for such crimes in 2006 and 2007, a
Supreme Court decision reversing the Board
of Immigration's decision in the Lopez case
may make all the difference, signaling,
perhaps, yet another change in the status
quo.
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"Immigrants Facing Deportation Get Second Chance"
The New York Sun
February 17, 2005
Daniela Gerson
On January 31, Antonia Estrella received a
desperate call. After five years in
immigration detention centers in Alabama,
Georgia, and Louisiana, her son, Franklin
Grullon, said he had been told his time was
up. Immigration officials had informed
Grullon, a legal permanent resident who
pleaded guilty 10 years ago to drug and
robbery charges, that he would be deported
on the next flight to the Dominican
Republic.
But at the 11th hour, the government granted
a temporary reprieve. Grullon - and probably
thousands in similar situations - now has the
opportunity for a waiver hearing, one that
may allow him to stay in this country
legally.
"Now there's a little hope," Ms. Estrella, a
Bronx resident, said in Spanish. "Now
they're saying, 'Yes, he's going to have his
day in court.' "
When Grullon, 39, who immigrated legally
at 16 and is the father of two American
citizens, was convicted in 1995, other
noncitizen criminals in his situation were
eligible for relief from deportation. Relief
was a chance to present evidence to
immigration judges that they should be
allowed to stay in America, evidence such as
rehabilitation and ties to the community.
When the immigration laws were overhauled
in 1996, however, that opportunity was
taken away for thousands. A broad category
of crimes known as aggravated felonies now
triggers automatic deportation.
Those laws were applied retroactively. Thus,
when Grullon was released in 2000, he was
immediately placed in deportation
proceedings.
This fall, however, the Justice Department
issued a new rule, and immigrants like
Grullon, who have not yet been deported,
have been given a second chance. The
change was based on a Supreme Court
decision four years ago that it was unlawful
to apply the change retroactively.
For thousands, it's too late. The Justice
Department is not allowing those already
deported to apply for the waiver. More than
500,000 noncitizens with criminal
convictions, many of whom would have
been eligible for the waiver, have been
deported since the new laws went into effect
in 1996.
Others will not hear about the waiver in
time: The opportunity to apply runs out this
April 26. In October, the Justice Department
posted notices in the Federal Register and
sent out a press release, but immigration
lawyers said the information is not trickling
down to immigrant offenders who need to
hear it.
The New York State Defenders
Association's Immigrant Defense Project, a
nonprofit group, is scrambling to get the
word out that some immigrants who, before
1997, pleaded guilty to a crime, can seek a
waiver.
"Every other day, our hotline mailbox gets
filled because of people calling," a staff
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attorney of the Defense Project, Benita Jain,
said.
For many of them, however, the rule change
came too late.
"Most people who have been calling us have
a loved one who was deported wrongfully,
and there's not a lot we can say to them," she
said. "For people who were deported, the
government's position is they can't come
back to apply for the waiver, even though
they were wrongfully deported."
Another problem disturbs a New York
University School of Law professor, Nancy
Morawetz, who helped prepare the plaintiffs
brief in the Supreme Court case. She said the
government is not doing enough to inform
immigrants from countries with which
America currently has no repatriation
agreements, such as Cuba, Vietnam, and
Laos. Many have been released from
detention because the government will not
be able to deport them in the foreseeable
future, but they are unaware they should
apply for the waiver to prevent future
deportation in the event of a shift in bilateral
relations. Such a shift recently took place
with Cambodia, where America is now able
to deport immigrants convicted of crimes.
"What I think is a huge problem is that they
tell people there is a time limit, and they
simply assume people will know what they
are supposed to do. It's a very complicated
piece of law," Ms. Morawetz said. "When
the government makes a mistake, they have
a clear responsibility to fix it, and that's a
responsibility they're clearly reneging on in
these regulations."
The Justice Department said its response
reflects standard policy.
"This is consistent with what the Department
of Justice has done in other cases where
individuals were given an opportunity to
seek relief. But at the same time, the matter
is not left open indefinitely," a spokesman
for the department, John Nowacki, said.
Advocates of increased restrictions on
immigration see the waivers as providing a
new loophole to let the worst type of
immigrants remain in the country.
But for Franklin Grullon's mother, Ms.
Estrella, "212(c)," the name of the waiver
and a number she loves to rattle off in
Spanish, is the last hope for her son. Ever
since his conviction, she said, she has
contended he was innocent and was tricked
into pleading guilty.
Now, with a stack of court papers almost as
tall as she is and more than 170 family
members and friends signed on to support
his waiver application, she is optimistic that
she will keep her son in American and then
clear his name.
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Burton v. Waddington
(05-9222)
Ruling Below: (Burton v. Waddington, 142 Fed. Appx. 297 (9th Cir., 2005)., cert granted 126 S.
Ct. 2352; 74 U.S.L.W. 3676 [2006]).
Burton, an inmate, sued for a writ of habeas corpus, objecting to the consecutive sentences for
rape, robbery, and burglary that he received from a judge, claiming that Blakely v Washington
should apply to reduce his sentence. Blakely held that only a jury may make findings that add to
sentences. The court of appeals held that Blakely was a new rule
Questions Presented: 1. Is the holding in Blakely a new rule or is it dictated by Apprendi?
2. If Blakely is a new rule, does its requirement that facts resulting in an enhanced statutory
maximum be proved beyond a reasonable doubt apply retroactively?
BURTON, Petitioner
V.
WADDINGTON, Respondent.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
Decided July 28, 2005
TASHIMA, PAEZ, and BEA, Circuit
Judges:
Lonnie Lee Burton ("Burton") appeals the
district court's denial of his petition for writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2254. In 1994, a jury convicted Burton of
rape in the first degree, robbery in the first
degree, and burglary in the first degree.
Burton challenges his consecutive sentence
of 304 months for the rape, 153 months for
the robbery, and 105 months for the
burglary, for a total of 562 months on
several constitutional grounds. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253
and we affirm. We review de novo a district
court's denial of a petition for writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Alvarado v.
Hill, 252 F.3d 1066, 1068 (9th Cir. 2001).
I.
The state argues that the district court lacked
jurisdiction over Burton's 2002 habeas
petition because this court had not granted
leave to file a "second or successive"
petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2244(b)(3)(A). We disagree. In 1998,
Burton filed his first federal habeas petition
challenging his conviction. At that time, the
state court judgment as it related to Burton's
sentence was not yet final because Burton's
challenge to his sentence was still pending
before the state court of appeal. Because
Burton had not yet exhausted his federal
constitutional claims in state court at the
time he filed his first federal habeas petition,
they were not ripe for federal habeas review.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A)(requiring a
state prisoner to exhaust his claims in state
court before he is allowed to bring an action
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in federal court for habeas relief). Therefore,
Burton was not required to challenge his
sentence in his first federal petition because
no meaningful relief would have been
available at that time. See LaGrand v.
Stewart, 170 F.3d 1158, 1159 (9th Cir.
1999)(order). We agree with the district
court that Burton's petition is not "second or
successive" because he had a "legitimate
excuse for failing to raise a claim at the
appropriate time." See McCleskey v. Zant,
499 U.S. 467, 490, 113 L. Ed. 2d 517, 111
S. Ct. 1454 (1991).
II.
Burton claims that his due process rights
were violated when the trial court increased
his offender score at the sentencing hearing
by separately counting his Indiana theft and
fraud convictions, rather than aggregating
them as it had done in the first and second
sentencing hearings. Because Burton has not
shown that the Washington Court of
Appeals' application of the law of the case
doctrine was "contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly
established federal law as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States" 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), we affirm the district
court's denial of relief on this claim.
III.
Burton next argues that his due process
rights were violated because the sentencing
court was vindictive in imposing an
exceptional sentence at his third sentencing
hearing. As the Washington Court of
Appeals noted, Burton's third sentence is
lower than his original sentence, and is
therefore not presumptively vindictive under
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,
725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072
(1969), overruled on other grounds,
Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 104 L. Ed.
2d 865, 109 S. Ct. 2201 (1989). Because
Burton has not shown that the trial court was
vindictive in violation of clearly established
federal law, Burton's claim is not cognizable
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
IV.
Finally, Burton argues that his exceptional
sentence was imposed in violation of his
Sixth Amendment rights under Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d
435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), and Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 159 L. Ed. 2d
403, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). We expanded
the Certificate of Appealability and
requested supplemental briefing on the
impact of Blakely and United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621,
125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), on this case.
Although Apprendi was decided before
Burton's conviction became final and may
therefore be applied to this case, the state
argues that Blakely-decided after Burton's
conviction became final-established a new
rule that does not apply retroactively on
collateral review. See Teague v. Lane, 489
U.S. 288, 310, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334, 109 S. Ct.
1060 (1989). We agree. See Schardt v.
Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 2005 U.S. App.
LEXIS 13569, 2005 WL 1593468 (9th Cir.
July 8, 2005)(holding that Blakely does not
apply retroactively to a 28 U.S.C. § 2254
habeas petition).
Apprendi held that "other than the fact of a
prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. The
statutory maximum for each of the offenses
to which Burton was found guilty was life
imprisonment. See WASH. REV. CODE §§
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9A.44.040(2), 9A.52.020(2), 9A.56.200(2)
(classifying rape in the first degree, burglary
in the first degree, and robbery in the first
degree as class A felonies); §
9A.20.02 1(1)(a)(setting statutory maximum
for class A felonies as life imprisonment).
At Burton's third sentencing hearing, the
judge imposed consecutive sentences of 304
months for the rape conviction, 153 months
for the robbery conviction, and 105 months
for the burglary conviction, for a total of 562
months. Because the sentence on any
individual count, and the total sentence
imposed does not exceed the statutory
maximum of life imprisonment, it does not
violate Apprendi. See United States v.
Shryock, 342 F.3d 948, 989 (9th Cir.
2003)(holding that where statutory
maximum for murder in either the first or
second degree was life imprisonment, court
did not err in sentencing under provision for
first degree murder on the basis of judge-
found facts); United States v. Sua, 307 F.3d
1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2002)(holding that
Apprendi was not violated where sentence
imposed did not exceed the statutory
maximum); see also United States v.
Buckland, 289 F.3d 558, 570 (9th Cir.
2002)(en banc)(finding no Apprendi
violation where none of the individual
sentences imposed consecutively exceeded
the statutory maximum for that offense).
Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
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"Supreme Court to hear Washington case"
The Seattle Times
June 6, 2006
Natalie Singer
The U.S. Supreme Court said Monday it will
consider whether inmates can reopen
challenges to prison sentences based on a
court ruling two years ago that limited
judges' discretion in sentencing criminal
defendants.
Justices will hear arguments this fall from
Lonnie Burton, who is serving nearly 47
years in prison in Washington state for a
1991 rape, robbery and burglary in Federal
Way.
Burton was convicted in 1994 of forcing his
way into a home and raping a 15-year-old
boy at gunpoint. He stole $160 from the
house before leaving.
Prosecutors asked for a 25-year sentence for
Burton-about the maximum outlined under
the state's sentencing guidelines-but a King
County judge gave him 47 years, saying he
deserved the harsher sentence.
Burton's appeal follows a Supreme Court
ruling in 2004 that overturned the sentence
of another Washington man, Ralph Blakely,
who was convicted of kidnapping his
estranged wife. A judge, acting alone, had
determined that Blakely of Grant County
had acted with "deliberate cruelty" and
deserved a longer prison term.
The issue in question centers around judges'
ability to issue "exceptional sentences," said
Helen Anderson, assistant professor of law
at the University of Washington.
The Legislature about two decades ago
created sentencing guidelines, which laid out
sentence ranges for every crime based on
factors such as the nature of the crime and
the criminal's previous convictions. The
Legislature also gave judges the authority to
give higher sentences in certain exceptional
cases.
"The hope was that these ranges would
provide more equality" over the much-
larger, less-defined sentencing ranges used
before the reforms, Anderson said.
But in a 5-4 decision in the Blakely case, the
justices found that exceptional sentences
were unconstitutional because they allowed
judges to independently consider facts that
the jury had not used in reaching a verdict.
Burton had an appeal pending when the
court resolved Blakely's case.
Brian Tsuchida, Burton's attorney, said the
Supreme Court case is a highly technical one
that will determine what remedies, if any,
are available for inmates possibly affected
by the Blakely case.
"It has to do with whether Blakely v.
Washington established a new rule, and if it
did, does that new rule apply retroactively. It
doesn't address whether the sentencing
scheme [in Washington] is legal or illegal."
After Blakely, the Legislature changed the
law to say that the state itself, and not
judges, must decide before trial whether to
seek an exceptional sentence, thereby
ensuring that a jury determine the facts that
would allow for a longer sentence.
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"Blakely issues dominate court docket in 2005"
The Indiana Lawyer
June 28, 2006
Michael W. Hoskins
One of the largest issues addressed by the
Indiana Supreme Court in 2005 was a
byproduct from the nation's highest court the
year before.
The state's high court saw a spike in cases
heard as a result of the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Blakely v. Washington, which
shook the legal world and called into
question the nation's sentencing structure.
Since then, state courts are still reeling from
the issue and figuring out how the decision
impacts thousands of current and past cases
dating to the 1970s.
An Examination of the Indiana Supreme
Court Docket, Dispositions and Voting in
2005, an annual review of the high court,
found a higher caseload resulted from the
Blakely decision, causing the number of
cases to jump about 43 percent.
Blakely issues came up in a third of the
Indiana court's cases and amounted to 20
percent of the caseload, according to the
review. Twenty-two opinions were focused
on the issue, and half were abbreviated
error-correcting opinions, the review shows.
The Blakely decision was a big piece of
work for our state courts, said Mark J.
Crandley, who helped author the review.
That was a huge bomb to drop on lower
courts, and it says a lot about our U.S.
(Supreme) Court. But Indiana is ahead of the
curve and handled it well.
Most of the state's opinions on Blakely
issues were unanimous, and the opinions
were shorter and more concise, he and other
legal scholars said.
While important, Blakely isn't overly
complicated to deal with, said associate
professor Joel Schumm at Indiana
University School of Law (not equal
symbol) Indianapolis.
My take is that while they might represent
20 percent of cases, they don't require the
kind of work or discussion that hot-button
issues might need, Schumm said. I'm not
surprised that so many are related to Blakely.
It's important but not time consuming.
Crandley said the Indiana Supreme Court
issued a ruling in March 2005 that other
state courts could model. The ruling in
Smylie v. Indiana a case arising from
Johnson County determined Blakely's
applicability to the state's sentencing
structure. The court rejected the suggestion
of making statutory sentencing structure
advisory and instead requires jury
determinations of sentence-enhancing facts.
Indiana justices also touched on
retroactivity, saying that Blakely applies to
all cases on direct appeal at the time the
Blakely decision came down. The
retroactivity issue is one that the U.S.
Supreme Court expects to tackle this fall in
the case of Burton v. Waddington, 05-9222.
Justices will hear arguments from Lonnie
Burton, who is serving nearly 47 years in
prison in Washington State for rape,
robbery, and burglary. His attorneys told
justices that the local judge increased the
sentence by 21 years, declaring that Burton
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deserved a harsher sentence than what was
provided by the state's sentencing scheme.
At the time of the Blakely ruling, Burton had
an appeal pending. Justices have not said
how the decision would affect old cases, but
attorneys plan to watch the case with
interest.
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Cunningham v. Caifornia
(05-6551)
Ruling Below: (People v. Cunningham, Not Reported in Cal.Rptr.3d, 2005 WL 880983
(Cal.App. 1 Dist.,2005), cert granted 126 S.Ct. 1329, 164 L.Ed.2d 47, 74 USLW 3457, 74
USLW 3471, [2006]).
John Cunningham, appellant, was accused by his son (Doe) of forcibly sodomizing him and
forcing him to orally copulate appellant. Despite Doe's history of lying, Appellant was convicted
by a jury for sexual abuse of a child under 14. The trial court judge imposed the statutory
maximum sentence, 16 years, after weighing the aggravated and mitigating factors. Appellant
appealed the admittance of certain hearsay evidence and the imposition of the upper term
sentence based on aggravating factors not found by the jury in violation of his right to a jury trial
under Blakely v. Washington. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in allowing the
hearsay evidence. Furthermore, two of the judges held that the upper term sentence was part of
the range of authorized punishments under California's statutory scheme and thus a permissible
scheme under Blakely. One appellate judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part, interpreted
Blakely to require any fact that increases the penalty of a crime to be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt to the jury and would therefore remand the case for re-sentencing.
Question Presented: Whether California's Determinate Sentencing Law, by permitting
sentencing judges to impose enhanced sentences based on their determination of facts not found
by the jury or admitted by the defendant, violates the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments?
Court of Appeal, First District, Division 5, California.
The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
V.
John CUNNINGHAM, Defendant and Appellant.
Contra Costa County Super. Ct.
April 18, 2005.
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
SIMONS, J. Blakely v. Washington. We reject these
contentions and affirm.
John Cunningham (appellant) appeals his
conviction by jury trial of continuous sexual Background
abuse of a child under age 14. On appeal he
contends the trial court erroneously admitted Victim's Testimony
the victim's hearsay statements, imposed the
upper term, and based the upper term on The victim, referred to at trial and herein as
aggravating factors not found by the jury in John Doe, is appellant's son. Doe, born in
violation of his right to jury trial under August 1989, testified that he lived with his
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mother, Wanda, for the first 10 years of his
life. In December 1999, when Doe was 10
years old, he went to live with appellant,
appellant's girlfriend, Latasha, appellant's
and Latasha's baby, and Latasha's young
nephew.
Doe admitted that prior to moving in with
appellant, Doe falsely accused his stepfather
of beating him, resulting in scars on his
back, because he wanted to live with
appellant and did not like his new stepfather.
After appellant took Doe to the hospital Doe
admitted he had lied. Doe also admitted that
when he was eight years old he called the
telephone number for Boys' Town and
falsely reported that there was no food in his
mother's house and she did not provide him
with enough attention. The police and child
protective services investigated the call and
found Doe was healthy and had ample food
at his house.
Doe testified that in January 2000, shortly
after he moved in with appellant, appellant
began forcibly sodomizing him and forcing
him to orally copulate appellant. Sometimes
while being sodomized by appellant, Doe
screamed for help because it hurt "very bad"
and appellant put his hand over Doe's mouth
to stop Doe from screaming. The acts
occurred in appellant's bedroom, the living
room, the bathroom and the shower.
Sometimes appellant molested Doe when he
was angry with Doe. Because appellant
threatened to kill Doe if he told anyone
about the abuse, Doe was afraid of appellant
and did not tell anyone while living with
him. In December 2000, Doe first told his
younger cousin, Brittany, about appellant's
abuse in a note while visiting her when
appellant was out of town. Before giving her
the note Doe said "I have to tell you," but
did not want to say it aloud. The note said,
"my dad is hu[m]ping me." Thereafter
Brittany showed the note to her mother,
Karla, who then questioned Doe as to what
it meant. Doe told Karla about appellant's
repeated incidents of sodomy and forcing
Doe to orally copulate him. After Karla told
her husband, Gerrell, about Doe's
allegations, Gerrell talked to Doe, then took
him to appellant's house for a family
meeting. While there, as Doe was packing
his clothes, appellant confronted him while
they were alone and said, "In a week you
better say you are lying or else I am going to
fuck you up."
After Doe reported appellant's abuse to
Wanda and his stepfather, Wanda took him
to the hospital. The pediatrician who
performed a sexual assault examination on
Doe testified that the examination revealed
no trauma to Doe's anus, consistent with
most postsodomy examinations. However,
the doctor said that Doe's accounts of how
he felt physically during and after being
sodomized and orally copulating appellant
were consistent with how children report
such incidents.
On January 4, 2001, Doe was interviewed
by San Pablo Police Officer Jeff Palmieri.
Doe told Palmieri that appellant sexually
abused him numerous times beginning
shortly after he moved in with appellant. On
January 8, Kerry O'Malley of the Children's
Interview Center (CIC) conducted a
videotaped sexual assault interview of Doe.
Doe's statements during the CIC interview
were consistent with his earlier statements to
Palmieri.
On January 5, 2001, appellant agreed to a
videotaped interview by Officer Palmieri
and Contra Costa District Attorney's Office
Inspector Ted Todd. At the beginning of the
interview appellant adamantly denied any
type of sexual touching of Doe. As the
questioning ensued, appellant became more
forthcoming in his responses. After two or
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three hours, appellant admitted that Doe's
mouth did make contact with appellant's
penis for five seconds while in the shower
on one occasion. Appellant also said that
Doe was a liar and was manipulative and
later said Doe was a homosexual and "can't
quit the homosexual behavior."
Defense
Testifying in his own defense, appellant
denied ever molesting Doe or any child. He
also denied ever threatening to kill Doe or
"fuck [him] up." Appellant testified that
prior to coming to live with him, Doe had
been expelled from school due to behavior
problems and was not doing his homework.
Other defense witnesses testified that Doe
had a history of lying and his allegations
against appellant were fabricated because he
was unhappy about appellant's requirements
regarding chores and homework.
Discussion
I. Doe's Hearsay Statements Were Properly
Admitted
Appellant contends the court erred in
admitting, pursuant to Evidence Code
section 1360 (hereafter section 1360), the
portions of the videotaped CIC interview
which contained Doe's hearsay statements to
Brittany and Karla. He contends the error
violated his right to due process. Appellant
does not argue that the admission of Doe's
hearsay statements violated the Sixth
Amendment right of confrontation under the
rule recently announced in Crawford v.
Washington. Since Doe testified at trial, no
Confrontation Clause violation occurred.
Section 1360 creates a limited exception to
the hearsay rule in criminal prosecutions
regarding a child's statements describing
acts of child abuse or neglect, including
sexual abuse. In determining whether child
hearsay statements possess the requisite
indicia of reliability pursuant to section
1360, subdivision (a)(2), the trial court may
consider such nonexclusive factors as: "(1)
spontaneity and consistent repetition; (2) the
mental state of the declarant; (3) use of
terminology unexpected from a child of
[similar] age; and (4) lack of motive to
fabricate. Although courts have considerable
leeway in their consideration of appropriate
factors, the " 'unifying principle is that these
factors relate to whether the child declarant
was particularly likely to be telling the truth
when the statement was made."'
Appellant relies on Lilly v. Virginia and
People v. Eccleston to argue we are to
exercise de novo review over the trial court's
reliability determination. This argument
rests on a misunderstanding of the cited
authorities. At the time section 1360 was
enacted (1995), the leading case on the
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause
was Ohio v. Roberts. Roberts had held that
the prosecution could only introduce hearsay
against a criminal defendant if the statement
was admitted under a firmly rooted hearsay
exception or had sufficient indicia of
reliability. Since section 1360 is not a firmly
rooted hearsay exception, an accused could
argue under Roberts that a statement
admitted under this section lacked the
reliability required by the statute and by the
Constitution. While the deferential abuse of
discretion standard of review is applied to
the statutory finding, the stricter de novo
standard of review is applied to the
reliability finding under the Confrontation
Clause. Since only the statutory finding of
reliability is at issue here, we apply the
abuse of discretion standard. In doing so we
review the trial court's ruling based on the
evidence before the court at the time of the
ruling.
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In this case, prior to trial, appellant filed a
written motion in limine seeking to exclude
portions of Doe's videotaped CIC interview
on the basis that they did not qualify under
section 1360. At the initial hearing appellant
also objected to admission of Doe's
incriminating statements to Brittany and
other adult relatives prior to the videotaped
interview. The parties stipulated that the
court would review the CIC interview video
and sections of the police reports submitted
by the prosecutor, which describe the
subject statements by Doe to determine
whether the statements provided sufficient
indicia of reliability to be admitted under
section 1360. Thereafter the court reviewed
the CIC interview videotape, a transcript
thereof, a police report, and a supplemental
police report, after which it ruled Doe's
hearsay statements admissible.
A. The Police Reports
1. Initial Report
Officer Palmieri's initial report states that in
his January 4, 2001 interview, Doe said that
during the first molestation incident
appellant made Doe touch appellant's penis
and then "whipped" Doe on the buttocks
with his hand for not doing his homework.
Throughout the year 2000, appellant made
Doe orally copulate him in the living room
of the residence and appellant sodomized
Doe several times while in the bathroom.
Doe referred to appellant's penis as his
"dingling" or "dick," and said appellant used
Vaseline or oil before sodomizing him. Doe
said that in December 2000 he "got in
trouble by [appellant]" regarding a book
report after which appellant whipped him on
his buttock and had him orally copulate
appellant. Two weeks before Christmas
appellant sodomized him in the shower
causing him great pain. Doe described
having to use the bathroom after being
sodomized and seeing a white film in the
toilet water. He said the oral copulation and
sodomy happened almost every day that he
was alone with appellant. He admitted lying
several times to his parents, but was
adamant that his accusations regarding
appellant were not lies, and he was visibly
upset. When Palmieri asked why Doe was
crying, he said he did not want to get anyone
in trouble, loved appellant and wanted
appellant to stop molesting him. Doe told
Palmieri that on January 2, 2001, he looked
Brittany in the eyes and told her appellant
was molesting him. After Brittany told
Karla, Karla confronted Doe and he told her
about appellant's abuse over the last year.
Doe also told Palmieri that when Karla took
him back to appellant's house to confront
appellant with Doe's allegations, appellant,
while alone with Doe told Doe that if he did
not say the allegations were a joke, he would
"fuck him up." Doe also told Palmieri he did
not tell anyone about the abuse for a long
time because appellant threatened to kill him
if he told anyone.
2. Supplemental Report
Officer Palmieri's supplemental report states
that on January 9, 2001, he telephoned Karla
and Brittany. Brittany told him that on the
afternoon of January 2 while she and Doe
were drawing, Doe told her he had
something important to tell her but did not
want to say it out loud. Doe wrote down that
appellant had been "humping" him. When
Brittany asked Doe if he was telling the
truth, he looked her in the eyes and
responded affirmatively. Brittany believed
Doe was telling the truth because before he
wrote the note he was "happy," and when he
told her about appellant he started crying.
Karla told Palmieri that after Brittany gave
her Doe's note she confronted Doe and told
him she wanted him to tell the truth. Doe
told Karla that appellant had been "putting
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his dingling in [Doe's] butt," and Doe was
also made to put his mouth on appellant's
penis. Doe told her the incidents had been
occurring for a year, often in the shower,
and that appellant put Vaseline or grease "on
his butt" before each act of sodomy. Doe
told her the last act happened a couple of
weeks before because he had not completed
a book report.
B. The CIC Videotape
When interviewer O'Malley asked Doe if he
knew why he was at CIC, Doe responded
"so [he] could talk to [her]""about
something that happened to [him]." In
response to O'Malley's saying, "Well if you
feel comfortable right now, [Doe], could you
tell me what happened," Doe gave a detailed
description of the molestation he suffered
for a year by a "person" or "him." Doe
described appellant's use of Vaseline and the
pain he experienced while being sodomized.
His description of the first incident of
molestation was consistent with Palmieri's
police report. Subsequently, when O'Malley
asked who "him" referred to, Doe identified
appellant. Doe said appellant "humped"
him, which Doe said meant "molested." The
conduct Doe described as appellant
"humping" him constituted sodomy. Doe
often referred to appellant's penis as his
"private part," but also referred it as his
"ding-a-ling" and his "dick." He referred to
having to go to the bathroom after being
sodomized as "when I boo-boo." He also
said after being sodomized something
"white with bubbles" would come out in his
stool. Doe described the December book
report incident as the last incident of
molestation. He said appellant first
"whooped him" in the bedroom with a belt,
then took him to the living room and had
Doe orally copulate him, then took Doe into
the bathroom and sodomized him. Doe said
he told Brittany because he knew she would
tell her mother.
When O'Malley asked Doe how he felt
about what happened with appellant, Doe
said he felt "shock." Doe said appellant
threatened to kill him if he told anyone. Doe
said he was afraid to tell anyone because
they might not believe him. However, he
said he "got tired of him doing it" and "it
was disgusting" and told his cousin Brittany
to tell her mother. He said he was glad he
"brought it out" because he "got sick of it."
He said the molestation happened almost
every day.
Doe admitted to O'Malley that in the past he
had "said some stuff' about his mother that
was not true. When O'Malley asked how she
would know if he was telling her the truth,
Doe said people know when he is telling the
truth. He said Brittany knew he was telling
the truth because he looked in her eyes in
response to her request to do so and she
knew he was telling the truth. He also said
he was not laughing when he told Brittany,
and that kids laugh when they are not telling
the truth. Doe said he cried when talking to
Officer Palmieri because he was afraid that
Palmieri would not believe him. He was
afraid no one would believe him because of
his prior lies about his mother and
stepfather. He said he previously lied about
his mother because he was left alone with no
one to talk to and play with. He said he lied
about his stepfather because his stepfather
would play with his sisters but not with him.
C. Court's Reasoning Regarding Reliability
At the subsequent hearing on the in limine
motion the court ruled Doe's out-of-court
statements admissible, stating the following
reasons for concluding that they bore
sufficient indicia of reliability:
"In terms of reliability, the court finds
that the spontaneity of the statements by
272
the minor to his cousin Brittany in the
note, knowing his cousin would tell his
aunt, and consistent repetition of the
manner in which the acts were
committed shows the reliability of such
statements. The mental state of the
minor is demonstrated by the fact that he
came forward because he said he was
tired of the abuse. The use of the
terminology ... in which he described the
acts is unexpected in a child of similar
age. And to further explain the court's
finding ..* the court has read his
description of the sexual acts which
showed a knowledge of such matters far
beyond the ordinary familiarity of a
child of his age. And fourth, the lack of
motive to fabricate is demonstrated by
the fact that he was very sorry that he
had to tell about these acts because they
involved his father and he did not want
to have to describe them. So, based upon
those factors the court finds under Brodit
and Eccleston and [section] 1360 that the
requirements have been met."
For the following reasons, appellant
contends the court erroneously concluded
that Doe's hearsay statements were
sufficiently reliable to be admissible under
section 1360: First, the statements,
particularly the note to Brittany, were not
spontaneous, but were instead planned. In
addition, the statements were not consistent,
but were "embellished" and "refined" with
each retelling. Second, Doe's mental state at
the time of his statements was "unstable"
given his prior false accusations against
Wanda and Latasha; his animosity toward
appellant, Wanda and Latasha; and his
behavioral problems at school. Third, Doe's
statements did not indicate a level of
knowledge that was unexpected for an 11
and one-half year old, and he spent time
with older siblings and had access to
numerous TV channels with no parental
controls. Fourth, Doe had a motive to lie-he
wanted to move back to Wanda's house due
to his perceived mistreatment by appellant
and Latasha. Finally, there was little, if any,
evidence corroborating Doe's accusations.
We conclude the court did not abuse its
discretion in finding Doe's hearsay
statements reliable. Regarding the
spontaneity of the statements to both
Brittany and O'Malley, Doe's statements
were spontaneous in the sense that Doe
initiated them. In addition, his statements to
O'Malley regarding appellant's abuse were
in response to her neutral question, "could
you tell me what happened?" We reject
appellant's assertion that Doe's hearsay
statements were not consistently repeated,
but were "embellished" and "refined" with
each retelling. Doe's initial and very brief
statement to Brittany that appellant had been
sodomizing him was not inconsistent with
his much longer statements to Karla and
O'Malley. Doe's statements to Karla and
O'Malley were remarkably consistent as to
the "general outline of abuse" and it is
understandable that he imparted extra details
of the abuse to the interviewer because of
the interview format.
Regarding Doe's mental state, the record is
mixed. Although he conceded to O'Malley
that he had previously fabricated claims
against his mother and stepfather, O'Malley
conducted a lengthy colloquy with him
regarding truth and falsity and questioned
him as to how she would know that he was
telling the truth. He also stated that in light
of his prior lies he was worried that his
allegation of appellant's abuse would not be
believed. The court could reasonably
conclude that this degree of candor
enhanced, rather than detracted from Doe's
reliability.
We also reject appellant's assertion that
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Doe's statements did not indicate a level of
knowledge unexpected of an 11 and one-half
year old. Doe's extremely detailed
descriptions of the unpleasant physical
sensations he experienced during and after
being sodomized would be unusual even for
an adult unless experienced firsthand.
Nothing in the record before the court at the
in limine hearing suggested that Doe's level
of knowledge came from a source other than
his personal experience.
Based on the record before the court at the
in limine hearing, it could properly
determine that Doe lacked a motive to
fabricate based on his stated love for
appellant, reluctance to report the abuse and
the possibility of appellant's resulting
incarceration. Appellant had the opportunity
to cross-examine Doe at trial about his
perceived mistreatment by appellant and
appellant's girlfriend as a motive for
fabricating the abuse allegations.
Finally, we reject appellant's assertion that
the lack of corroborating evidence suggested
that Doe's hearsay statements were
unreliable. Corroboration is not necessary
where the child victim testifies at trial.
After reviewing the police reports and CIC
videotape, the court provided a thorough
statement of its reasons for finding Doe's
hearsay statements reliable. Appellant has
failed to demonstrate that the court abused
its discretion.
II. The Court Properly Imposed the Upper
Term
A. Aggravating Factors
Appellant next contends the court
erroneously relied on five of six aggravating
factors in sentencing him to the upper term.
Prior to sentencing, the court appointed
psychologist Richard Lundeen, pursuant to
Penal Code section 288.1, to examine
appellant and submit to the court a written
report and recommendation. Dr. Lundeen
opined that appellant would not be a danger
to Doe or other children in the community if
released. Regarding treatment, Dr. Lundeen
stated " 'either [appellant] did not engage in
inappropriate sexual behavior as charged, or
else he has repressed those behaviors to a
depth where he cannot deal with them at a
conscious level at this time. In either case,
he would be a poor candidate for
rehabilitative therapy if he does not have a
condition from which he is trying to
rehabilitate." Appellant retained
psychologist John Kincaid to conduct a
psychological evaluation. Dr. Kincaid's
report stated that if granted probation
appellant would be unlikely to pose a risk to
Doe, but it would be prudent to restrict him
from direct contact with minors without the
immediate presence of a responsible adult.
Dr. Kincaid also stated that he saw "little
likelihood that [appellant's] incarceration
would be a detriment to [Doe], who had
lived with him only a relatively brief time."
Dr. Kincaid recommended that appellant
obtain treatment which would decrease the
likelihood that he would reoffend. He also
stated that, if incarcerated, appellant should
be referred for a mental health evaluation
although "offense-specific treatments are
almost nonexistent in custody."
Although the probation report did not
recommend a particular sentence, it noted
the following circumstances in aggravation:
(1) "The crime involved great sexual
violence and callousness toward a 10-year-
old child." In particular, the report noted that
the victim was "brutally whipped and
sodomized over 100 times in a one year
period." (2) The victim was particularly
vulnerable as he relied on his father, as his
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custodial parent, for support. (3) Appellant
took advantage of his position of parental
trust and trust as a police officer to commit
the offense. (4) Appellant engaged in violent
conduct which indicated a serious danger to
children in society. The probation report
noted the single mitigating factor that
appellant had no prior criminal record.
At sentencing, the court acknowledged that
it had considered the probation report,
psychological evaluations, sentencing
memoranda, letters from the community in
mitigation and letters from Doe and his
mother. After denying probation, it found
the sole mitigating factor was appellant's
lack of prior criminal conduct. The court
found the following aggravating factors: (1)
The crime involved great violence and the
threat of great bodily harm disclosing a high
degree of viciousness and callousness. (2)
The victim was particularly vulnerable due
to his age and dependence on appellant as
his father and primary caretaker. (3)
Appellant threatened to commit bodily
injury upon the victim in an attempt to
coerce the victim to recant his statements
about the crime. (4) Appellant took
advantage of a position of trust to commit
the crime in that he is the victim's father and
sole caregiver for a substantial period of
time. (5) Appellant engaged in violent
conduct which indicates a serious danger to
the community. (6) Appellant was a peace
officer at the time he committed the criminal
acts, violating his duty to serve the
community of which the victim was a
member. After finding that the aggravating
circumstances outweighed the sole
mitigating factor, the court imposed the
upper 16-year term.
1. The Relationship Between Appellant and
the Victim
Appellant contends the court erred in finding
the victim was vulnerable due to his age
because age was an element of the charged
offense. Although the victim's minority
cannot be used as an aggravating factor
where minority is an element of the offense,
victim vulnerability in this case was also
based on the victim's dependence on
appellant as his primary caretaker. Thus, the
court properly based its vulnerable victim
finding on a factor other than the victim's
age.
Appellant next contends the court erred in
using the victim's dependence on appellant,
and appellant's taking advantage of a
position of trust as the victim's father/sole
caregiver as two separate aggravating
factors. He relies on Garcia, which held that
the victim's relationship to the defendant
could not be used both to support a finding
of vulnerability and to find that the
defendant took advantage of a position of
trust or confidence to commit the offense.
"It does appear that these factors are two
sides of the same coin. The significant
circumstance is the relationship between the
defendant and the victim. The circumstances
that placed the defendant in a position of
trust and confidence were identical to the
circumstances which placed the victim in a
position of vulnerability." We agree with
this analysis and conclude that having used
the relationship between appellant and the
victim in support of the vulnerable victim
factor, the court could not use that fact in
support of a separate aggravating factor.
2. Danger to Society
Appellant next contends the court's finding
that he engaged in violent conduct, which
indicated he posed a serious danger to the
community, is not supported by the
evidence. We disagree. The fact that
appellant repeatedly forcibly sodomized Doe
and forced Doe to orally copulate him
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suggests that the charged offense was a
crime of violence. In addition, appellant's
retained psychologist, Dr. Kincaid, opined
that while a grant of probation would not
pose a risk to Doe, it would be prudent to
restrict appellant from unsupervised direct
contact with minors. In addition, Dr.
Kincaid recommended that appellant receive
treatment to reduce the likelihood of
reoffending. Dr. Kincaid's testimony
provides sufficient support for the finding
that appellant posed a serious danger to the
community.
3. Great Violence and Great Bodily Harm
Appellant argues the court erred in using the
fact that he threatened the victim both to
find that the crime involved great violence
and the threat of great bodily harm and to
find that he threatened the victim in an
attempt to coerce the victim to recant the
victim's statement about the crime.
Appellant asserts the record is devoid of any
violence separate from that deemed to be
inherent in the acts of sodomy and oral
copulation.
Even assuming the court's reliance on this
factor was misplaced, the court properly
found multiple aggravating factors.
Sentencing courts have wide discretion in
weighing aggravating and mitigating factors,
and may balance them qualitatively as well
as quantitatively. In addition, one
aggravating factor alone may warrant
imposition of the upper term and the court
need not state reasons for minimizing or
disregarding mitigating circumstances.
4. Status As Peace Officer
Finally, appellant contends his status as a
police officer was not reasonably related to
his sentencing and therefore the court
erroneously relied upon it as an aggravating
circumstance under rule 4.408(a). In
particular, he argues that the abuse he
inflicted on the victim was in no way related
to his employment as a police officer.
Moreover, he argues that his status as a
police officer did not make the offense
against the victim "distinctively worse than
it would ordinarily have been."
Appellant also notes that this case is
factually distinguishable from Brown, where
the defendant's status as a police officer was
relied on as an aggravating factor in
imposing the upper term on a firearm
enhancement. In that case, the defendant
shot a fellow officer with whom she was
having an affair, and thereafter destroyed
evidence. Brown stated that the trial court
could properly have considered the unusual
facts relating to the defendant-that the
defendant was a police officer who used
deadly force to solve a personal problem,
caused serious injury, and thereafter
destroyed evidence as an aggravating factor
because peace officers are seen as having a
duty to protect people, not unlawfully shoot
an unarmed estranged lover. We agree with
appellant that Brown is distinguishable from
the instant case.
Again, assuming the court improperly relied
on appellant's police officer status as an
aggravating factor, the court properly found
two aggravating factors and exercised its
discretion in balancing them against a single
mitigating factor. Appellant has failed to
demonstrate that imposition of the upper
term was an abuse of the court's discretion.
Remand for resentencing is unnecessary
since it is not reasonably probable that the
court would have imposed a lesser term had
it know that some of its reasons were
improper.
B. Blakely v. Washington
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In a supplemental brief filed pursuant to
Blakely v. Washington, appellant contends
his sentence must be reversed because in
imposing the upper term the trial court, and
not the jury, made the findings on
aggravating factors in violation of his rights
to jury trial and due process. The People
rejoin, in part, that appellant waived his
challenge.
Under the California sentencing scheme the
lower, middle and upper terms constitute a
range of authorized punishments for a given
crime; the exercise of judicial discretion in
selecting the upper term based on
aggravating sentencing factors does not
implicate the right to a jury determination
because the upper term is within the
authorized range of punishment. A
defendant, such as appellant, who is
convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a
child under age 14, faces a maximum prison
term of 16 years in prison that may be
imposed " solely on the basis of the facts
reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by
the defendant." (Blakely v. Washington.) As
Blakely explained, "In other words, the
relevant 'statutory maximum' is not the
maximum sentence a judge may impose
after finding additional facts, but the
maximum he may impose without any
additional findings. When a judge inflicts
punishment that the jury's verdict alone does
not allow, the jury has not found all the facts
'which the law makes essential to the
punishment,' and the judge exceeds his
proper authority." It is instructive that, in
distinguishing between permissible and
impermissible schemes, the court in Blakely
explained: "In a system that says the judge
may punish burglary with 10 to 40 years,
every burglar knows he is risking 40 years in
jail. In a system that punishes burglary with
a 10-year sentence, with another 30 added
for use of a gun, the burglar who enters a
home unarmed is entitled to no more than a
10-year sentence-and by reason of the Sixth
Amendment the facts bearing upon that
entitlement must be found by a jury." Here,
the 16-year upper term was the maximum
statutorily authorized sentence for violating
Penal Code section 288.5. The court's
imposition of that maximum did not violate
appellant's rights to jury trial or due process.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur. STEVENS, J.
JONES, P.J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur with the majority opinion in all
respects, except its conclusion that
imposition of the 16-year upper term was
not unconstitutional. I conclude the case
must be remanded for resentencing under
compulsion of Blakely v. Washington, for
the reasons expressed in my dissent in
People v. Picado.
In short, Blakely held that "any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt." It explained that the
relevant "statutory maximum" is not the
maximum sentence a court may impose after
finding additional facts, but the maximum it
may impose based solely on the facts
reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by
the defendant. Under California's
determinate sentencing scheme, the
maximum sentence a court can impose
without making additional factual findings is
the middle term.
In this case, the trial court relied on a
number of aggravating factors as the basis
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for imposing the upper term. Even if the
vulnerable victim factor was based on
evidence other than the victim's age, I
believe that Blakely requires a jury finding
of this factor. Similarly, the factors that
appellant engaged in violent conduct
indicating a serious danger to the
community, and the crime involved great
violence and the threat of bodily harm
require a jury finding under Blakely. Finally,
even assuming the evidence shows that
appellant admitted his status as a police
officer, I need not reach the question
whether this is unrelated to the offense, as
appellant contends, because I would remand
the case to the trial court to weigh whether
this factor alone is sufficient to support the
upper term.
United States v. Booker, addressing the
applicability of Blakely to the federal
sentencing guidelines, does not alter my
conclusion. Justice Breyer's majority
opinion severed from the Federal Sentencing
Act its provision that makes the guidelines
mandatory. As a result, the guidelines are
now effectively advisory; their use will not
implicate the Sixth Amendment, leaving a
federal court broad discretion to impose a
sentence within the statutory range assigned
to a particular offense. By the mandatory
language of Penal Code section 1170,
subdivision (b), a California court is
required to impose the middle term, unless it
makes factual findings different from, or in
addition to, those inherent in the jury
verdict.
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"State Sentencing Guidelines Draw U.S. Supreme Court Scrutiny"
Bloomberg. com
February 21, 2006
The U.S. Supreme Court, aiming to clear up
confusion about the rules for criminal
sentencing, agreed to consider whether the
systems in California and other states violate
the constitutional guarantee of a jury trial.
The court today said it will review a
California Supreme Court decision
upholding that state's sentencing system,
under which judges choose from three
possible sentences for each crime. Lawyers
for convicted child molester John
Cunningham say the system lets judges
decide issues that should go before a jury.
California is "continuing every day to
violate the constitutional rights of countless
criminal defendants facing sentencing in its
courts," Cunningham argued in an appeal
filed in Washington.
The dispute may affect thousands of
criminal cases around the country. State
courts are split on the meaning of two recent
U.S. Supreme Court decisions, a 2005 ruling
that invalidated aspects of the federal
sentencing guidelines and a 2004 decision
involving Washington state's system. At
least seven states have since struck down
parts of their own sentencing systems, while
three have said theirs are constitutional.
The Supreme Court rulings say judges can't
increase a maximum possible prison
sentence based on their own factual
conclusions, rather than the findings of a
jury or admissions made by a defendant in a
guilty plea.
Flexibility Touted
California requires judges to choose from
three possible sentences for each crime.
Judges must select the middle term unless
they find aggravating or mitigating
circumstances. The law lays out a non-
exclusive list of factors the judge should
consider.
The law also says judges should consider
those factors based on a preponderance of
the evidence-an easier standard to meet
than the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt test that
applies in trials on guilt.
California Attorney General Bill Lockyer
argued in a court filing that the system is
sufficiently flexible to pass constitutional
muster because judges aren't limited to the
list of sentencing factors set out in the law.
He argued that California judges have
discretion, much as federal judges now do in
the aftermath of the high court's decision last
year.
California judges engage in "the same type
of judicial fact-finding that traditionally has
been part of the sentencing process,"
Lockyer argued, quoting from a California
Supreme Court decision.
Cunningham was sentenced to 16 years, the
longest possible term, for continuous sexual
abuse of his son. A trial judge pointed to the
victim's vulnerability, the especially violent
nature of the crime and other so-called
aggravating factors.
The case is Cunningham v. California, 05-
6551.
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Williams v. Overton
(05-7142)
Ruling Below: (Williams v. Overton, 136 Fed.Appx. 859 (6th Cir. 2005), cert granted 126 S.Ct.
1463 (Mem), 164 L.Ed.2d 246, 74 USLW 3499, 74 USLW 3503 [2006]).
Williams sued prison officials for rejecting his requests for surgery and a single-occupancy cell
to accommodate his handicap. The United States District Court and the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit dismissed his claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, as mandated by
the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, because the defendants named in the suit were not named in
the administrative complaint.
Questions Presented: Whether the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act requires a prisoner to name
a particular defendant in his or her administrative grievance in order to exhaust his or her
administrative remedies as to that defendant and to preserve his or her right to sue them. Also,
whether the PLRA prescribes a "total exhaustion" rule that requires a federal district court to
dismiss a prisoner's federal civil rights complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies
whenever there is a single unexhausted claim, despite the presence of other exhausted claims.
Timothy WILLIAMS
Plaintiff, Appellant,
V.
William OVERTON, et al.,
Defendants, Appellees
United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit.
Decided June 22, 2005.
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
GIBBONS, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff-Appellant Timothy Williams, an
inmate in a Michigan Department of
Corrections (MDOC) facility, filed a pro se
§ 1983 action against several employees of
the MDOC. The district court dismissed
Williams' case without prejudice based on a
finding that Williams had failed to exhaust
all of his administrative remedies as required
by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Williams appeals
that determination.
For the following reasons, we affirm the
judgment of the district court.
I.
Williams is an inmate in the custody of the
MDOC. Appellant has had "noninvoluting
cavernous hemangiomas" in his right arm
since birth. This condition creates the
growth of tumors and results in
disfigurement of his arm.
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Denial of Surgery Claim
In March 2001, Williams submitted to
surgery performed by Khawaja H. Ikram,
D.O., to remove a hemangioma, primarily to
relieve the pain accompanying his condition.
Williams went to K. Nimr Ikram, D.O. in
August 2001 and January 2002 for
consultations. At both consultations, further
surgery to remove hemangiomas and to
straighten his wrist was discussed. On Dr.
Ikram's referral, Williams went to see
Raymond C. Noellert, M.D. in March 2002.
Dr. Noellert concluded that surgery would
be "a fairly extensive undertaking" and even
in the best case scenario, he "would not
expect much in the way of digital flexion
over strength, with the hand largely
functioning as a passive assist." Dr. Noellert
discussed this opinion with Williams, and
authorized the treatment because Williams
"simply cannot stand the hand the way it is."
The Correctional Medical Services ("CMS")
denied authorization of the surgery, stating
that "functional return of hand is not a
known result. Surgery would be cosmetic
and dangerous." On March 26, 2002, this
result was appealed on the grounds that the
''request is for pain relief not to regain
function." The request was again denied,
due to the "hazards" of the surgery and the
"probable futility of it." The result was again
appealed on April 8, 2002 and the CMS
decided to present the case at an upcoming
medical meeting.
Williams completed a Prisoner/Parolee
Grievance Form on June 17, 2002,
complaining that he had requested medical
follow-up care and had not been treated.
Williams failed to specifically name any of
the appellees in the Grievance. The Medical
Services Advisory Committee upheld the
non-approval. Williams appealed this
decision through Steps II and III of the
grievance process, but both appeals were
denied.
Single-Occupancy Cell Accommodation
Claim
On August 13, 2002, Williams requested,
among other accommodations, placement in
a "handicapped accessible single cell" to
accommodate his condition. On August 22,
2002, he filed a Prisoner/Parolee Grievance
Form against Warden Jamrog requesting the
same accommodation. This request was
denied. Williams appealed the denial of
placement in a single cell through Steps II
and III of the grievance process, but his
appeals were denied because he was not
eligible under prison regulations for
placement in a single occupancy cell.
Apparently, at some point Williams was
placed in a single occupancy cell, but was
later removed from the cell because
Williams failed to provide medical
documentation or other evidence that he
qualified for single cell occupancy. After his
removal, Williams filed a Grievance Form
against Deputy Warden of Housing Klee and
Supervisor Peterson. Williams
unsuccessfully appealed the denial of these
grievances through Steps II and III of the
process.
District Court Opinion
Williams filed a pro se § 1983 action against
various members of the MDOC-Appellees
Jamrog, Klee, Markwell, Pass, Peterson and
Overton-claiming that (1) he was denied
the surgical procedure to remove the tumors
in his hand, and (2) he was improperly
denied placement in a single occupancy cell.
Williams claimed a violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, the
Rehabilitation Act, and the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments, seeking injunctive
and monetary relief. In lieu of filing an
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answer, defendants-appellees Jamrog,
Markwell, Pass, Klee, Peterson and Overton
filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) and a motion
for summary judgment pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(b). United States
Magistrate Judge Virginia M. Morgan
reviewed the case and issued a Report and
Recommendation which recommended that
the defendants' motions be granted. The
magistrate judge reached the following
conclusions: (1) the motion to dismiss
should be granted because Williams failed to
name any of the defendants specifically in
his grievances filed regarding his medical
claim, and thus had failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies; (2) defendants
were entitled to summary judgment due to
the fact that Williams failed to present
evidence to support his claim with regard to
the medical procedure; (3) the defendants
were entitled to qualified immunity on
Williams' medical claim; (4) defendants
should be granted summary judgment on
Williams' accommodation claim due to the
"total exhaustion" rule based on Williams'
failure to exhaust his medical claim; (5)
Williams failed to survive the summary
judgment standard with respect to his
accommodation claim pursuant to the ADA,
the Rehabilitation Act, the Eighth or the
Fourteenth Amendments; and (6) defendants
were entitled to qualified immunity on
Williams' accommodation claim.
The district court reviewed the Magistrate
Judge's Report and Recommendation and
dismissed the complaint for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The district court
explicitly failed to address the remainder of
the Magistrate Judge's analysis. Williams
filed a timely appeal from the district court's
order.
II.
This court reviews de novo a district court's
dismissal for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
The district court held that Williams had
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
because although he had filed a grievance
and pursued the appropriate appeals with
regard to the denial of his request for
surgery, he failed to identify any of the
defendants personally, and thus had failed to
exhaust his claim with respect to those
individuals as required by Curry. Applying
the total exhaustion rule, the district court
dismissed Williams' complaint in its
entirety, despite the fact that he appears to
have exhausted his administrative remedies
with respect to the single-occupancy cell
accommodation claim.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires
prisoners who wish to file a civil rights
action regarding the conditions of their
confinement to exhaust all available
administrative remedies prior to filing suit in
federal court. The prisoner bears the burden
of showing that all administrative remedies
have been exhausted by attaching any
decision demonstrating the "administrative
disposition of his complaint." The prisoner
must demonstrate that he has exhausted the
administrative remedies with respect to each
individual he intends to sue.
The exact statutory language of 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a) states:
No action shall be brought with respect to
prison conditions under section 1983 of this
title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner
confined in any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility until such administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted.
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Until fairly recently, there had been a lack of
clear consensus on whether the language of
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) compels total
exhaustion. Recently, however, this court
"definitively answer[ed]" the question of
whether a prisoner's complaint containing
both exhausted and unexhausted claims
must be dismissed under the PLRA in the
affirmative. Pursuant to this circuit's opinion
in Jones Bey, it is now clear that total
exhaustion is required in order for a prisoner
to bring a civil rights action in this court.
Williams has failed to satisfy the
requirement of total exhaustion under the
PLRA, and thus, the district court's
judgment must be affirmed. Williams did
file a grievance based on the denial of
medical treatment, and he appealed the
grievance through Steps II and III of the
grievance process, thus pursuing the claim
through all stages of the process. However,
the grievance failed to specifically name any
of the appellees that Williams has named in
his complaint. Because Williams has failed
to exhaust his claims with respect to
individual appellees, his complaint must be
dismissed under the PLRA. See Burton, 321
F.3d at 574 ("[A] prisoner must
administratively exhaust his or her claim as
to each defendant associated with the
claim.").
With respect to Williams' accommodation
claim, Williams filed a grievance against
specific individuals and appealed the
grievance through Steps II and III of the
process. Thus, it appears that Williams
exhausted his administrative remedies on the
accommodation claim, a conclusion not
contested by the defendants-appellees.
Despite Williams' apparent exhaustion of
this issue, however, Jones Bey requires that
the entire action be dismissed due to
Williams' failure to exhaust his medical
claims.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the
judgment of the district court.
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Walton v. Bouchard
(05-7142)
Case Below: (Walton v. Bouchard, 136 Fed.Appx. 846 (6th Cir. 2005), cert granted 126 S.Ct.
1463 (Mem), 164 L.Ed.2d 246, 74 USLW 3499, 74 USLW 3503 [2006])
Walton sued prison officials for disciplining him in a racially discriminatory manner. The
United Sates District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit dismissed his claims
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, as mandated by the Prisoner Litigation Reform
Act, because only one of the defendants named in the suit were named in the initial
administrative complaint.
Questions Presented: Whether the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act requires a prisoner to name
a particular defendant in his or her administrative grievance in order to exhaust his or her
administrative remedies as to that defendant and to preserve his or her right to sue them. Also,
whether the PLRA prescribes a "total exhaustion" rule that requires a federal district court to
dismiss a prisoner's federal civil rights complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies
whenever there is a single unexhausted claim, despite the presence of other exhausted claims.
John H. WALTON,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
V.
Barbara BOUCHARD, et al.,
Defendants, Appellees
United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit
Decided June 17, 2005
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
SUTTON, Circuit Judge:
John Walton, an inmate at the Alger
Maximum Correctional Facility in
Munising, Michigan, filed this § 1983 action
claiming racial discrimination by several
prison employees. The district court granted
the employees' motions to dismiss on
procedural, not substantive, grounds,
determining that Walton did not exhaust his
administrative remedies as to each defendant
named in the suit in accordance with 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(a). On the basis of §
1997e(a) and this court's recent decision in
Jones Bey v. Johnson, 407 F.3d 801 (6th Cir.
2005), we affirm.
I.
On July 17, 2001, the prison punished
Walton for assaulting a prison officer by
giving him a sanction referred to as an
"upper slot restriction" for an indefinite
period of time. Nearly a year later, in early
April 2002, Walton, an African American,
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filed a prison grievance charging Assistant
Deputy Warden (ADW) Ron Bobo with
racial discrimination for giving him the
indefinite upper slot restriction. Walton
claims that while white prisoners were given
definite upper slot restrictions (30 or 60 days
at most) for similar assaults, he was given an
indefinite restriction. In support of his claim,
he identified a white prisoner who had
received a definite upper slot restriction for
a similar infraction. In Step I of the prison's
grievance process, he charged only Bobo
with responsibility for the incident. The
prison responded to his grievance by stating
that ADW Ken Gearin had placed Walton
on an indefinite upper slot restriction and
that racial discrimination had nothing to do
with Gearin's decision. Such restrictions, the
prison explained, are imposed individually
and one prisoner's restriction does not affect
the discipline that another prisoner receives.
Walton appealed his claim to Step II of the
grievance process, restating his allegations
from Step I and claiming racial
discrimination on the part of "corrupt
administration[ I heads, warden, et[ ] al[.]"
Prisoner Grievance Appeal Form at Step II
(contained in Walton Reply Br. at 14). The
prison responded that Walton had failed to
present any new evidence at Step II and that
its Step I response adequately addressed
Walton's allegations.
Walton appealed to Step III of the grievance
process, the final level of appeal. In addition
to restating his earlier allegations, he
identified an additional white prisoner who
was given a definite upper slot restriction for
misconduct that allegedly paralleled
Walton's misconduct. The prison denied the
Step III appeal, stating that the responses in
Steps I and II adequately addressed Walton's
concerns.
Having obtained no relief in the grievance
process, Walton filed this action under §
1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment
against Warden Barbara Bouchard, ADW
Gearin, ADW Bergh, prison employee
Cathy Bauman, case manager Denise Gerth
and ADW Bobo. In his request for relief, he
asked the court to order the defendants to
remove the upper slot restriction and to
order each of the defendants to pay him up
to $750,000 in compensatory and punitive
damages.
At the time Walton filed this complaint,
several district courts within this circuit had
reached different conclusions about whether
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)
required the dismissal of a prisoner's
complaint if it contained both exhausted and
unexhausted claims. The district court in this
case sided with the total- exhaustion school
of thought and dismissed Walton's
complaint without prejudice for his failure to
exhaust administrative remedies against
each named defendant. Guided by our recent
decision in Jones Bey, we now follow the
same path and affirm.
II.
We give fresh review to a district court's
dismissal of an action for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. Curry v. Scott, 249
F.3d 493, 503 (6th Cir. 2001). Exhaustion of
administrative remedies is mandatory, we
have said, "even if proceeding through the
administrative system would be futile," and
even if the defendant does not raise the
defense. The inmate bears the burden of
establishing that he has exhausted his
administrative remedies.
Under the PLRA, "[n]o action shall be
brought with respect to prison conditions
under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other
Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any
jail, prison, or other correctional facility
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until such administrative remedies as are
available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a) (emphasis added). In view of the
exhaustion provision's reference to "action"
and the PLRA's other reference to "claim,"
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(2), another panel of
this court recently interpreted § 1997e(a) to
"require[ I a complete dismissal of a
prisoner's complaint when that prisoner
alleges both exhausted and unexhausted
claims."
We also have previously held that a prisoner
must "file a grievance against the person he
ultimately seeks to sue." Curry, 249 F.3d at
505. Such a requirement is consistent with
the aims of the PLRA as it gives the prison
administrative system "a chance to deal with
claims against prison personnel before those
complaints reach federal court." And not
only must the prisoner file a grievance with
regard to each defendant, he "must
administratively exhaust his ... claim as to
each defendant associated with the claim."
Burton, 321 F.3d at 574. In order to exhaust
"a claim against a particular defendant, a
prisoner must have alleged mistreatment or
misconduct on the part of the defendant at
Step I of the [Michigan Department of
Corrections] grievance process." ("By
negative implication, we understand these
[Michigan] policies to preclude
administrative exhaustion of a claim against
a prison official if the first allegation of
mistreatment or misconduct on the part of
that official is made at Step II or Step III of
the grievance process.").
Walton has not satisfied these requirements.
He named only ADW Bobo in Step I of his
grievance process, and under our precedent
that is the only claim that we may consider
exhausted. His claims as to all other
defendants remain unexhausted and
accordingly the district court properly
dismissed the entire complaint under Jones
Bey's total-exhaustion requirement.
In his pro se brief on appeal, Walton argues
that by mentioning "corrupt administration[
] heads, warden, et[ ] al[.]" during the
grievance process, he gave any unnamed
party notice of the allegations because the
prison at that point could have determined
which prison employees were involved in
the incident. But Walton's reference to
"corrupt administration[ ] heads, warden, et[
] al[.]" came at Step II of the process, not
Step I-the step at which a prisoner
generally must name each defendant. And in
response to his Step I grievance, the prison
gave Walton all of the information that he
needed to comply with this requirement. Far
from leaving Walton in the dark as to which
prison officials were responsible for his
alleged mistreatment, the prison told him
that ADW Gearin gave him the upper slot
restriction. At that point, Walton was armed
with all of the information that he needed to
file a Step I grievance against ADW
Gearin-and a federal complaint against
Gearin once the claim had been exhausted-
but he simply chose not to follow this route.
Even if we took the view, moreover, that the
prison's acknowledgment that ADW Gearin
was responsible for Walton's upper slot
restriction establishes that Walton
adequately exhausted his claim against
Gearin, it would not establish that Walton
exhausted his claims against the other
defendants by identifying them by name or
position in Step I of the grievance process.
III.
For these reasons, we affirm the district
court's dismissal of Walton's complaint
without prejudice.
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Jones v. Bock
(05-7058)
Case Below: (Jones v. Bock, 135 Fed.Appx. 837 (6th Cir. 2005), cert granted 126 S.Ct. 1462
(Mem), 164 L.Ed.2d 246, 74 USLW 3499, 74 USLW 3503 [2006]).
Jones sued prison officials for ignoring his medical needs. The United Sates District Court and
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit dismissed all his claims for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies, as mandated by the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, because some of
his claims were not exhausted.
Questions Presented: Whether the Total Exhaustion Rule is an affirmative defense, or a bar to
suit. Also, whether failure to exhaust one claim, when other claims are exhausted, should result
in dismissal.
Lorenzo L. JONES,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
V.
Barbara BOCK, Warden, et al.,
Defendants, Appellees
United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit
Decided June 15, 2005
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff-Appellant Lorenzo Jones appeals a
district court order dismissing his action
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
violations of the First, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution. For the reasons that
follow, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
district court.
I. BACKGROUND
On November 14, 2000, Plaintiff-Appellant
Lorenzo Jones sustained serious injuries
from a motor vehicle accident while he was
in custody of the Michigan Department of
Corrections. Jones alleges that after the
accident, various prison officials required
him to complete tasks which aggravated his
injuries. He argues, inter alia, that this action
constituted deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs in violation of the
Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. The defendants sought
dismissal of the complaint based on Jones's
failure to exhaust administrative remedies as
required by the Prison Litigation Reform
Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat.
1321 (1996) ( "PLRA"), codified at various
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sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C. The district
court granted the motion. This appeal
followed.
II. ANALYSIS
The district court did not err in dismissing
the claims against the prison officials based
on Jones's failure to exhaust his
administrative remedies. The PLRA requires
plaintiffs to exhaust all administrative
remedies before bringing an action in federal
court regarding prison conditions. This
Circuit follows the "total exhaustion" rule,
meaning that we must dismiss a complaint
for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies whenever there is a single
unexhausted claim, despite the presence of
other exhausted claims. See Bey v. Johnson,
407 F.3d 801, 806 (6th Cir. 2005) ("We now
join the Tenth and Eighth Circuits in holding
that total exhaustion is required under the
PLRA."). An action is one regarding prison
conditions where it arises under federal law
and concerns, inter alia, the "effects of
actions by government officials on the lives
of persons confined in prison."
This Court has held that in order to meet the
exhaustion requirement of the PLRA, a
prisoner must either attach a copy of his
prison grievance forms to the complaint or
state the nature of the remedies pursued and
the result of each process. Jones stated in his
complaint that he had exhausted his
administrative remedies. However, he
neither attached the grievance forms to his
complaint nor described the remedies he
pursued and the outcome. The fact that the
defendant Later provided evidence that
Jones may have exhausted some of his
claims is irrelevant under the PLRA and
Sixth Circuit precedent. Furthermore, even
if Jones had shown he had exhausted some
of his claims, the district court properly
dismissed the complaint because Jones did
not show that he had exhausted all of his
claims. Accordingly, Jones's prison-
conditions claim was properly dismissed as
he did not comply with the exhaustion
requirement, as defined by this Court's
precedent.
III. CONCLUSION
For the preceding reasons, we AFFIRM the
judgment of the district court.
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"Supreme Court to Hear Inmates' Appeal: High Court Considers Steps Prisoners Must
Take Before Filing Civil Rights Suits"
ABC News
March 6, 2006
Toni Locy
The Supreme Court agreed Monday to
clarify when inmates can file civil rights
lawsuits contesting prison conditions.
Justices will review the cases of three
Michigan inmates whose lawsuits were
dismissed because they had failed to
complete administrative grievance processes
or did not name every prison official they
later tried to sue over prison conditions.
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of
1995, Congress sought to limit lawsuits filed
by inmates over conditions of their
confinement, including such issues as the
quality of medical care and prison food.
The law requires federal judges to ensure
that inmates have completed a prison's
internal complaint process before allowing a
civil rights lawsuit to go forward.
Civil rights lawsuits filed by the three
Michigan inmates Lorenzo Jones, Timothy
Williams and John Walton were dismissed
because the lower courts found the prisoners
had failed in one way or another to follow
the grievance procedures to the letter.
Jones, who suffered serious back injuries in
a car accident while he was in prison
custody, sued because he was assigned a job
that required him to do physical labor.
Williams filed suit because he was denied
surgery on his right arm and hand to remove
disfiguring tumors.
Walton, who is black, alleged he was the
victim of racial discrimination because he
received more severe discipline for
assaulting a corrections officer than white
inmates he said had committed similar acts.
The cases will be consolidated for argument
during the court's next term, which begins in
October.
The cases
Williams
Bouchard,
are Jones v. Bock, 05-7058, and
v. Overton and Walton v.
05-7142.
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Lawrence v. Florida
(05-8820)
Case Below: (Lawrence v. Florida, 421 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2005), cert granted 126 S.Ct. 1625
(Mem), 164 L.Ed.2d 332, 74 USLW 3539, 74 USLW 3542 [2006]).
Lawrence was sentenced to death in Florida State Court for capital murder. The United States
District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus as untimely under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.
Questions Presented: Where a defendant facing death has pending a U.S. Supreme Court
certiorari petition to review the validity of the state's denial of his claims for state post-conviction
relief, does the defendant's application toll the 2244(d)(2) statute of limitations?
Alternatively, does the confusion around the statute of limitations-as evidenced by the split in
the circuits-constitute an "extraordinary circumstance," entitling the diligent defendant to
equitable tolling during the time when his claim is being considered by the U.S. Supreme Court
on certiorari?
Also, do the special circumstance where counsel advising the defendant as to the statute of
limitations was registry counsel-a species of state actor-under the monitoring supervision of
Florida Courts, with a statutory duty to file appropriate motions in a timely manner, constitute an
"extraordinary circumstance" beyond the defendant's control such that the doctrine of equitable
tolling should operate to save his petition?
Gary LAWRENCE,
Petitioner, Appellant,
V.
State of FLORIDA,
Respondent, Appellee
United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit
Aug 26, 2005
[Excerpt: some citations and footnotes omitted]
DUBINA, Circuit Judge:
This is a death penalty case in which the
Certificate of Appealability ("COA")
presents only one issue for our review:
whether the one-year limitations period of
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)(1), bars petitioner Gary Lawrence's
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habeas petition. After reviewing the record,
reading the parties' briefs, and having the
benefit of oral argument, we agree with the
district court that Lawrence's petition was
untimely. Accordingly, we affirm the district
court's order.
BACKGROUND
In March 1995, a Florida jury convicted
Lawrence of one count each of premeditated
murder in the first degree, conspiracy to
commit murder, petit theft, and grand theft
of a motor vehicle. The jury recommended a
death sentence based on the murder
conviction, and the trial court followed the
jury's recommendation and imposed a death
sentence. The Florida Supreme Court
summarized the facts of the murder as
follows:
Shortly after Gary and Brenda Lawrence
were married, they separated, and another
man, Michael Finken, moved in with Brenda
and her two daughters, Stephanie and
Kimberly Pitts, and Stephanie's friend,
Rachel Matin. On the day of the murder,
July 28, 1994, Gary and Michael drove
Brenda to work and then drank beer at a
friend's house. Later, Gary and Michael
picked Brenda up and the three returned to
the friend's house where they drank more
beer. After the three returned to Brenda's
apartment, Gary and Michael argued and
Gary hit Michael when he learned that
Michael had been sleeping with Brenda.
Gary and Michael seemed to resolve their
differences, and Michael fell asleep on the
couch. Gary and Brenda conversed, and
Brenda went through the house collecting
weapons-including a pipe and a baseball
bat. Gary and Brenda told Kimberly and
Rachel that they were "going to knock off
Mike." Gary told Kimberly to "stay in your
bedroom no matter what you hear."
The trial court described what happened
after Gary and Brenda spoke to the girls:
Thereafter, the two girls heard what they
described as a pounding sound. At one
point, Rachel Matin stated that she heard the
victim say, "stop it, if you stop, I'll leave."
She stated that she heard that statement
several times. Kimberly Pitts stated she
heard the victim say, "please don't hit me,
I'm already bleeding." The victim's pleas,
however, were met with more pounding.
Once the pounding stopped, the girls were
required to assist in the clean up and
described to the jury what they observed.
Kimberly stated that much of the victim's
right side of his face was missing and his
chin was knocked over to his ear. Rachel
Matin stated that there was no skin left on
the victim's face and part of his nose was
missing. Apparently the victim was still
alive. Kimberly observed her mother coming
out of the kitchen area with what appeared
to be a dagger and then, although not seeing
the dagger in her hand at the time, observed
her mother make a stabbing motion toward
the victim with something in her hand.
It was at that time when Brenda Lawrence
requested that the girls obtain the assistance
of Chris Wetherbee. Upon his entrance into
the home, Chris Wetherbee observed the
victim's head being caved in, blood all over,
the victim's eyeball protruding
approximately three inches and a mop
handle shoved into the victim's throat.
Wetherbee asked Gary Lawrence, "what's
going on?" At which time the Defendant
responded by pulling out the mop handle
and kicking the victim and making the
statement "this is what's going on."
Immediately after removing the mop handle
from the victim's throat, Wetherbee heard
the victim give approximately three or four
ragged breaths at which time the victim
thereafter stopped breathing and apparently
expired. The Defendant, Gary Lawrence,
told Wetherbee that he had beat him with a
pipe until it bent and then beat him with a
baseball bat.
Chris Wetherbee summarized the victim's
state: "And [he] looked like something off of
one of the real good horror movies." Gary
and Brenda then removed a small amount of
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money from Michael's pockets, wrapped the
body in a shower curtain and placed the
body in Michael's car, and Gary drove to a
secluded area where he set the body afire.
When Gary returned home, he and Brenda
danced.
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed
Lawrence's conviction and sentence. The
United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari review on January 20, 1998.
Lawrence sought state post-conviction
relief, and the trial court denied the petition
on October 11, 2000. The Florida Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court's denial of
state post-conviction relief. The United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari
review of the Florida Supreme Court's
denial of post-conviction relief.
Lawrence then moved to federal court
seeking habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 2254. The filing of his March 11, 2003,
federal pro se petition sparked an unusual
procedural journey. After filing an amended
habeas petition, the State responded that the
district court should dismiss the petition
because Lawrence was time-barred from
obtaining federal habeas relief on either the
original petition or the amended petition.
The State also argued that equitable tolling
should not apply in Lawrence's case.
Lawrence opposed the dismissal on the basis
that there was a disagreement among the
courts of appeal on the question whether a
petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme
Court following the denial of state post-
conviction relief tolls the limitation period.
Lawrence sought to invoke the doctrine of
equitable tolling on the grounds that it was
appropriate because (1) counsel who advised
him of the timing of his petition was
selected by and pre-qualified by the State of
Florida under its registry statute; (2) his
mental abilities prevented him from
meaningfully participating in a relationship
with his counsel; and (3) he had a facially
strong constitutional claim.
On April 12, 2004, the district court entered
an order staying the proceedings. The court
determined that whether Lawrence's petition
was time-barred "depends upon whether the
one-year limitations period was tolled
during the pendency of Petitioner's petition
for writ of certiorari in the United States
Supreme Court challenging the state court's
denial of his motion for state collateral
review." The court noted that there was a
circuit split on the issue, although Eleventh
Circuit precedent clearly stated that the
limitations period was not tolled during the
pendency of a petition for certiorari
challenging the state court's denial of post-
conviction relief. On the question of
equitable tolling, the district court found that
Lawrence had not met the prerequisites to
equitable tolling. However, in light of the
pending certiorari petition in Abela v.
Martin, which held contrary to this circuit's
decision in Coates, the district court entered
an order staying the proceedings. The
district court noted that if the Supreme Court
denied review in Abela, then it would
dismiss Lawrence's petition based on
Coates.
Subsequently, on May 27, 2004, after the
Supreme Court denied review in Caruso v.
Abela, the district court noted in an order
that Lawrence's petition was time-barred
based on Coates. However, the court did not
enter an order dismissing the petition
because the State had lodged an appeal from
the district court's stay order. After this court
dismissed the State's appeal from the stay
order for lack of jurisdiction, the district
court entered the order dismissing the
petition. Lawrence filed a motion for a
COA, which the district court granted. The
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district court set forth the issue in the COA
as "whether the one-year limitations period
applicable to a petition for writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 barred this
petition, and on the legal issue whether the
statute of limitations is tolled during the
pendency of a petition for writ of certiorari
in the United States Supreme Court
challenging the state court's denial of
petitioner's earlier motion for state collateral
review."
DISCUSSION
The only issue presented in the COA is
whether the one-year limitations period
under AEDPA bars Lawrence's habeas
petition. After needless delay, the district
court determined that Lawrence's petition
was untimely. "The district court's
interpretation and application of a statute of
limitations is a question of law that is
subject to de novo review." We also review
de novo the district court's legal decision on
equitable tolling. However, we will reverse
the district court's factual determinations
only if they are clearly erroneous. The
district court's finding whether a party was
diligent in ascertaining the federal habeas
filing deadline is a finding of fact.
We begin our discussion by setting forth the
limited circumstance under which a court
may issue a COA. The right to appeal is
governed by the COA requirements set forth
in 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c):
(c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues
a certificate of appealability, an appeal may
not be taken to the court of appeals from-
(A) the final order in a habeas corpus
proceeding in which the detention
complained of arises out of process issued
by a State court; or
(B) the final order in a proceeding under
section 2255.
(2) A certificate of appealability may issue
under paragraph (1) only if the applicant has
made a substantial showing of the denial of
a constitutional right.
(3) The certificate of appealability under
paragraph (1) shall indicate which specific
issue or issues satisfy the showing required
by paragraph (2).
Under this limited provision, if a district
court denies a habeas petition on procedural
grounds without reaching the petitioner's
underlying constitutional claims, a COA
should issue only if the petitioner shows
"that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the petition states a valid
claim of the denial of a constitutional right,
and that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the district court was
correct in its procedural ruling." "[B]oth
showings [must] be made before the court of
appeals may entertain the appeal." If the
procedural bar is obvious and the district
court correctly invoked it to dispose of the
case, "a reasonable jurist could not conclude
either that the district court erred in
dismissing the petition or that the petitioner
should be allowed to proceed further." The
court may first resolve the issue whose
answer is more apparent from the record and
the arguments. "The recognition that the
court will not pass upon a constitutional
question although properly presented by the
record, if there is also present some other
ground upon which the case may be
disposed of, allows and encourages the court
to first resolve procedural issues."
Because of the statutory constraint in issuing
a COA, we are puzzled by the district court's
issuance of a COA in this case. The district
court should not have issued a COA on the
statute of limitations issue because binding
circuit precedent clearly disposed of the
issue. "[T]he time during which a petition
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for writ of certiorari is pending, or could
have been filed, following the denial of
collateral relief in the state courts, is not to
be subtracted from the running of time for
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) statute of limitations
purposes." On that basis, jurists of reason
would not find the timeliness issue debatable
in this circuit. Thus, a COA should not have
issued.
However, the district court did issue a COA
on the statute of limitations issue. Although
the COA does not specifically state that the
exceptions to the statute of limitations-
State impediment and equitable tolling-are
included within the COA, Lawrence
contends that these exceptions are subsumed
within the COA and properly before this
court for consideration. We agree. To decide
whether the statute of limitations bars
Lawrence's federal habeas petition, we must
consider whether a State impediment or
equitable tolling excepts the one-year filing
deadline. If Lawrence can demonstrate that a
State impediment prevented him from
timely filing or that equitable tolling applies
to his case, then his petition is timely.
Lawrence contends that 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)(1)(B) applies to his case because
the State caused an impediment to his timely
filing by providing him with an incompetent
attorney through the Florida counsel registry
system. It is not clear, however, that
Lawrence asserted a § 2244(d)(1)(B)
impediment to the district court. We
generally do not consider an issue that was
not raised in the district court. Assuming
Lawrence presented this issue to the district
court, we conclude that Lawrence's assertion
that the State impeded him from timely
filing by providing an incompetent attorney
to assist him after setting up a State registry
system to monitor attorney performance, is
meritless. This is not the type of State
impediment envisioned in § 2244(d)(1)(B).
Additionally, Lawrence cannot show that
there are extraordinary circumstances
present in his case to warrant the application
of equitable tolling. "Equitable tolling is an
extraordinary remedy which is typically
applied sparingly." It is available "when a
movant untimely files because of
extraordinary circumstances that are both
beyond his control and unavoidable even
with diligence." Equitable tolling is limited
to rare and exceptional circumstances, such
as when the State's conduct prevents the
petitioner from timely filing.
Making the most of a novel argument,
Lawrence posits that the State's provision to
him of an incompetent attorney justifies the
imposition of equitable tolling. This is not
an extraordinary circumstance that warrants
the application of equitable tolling.
Moreover, we have stated on numerous
occasions that "attorney negligence is not a
basis for equitable tolling, especially when
the petitioner cannot establish his own
diligence in ascertaining the federal habeas
filing deadline."
Lawrence also contends that his mental
incapacity prevented him from timely filing
and justifies the invocation of equitable
tolling. However, Lawrence cannot establish
a causal connection between his alleged
mental incapacity and his ability to file a
timely petition. Lawrence admits in his
appellate brief that medical reports state that
his full scale IQ is 81, and he admits that he
did not make the assertion that he was
mentally incompetent per se. Instead,
Lawrence claims that his initial pleading
made it clear that he has suffered from
mental impairments his entire life. However,
this contention, without more, is insufficient
to justify equitable tolling.
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CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, we affirm the
district court's order dismissing Lawrence's
habeas petition as untimely.
AFFIRMED.
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"On the Docket: Lawrence, Gary v. Florida"
Medill News Service
March 28, 2006
Amy Held
Congress established the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act in 1996 after
the Oklahoma City bombings, in part to fund
anti-terrorism efforts but also with an eye on
victims' rights in limiting the appeals
process open to death-row inmates.
The Act significantly hampers death row
inmates' ability to apply for habeas relief, a
written petition stating the prisoner has been
wrongly imprisoned.
The AEDPA bars federal courts from
considering any petition for habeas corpus
unless the state court has "unreasonably"
interpreted some portion of the constitution
in finding the prisoner guilty.
The Act seeks to ensure "justice for victims
and an effective death penalty," according to
the text of the bill. It carries a one-year
statute of limitations on habeas appeals in
federal court.
Eleven years after his murder conviction and
on his third try, Gary Lawrence, a Florida
man, will have his case heard by the U.S.
Supreme Court on the statute of limitations
question.
On July 28, 1994, Lawrence bludgeoned
Michael Finken to death with a pipe and
baseball bat before setting his body ablaze in
Santa Rosa County, Florida.
Lawrence was seeking revenge on the
sleeping man for having an affair with his
estranged wife. Lawrence's two young
daughters witnessed the gruesome murder.
A jury convicted Lawrence of first-degree
murder in March 1995 and recommended
the death penalty. The Florida Supreme
Court affirmed the sentence in August 1997.
After unsuccessfully appealing his sentence
twice, on March 11, 2003, Lawrence sought
habeas relief in federal court, but lawyers for
the state argued that his claim should be
dismissed because he had already exceeded
the time limit on both his original and
amended petition based on the AEDPA
provision.
Lawrence argued that equitable tolling, or a
suspension of the petition's time limitation,
should apply in his case because his state-
appointed counsel decided when to file the
petition. Lawrence said that even though he
exceeded the time limit in the AEDPA, the
state itself should be held accountable.
Not only did Lawrence argue that his
attorney, John Miller, did not meet his duties
as effective counsel but their relationship
was also encumbered by the convicted
murderer's mental deficiencies which
prevented him from fully communicating
with Miller.
On May 27, 2004, the district court noted
that Lawrence's petition for habeas relief
was indeed invalidated by exceeded the
allotted time but issued him a certificate of
appealability. Lawrence appealed to the 11th
Circuit Court of Appeals.
On Aug. 26, 2005, the 11th Circuit said it
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only grants equitable tolling for
"extraordinary circumstances that are both
beyond (petitioner's) control and
unavoidable even with diligence."
According to the court, Lawrence did not
meet these criteria, despite his assertion that
the state granted him an incompetent
attorney.
The 11th Circuit stated that Lawrence could
demonstrate no causal relationship between
his mental shortcomings and his ability to
file a timely petition, and thus his claim was
invalidated. The appeals court stated further
that the district court was wrong to grant
him a certificate of appealability, but
acknowledged a disparity among the federal
circuits in how the time limit is applied.
Lawrence appealed and on March 27, 2006,
the U.S. Supreme Court accepted the case
for review and allowed Lawrence to have his
case heard without cost.
One of the issues to be considered by the
Court is from what date, exactly, the one-
year statute of limitations for death penalty
appeals should derive. The Court is being
asked to decide whether it should begin
when the court of appeals affirms the
District Court's conviction and sentence, or
from the deadline for filing a petition with
the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Act allows for one year for federal
appeals and any additional time the case
may be pending on state post conviction
review, but Lawrence is asking the Supreme
Court to decide whether this means only the
time pending in state court or includes the
time the convicted murderer asked the
Supreme Court to take the case, according to
Kent Scheidegger, Legal Director of the
California-based Criminal Justice Legal
Foundation.
Scheidegger said that before the Act's
introduction in 1996 the appeals process
took about 12 years from the time of
sentencing to execution and that the process
still takes about 12 years today. He said,
however, that the appeals process was
"steadily increasing" before the Act took
effect, so at the least it has stopped the
process from becoming ever-lengthier.
The Act states that this "reform will help
avoid the waste of state and federal
resources that now result when a prisoner
presenting a hopeless petition to a federal
court is sent back to the state courts to
exhaust state remedies."
"As a whole the act has caused the time to
level off and stop increasing but has not
decreased as much as proponents would
like," Scheidegger said.
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"Floridian Sentenced in Iowan's Death"
Omaha World Herald (Nebraska)
May 7, 1995
Stephen Buttry
A Florida man has been sentenced to die in
the electric chair for torturing and fatally
beating his wife's lover, a Council Bluffs
man who was planning to return to Iowa the
next day.
Circuit Judge Paul Rasmussen cited the
"torturous process" used to kill Michael
Dean Finken, 37, as an aggravating factor to
justify the death sentence Friday of Gary
Lawrence, 37, of Milton, Fla.
Finken's father, Francis Finken of Council
Bluffs, said he wired $ 200 to his son the
day he was killed. "He was coming back
home, supposed to leave the next day," the
elder Finken said.
Lawrence beat Finken with an aluminum
baseball bat at the Lawrences' home and
rammed a mop handle down the victim's
throat. His body was burned beyond
recognition and left on a nearby country
road where it was found last July 29.
Lawrence's wife, Brenda, 34, was sentenced
last week to life in prison after she was
convicted of being a principal to murder.
The Lawrences' three children testified at
the couple's trials, along with Francis
Finken. "I was there for his whole trial,"
Finken's father said. "Their mother was the
one that said, 'Let's get rid of Mike. ' " The
children had been asleep on a couch and
begged Lawrence to stop hitting Finken.
"The victim, having been beaten, not able to
feel his legs, and then beaten again, must
have surely realized his death was
imminent," Rasmussen said.
The Lawrences made their children get rid
of the weapons used to torture and kill
Finken, his father said.
Finken's brother Rick, also of Council
Bluffs, said his brother had been living with
a woman in Billings, Mont., and had a 6-
year-old daughter, Maria. He returned last
year to Council Bluffs for a few months.
A cousin who was a carpenter visited the
family in Council Bluffs. After the visit,
Michael Finken gave the cousin a ride to his
home in Florida and "just stayed on for a
while," Rick Finken said.
Finken was killed when Lawrence
discovered he had been sleeping with his
wife. "They all went out and got drunk that
day," Francis Finken said.
Michael Finken held a variety of jobs,
including working for a lawn service and
doing carpentry odd jobs and small roofing
jobs, his brother said. "He was kind of a jack
of all trades." He attended Abraham Lincoln
High School and obtained a high school
equivalency certificate through the school,
Rick Finken said.
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